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Enlisting Institutional Investors in Environmental
Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical
Perspectives
Benjamin J. Richardson*

I. Introduction
This Article investigates the role of private financial
organizations in environmental policy and argues that the
effectiveness of environmental regulation may be enhanced when
it can encourage institutional investors to take account of the
environmental effects of their decisions. Through a combination of
incentive, informational, and regulatory mechanisms, governments
can mobilize institutional investors to support environmental
policy by providing a means of transmitting and amplifying
primary regulatory controls through the market. Environmental
policymakers and academic commentators are becoming interested
in institutional investors, and other financial organizations, such as
banks, due to growing concerns that traditional command
techniques of environmental law are reaching the limits of their
design capabilities. Nonetheless, institutional investors face some
structural limitations on their ability to address environmental
matters. They are, thus, likely to complement and enhance, rather
than supplant, conventional environmental controls.
Interest in enlisting financial organizations as instruments of
environmental governance should be seen in the context of debates
regarding policy-instrument choices to promote sustainable
development. Over the past decade, "sustainable development"
has emerged in many countries as the primary goal of
environmental law.' The principles of sustainability, as defined in
* School of Law, University of Manchester, U.K. B.A./L.L.B. (Hons) Macquarie
University; Ph.D. Australian National University. Formerly at the New Zealand Centre
for Environmental Law, University of Auckland.
IThe literature is now voluminous: see, e.g., J.G. Frazier, Sustainable
Development: Modern Elixir or Sack Dress?, 24(2) ENVTL. CONSERVATION 182 (1997);
Andrew D. Basiago, Methods of Defining Sustainability, 3 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 109
(1995).
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international laws and policies and among scientific and academic
institutions, define economic prosperity as dependent on
environmental integrity. The sustainable development ideal seeks
to mediate or integrate the otherwise incongruous imperatives of,
on the one hand, the unrestrained economic exploitation of
resources and, on the other hand, the reality that all life hinges on
the conservation of healthy ecosystems. A seminal feature of
sustainability is the principle of integrating environmental and
economic issues in decision-making. 2 This integration requires the
embedding of ecological concerns in both government and marketdecision processes.'
Policy reformers and scholars are devoting more attention to
the possibility of new regulatory partnerships between the state
and the private sector and greater use of economic instruments for
motivating and financing sustainable development.4 Rather than
merely reacting to the market, the state could be engineering
changes that guide and reorient businesses more positively toward
the environment. The challenge posed by environmental
degradation requires new approaches to regulation that, whilst
using the incentive effects of economic instruments such as ecotaxes and tradeable emission allowances, also specifically targets
the behavior of market organizations from which environmental
problems often germinate. Effective environmental regulation
may reside in embedding environmental responsibilities in those
macro-market organizations that play a pivotal role in influencing
the environmental activities of individual enterprises and industry
sectors. Reforming the financial sector so that it enhances the
prospects for sustainable development raises fundamental
questions regarding the organization of environmental governance.
This Article investigates the relevance of institutional investors
to sustainable development and considers how government
regulation could be adjusted to best facilitate the environmental
role of this sector. The focus of this Article is on institutional
2 See Denise Church, Institutional Issues for Sustainability: Entering the New
Millennium, 3 N.Z. J. ENVTL. L. 159 (1999); John C. Dernbach, Sustainable
Development as a Frameworkfor National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,
51-58 (1998).
3 Dernbach, supra note 2.
4 See, e.g., Peter N. Grabosky, Green Markets: Environmental Regulation by the
Private Sector, 16 LAW & POL'Y 419 (1994).
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investors, such as pension funds and life insurance companies,
which dominate equity markets in many Western countries.5 This
article begins with an exploration of the theoretical foundations for
sharing environmental governance with financial organizations,
including the relevance of environmental policy to the financial
services sector and how regulation can be construed in relation to
this sector. The Article's next two parts canvass the role of
institutional investors in environmental governance as a key
example of the financial services sector's potential. This section
also analyzes the workings of capital markets and suggests
reforms to enhance long-term investment and promote corporate
environmental impacts as an efficient and effective means by
which unsustainable development is deterred.
The final part explores additional legal and policy reforms
necessary to provide a proper setting for enlisting financial
organizations in environmental policy. It focuses on the role that
improved environmental disclosure requirements have for
businesses, corporate environmental management systems, and
economic instruments. This Article explores these themes from a
comparative and theoretical perspective, canvassing developments
in Europe and North America in particular. Though not based on
new empirical case studies, it surveys and collates existing
research and practices. Finally, the Article advances some
theoretical propositions and recommends some reforms in relation
to ethical investment trends.
II. Sharing Environmental Governance
A. Concepts of Governance
Scholars and policymakers are increasingly interested in how
institutions of public governance can be redesigned to draw on the
skills and resources of third parties and to internalize compliance
cultures within regulatees. Theories of "governmentality, ''6 "self-

5 This article acknowledges that there are other institutions in financial markets
relevant to environmental regulation, most notably banks.
6 See Peter Miller & Nikolas Rose, Governing Economic Life, 19 EcON. & SoC'y
1(1990).
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organization," 7 and "reflexive regulation"8 reflect this burgeoning
interest in state-market partnerships. Views of governance framed
in terms of liberalist public versus private mechanisms, central
planning versus privatization, and so on, are seen as increasingly
inaccurate and unhelpful. Complementing this shift has been a
change in understanding the nature of authority and the role of
social norms and private institutions in performing regulatory-type
functions.9 The definition and scope of regulation has long been a
contested issue among scholars and policymakers, ° but they
increasingly accept a wider concept of regulation encompassing a
broad range of actions and institutions.
Regulatory theorists emphasize that regulators operate
increasingly in a pluralistic setting where effective governance
involves flexible, collaborative mechanisms in which state
functions are shared with, or devolved to, private interests."
Osborne and Gaebler favor governments using their leverage to
facilitate rather than command so that governments "steer" the
private sector toward public-policy objectives. 2 Rose and Miller
characterize this as "governing at a distance."' 3 Whilst we cannot
ignore the role of government, governance differs from the role of
organizations and their rules. Instead of direct government control,
governance may involve a combination of rules, incentives and
discursive processes by which the state seeks to steer and
coordinate the non-government sector.' 4 According to Freeman,
7 See generally NIKLAS
Jr. trans., 1989).

LUHMANN, ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION

(John Bednarz,

8 See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne Bankowska &

Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
9 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).

10 Mel Dunick and Alan R. Gitelson have referred to the plurality of definitions of
regulation as a conceptual "quagmire." Mel Dubnick & Alan R. Gitelson, Regulatory
Policy Analysis: Working in a Quagmire, 1 POL'Y STUD. REV. 423, 423 (1990).
11 See Martin Rein, The Social Structure of Institutions: Neither Public Nor
Private, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 49 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred
J. Kahn eds., 1989); JAMES Q. WILSON, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 357(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
12 DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: How THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 34-37 (1992).
13 Nikolas Rose & Peter Miller, PoliticalPower Beyond the State: Problematicsof
Government, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 173, 173 (1992).
14 See Gerry Stoker, Governance as Theory: Five Propositions,50 INT'L SOC. SCI.
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governance is increasingly shared through a process of "negotiated
relationships" between the government and private stakeholders. 5
Freeman rejects the public/private dichotomy inherent in many
theoretical views of the state and argues that in reality governance
tends to -be "dynamic, non-hierarchical, and decentralized,
'6
envisioning give and take among public and private actors."'
Salamon argues that the defining feature of the emerging
approaches to "third-party government" is the "massive
proliferation.., in the tools of public action," such as tax,
insurance, loans, contracts, and regulation. 7 He suggests,
[s]uch an approach is necessary because problems have become
too complex for government to handle on -its own, because
disagreements exist about the proper ends of public action, and
because government increasingly lacks the authority to enforce
its will on other crucial
actors without giving them a meaningful
8
seat at the table.1

There is a wide range of processes by which governance may
be modulated through private institutions. 9 Sometimes third
parties may be directly conscripted, as when the government
requires banks to report suspicious transactions and imposes
obligations on businesses to undertake revenue collection for the
state. 20 Alternatively, governments may compel companies to use
private institutions, as when firms are required to have their
environmental performance assessed and certified by private
auditors and to carry environmental liability insurance.2' Such
delegation and assignment of regulatory roles to auditors,
accountants, and other professions can be useful when they can
J. 17 (1998); R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government, 44
POL. STUD. 652 (1996).
15 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
548 (2000).
16 Id.at 571.
17

Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An

Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1611, 1612-13 (2001).
18 Id. at 1623.
19

The following discussion draws upon Peter N. Grabosky,

Using Non-

Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance, 8 GOVERNANCE 527, 530-36

(1995).
20 Id. at 530.
21 Id. at 530-31.
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develop appropriate regulatory standards and undertake effective
supervision on behalf of the state. Obligations to assemble and
disclose environmental performance information can also facilitate
governance by informing markets and other institutions about the
nature and effects of corporate operations. Apart from information
techniques, incentives can support regulatory partnerships with the
private sector - for instance, taxation benefits and regulatory relief
to enterprises that agree to adopt approved environmental
management systems and participate in alternative compliance
programs.22
A shift towards shared governance, however, is not without
various challenges and potential hazards for the state. Risks range
from policy incoherence, if the state is unable strategically to
direct decision-making, to complete policy failures, if private
institutions capture and distort regulatory programs. Rhodes
cautions that absent effective systems of democratic supervision, if
decisions are largely removed from the traditional governmental23
apparatus, new governance networks may reduce accountability.
Implementation failures can arise because of conflicts of interest
among participating private institutions as well as market failures
due to factors such as imperfect information and insufficient
competitive pressures. 24 Governance failures may also result from
private interests capturing the policy process. According to
Hancher and Moran, in corporatist forms of interest intermediation
characteristic of shared regulatory spaces, regulatory norms tend
to result from brokerage and negotiation processes.2 ' Hancher and
Moran predict that organizations likely to dominate regulatory
spaces are large, hierarchically-organized entities.26
Careful design of monitoring and oversight mechanisms is
needed to ensure the state is able to track and verify
implementation of policy goals and ensure governance systems are
22

Id. at 534-35

23

R.A.W:

RHODES,

UNDERSTANDING

GOVERNANCE:

GOVERNANCE, REFLEXIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

POLICY

NETWORKS,

54 (1997); see also Grabosky, supra

note 19, at 538.
24 Grabosky, supra note 19, at 538-41.
25

Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran, OrganizingRegulatory Space, in CAPITALISM,
271 (Leigh Hancher & Michael Moran eds.,

CULTURE AND ECONOMIC REGULATION

1989).
26

Id. at 286-87.
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democratically nourished. Grabosky sees the challenge as one of
"meta-monitoring," by which government agencies focus on
"strategic surveillance" and "monitor[] the overall regulatory
system" but engage in "authoritative intervention" where thirdparty resources are lacking.27 Even without proactive intervention,
regulatory partnerships with the private sector may disguise strong
state control over the policy process. Bennett argues that if power
is understood as the capacity to convince others to adjust their
behavior in accordance with the principal's wishes, then
enlistment of others by the state can be understood as an aspect of
the exercise of power.28 Moreover, power may accrue from the
very process of enlistment.
Today, considerable evidence of shared regulatory spaces
involving the private provision of regulation exists. The trend is
toward increasing reliance on private systems of governance
through the contracting out of public-sector service provisions.29
Private organizations, thus, may furnish social services such as
health care and undertake local government responsibilities
including waste collection and street repair.3" Private organizations
are also increasingly involved in monitoring and enforcing
compliance with public regulatory standards. 3' The contractual
relationship between financial institutions and their customers has
long been subject to regulation in the name of consumer protection
and fraud control.32 Harnessing private entities in compliance
control is justified by the often greater technical expertise held by
private bodies and the prospect that some additional control will
result, albeit perhaps, outside of direct political scrutiny.
Participation of market institutions in the design of regulatory
processes helps ensure that regulation is tailored to the
institutional contexts in which it is intended to apply. This
27

Grabosky, supra note 19, at 543-44.

Paul Bennett, Environmental Governance and PrivateActors: EnrollingInsurers
in InternationalMaritime Regulation, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 875, 878 (2000).
28

29 KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION,

CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 56-58 (1995).
30 JOHN D. DONAHUE,

THE PRIVATIZATION

DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS,

PRIVATE

MEANS 132 (1989).
31

See

LESTER M.

SALAMON,

PARTNERS

IN PUBLIC SERVICE:

NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE

(1995).

32 See ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 153 (1997).

GOVERNMENT-
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participation also gives non-governmental interests a stake in the
success of regulation. However, the private role in all these
processes has rarely displaced the regulator's formal role as
authoritative decision-maker.33
B. Sharing Responsibilityfor EnvironmentalPolicy
Arguments for more pluralistic, shared regulatory regimes are
particularly pertinent to environmental policy. 34 At a meta-policy
level, the achievement of an ecologically sustainable future
involves both rejecting the boundaries between economic and
environmental policymaking and fusing new regulatory
partnerships in which the linkages between economic decisionmaking and ecological health can be drawn. The principle of
integration of environmental and developmental policy is one of
the pillars of sustainable development; yet, in many countries,
prevailing systems of government tend to fragment and disconnect
relevant issues and actors. 35 A new model of a more open and
flexible governance involving different institutions must be
designed to accommodate the complex conditions of late
capitalism, where economic activity transcends the domain of
traditional, administratively-defined responsibilities, and corporate
entities wield resources and influence that defy the web of
command regulation. The ideal of a wholly discrete system of
environmental law is anachronistic given pressures to diffuse and
embed ecological considerations throughout aspects of social and
economic governance that influence environmental conditions.36
For the state, an environmental law diaspora requires a "whole of
government" approach encompassing, for instance, the greening of
government budgets, ecological tax reforms, adoption of
sustainability indicators, and the introduction of environmental
33 Freeman, supra note 15, at 637.
34 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 132-34

(1998).

35 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENT AND

ECONOMY: PROGRESS IN THE 1990s (1996); Bringing our Needs and Responsibilities

Together-Integrating Environmental Issues with Economic Policy: Communication
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2000) 576.
36 Tim Jewell & Jenny Steele, Law in Environmental Decision-Making, in LAW IN
ENVIRONMENTAL

DECISION-MAKING.

NATIONAL,

EUROPEAN

PERSPECTIVES 1, 7-9 (Tim Jewell & Jenny Steele eds., 1998).

AND

INTERNATIONAL
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costs in national accounts.3" The development of "green ministers"
networks, environmental reporting by all government departments,
and special cabinet environmental committees are mechanisms by
which some governments are attempting to ensure cross-sectoral
integration of environmental policy.38 The greening of public
purchasing policies and improvements in actual public sector
operations that use environmental resources are also necessary.39
For the market, effective diffusion of environmental policy is
likely to require a combination of mechanisms that revolve around
using economic instruments and financial organizations. Whilst
sanctions should retain a role primarily as regulatory threats or
front-line controls in relation to environmental activities too
dangerous or contentious for market implementation, incentive
and information-based processes are likely to be more popular
instruments for facilitating state-market partnerships. Discourses
and procedures that guide, rather than force, behavior are
important elements in the successful enrollment of market
institutions in governance. Emerging discussions regarding
"corporate environmentalism" and "ethical investment" are
increasingly important in changing the underlying culture of
market institutions and encouraging actors to reflect on, and be
more self-aware about, their ability to contribute positively to
environmental policy.4" These discourses share an orientation
toward mobilizing market institutions as a means of public policy

37 Among current reforms, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV.,
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES AND GREEN TAX REFORM (1997); ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: INDICATORS TO MEASURE
PROGRESS (2000).
38 See, e.g., Derek Osborn, Some Reflections on U.K. Environment Policy, 19701995, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 21 (1997); see also Andrea Ross, Greening Government-Tales
from the New Sustainability Watchdog, 12 J. ENVTL. L. 175 (2000).
39 J. Cinq-Mars, A New Policy Tool for the Environment: Green Public Purchasing
in the OECD, Speech Before the Green Procurement in Government Conference (July
11,
1997), http://www.sustainable-development.gov.uk/sdig/improving/zpartf/qe2/
qe2mars.htm (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
40 See, e.g., JOHN ELKINGTON & TOM BURKE, THE GREEN CAPITALISTS: HOW

INDUSTRY CAN MAKE MONEY-AND PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT (1989); MALCOM
MCINTOSH, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE

COMPANIES (1998); Peter Christoff, Ecological Modernisation, EcologicalModernities 5
ENVTL. POL. 476 (1996).
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and provide an emerging normative framework for shared
environmental governance.
When regulation addresses the organizational and procedural
structures of economic entities that shape their decision-making
culture, it may assist discursive practices."' Teubner and other
proponents of "reflexive" forms of law have advocated the
extension of mechanisms that serve to stimulate desired behavior
within regulated institutions, producing an enhanced sensitivity to
public policy objectives and a readiness to reflect and adjust
organizational policies and procedures accordingly.42 This
approach to governance involves making private organizational
fields internally and externally more visible for management and
policy purposes. Because of the existence of significant functional
differentiation in our social systems, it has been argued that
mechanisms to promote corporate social responsibility need to
operate at the level of the specific subsystems because uniform
normative structures would not succeed.43
Luhmann has argued that subsystems in functionally
differentiated complex societies could be integrated only by
creating decentralized and reflective structures, rather than central
regulation by means of substantive norms.44 Similarly, in rejecting
regulatory compulsion for promoting corporate social
responsibility, Teubner argues the role of law should be to
stimulate indirectly the controlling internal organizational
structures of companies: "[t]he role of law then is not the external
control of the firm's conduct, but external mobilization of internal
self-control resources., 45 Teubner believes that corporations are
more likely to be sensitive to the external effects of their
operations through procedural standards and organizational
See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L.
& Soc. REV. 239, 275 (1983).
42 See id.; Helmut Willke, Societal Guidance Through Law?, in STATE, LAW AND
41

ECONOMY

AS AUTOPOIETIC

SYSTEMS:

REGULATION

AND

AUTONOMY

IN A

NEW

353 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1992).
Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Their Beneficiaries, in

PERSPECTIVE
43

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

AND

DIRECTORS'

LIABILITIES:

LEGAL,

SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985).
44 LUHMANN, supra note 7.
45 Teubner, supra note 43, at 160.

ECONOMIC AND

149, 162 (Klaus J.
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devices, rather than imposition of substantive standards of
fiduciary responsibilities.46 Requirements to disclose, inform, and
consult with outside social and environmental interests may help
stimulate the social responsibility of economic enterprises.47 These
are decentralized integrative mechanisms that, by encouraging
consideration of the impacts of the regulatee's activities, serve to
link the economic activities of corporations with their noneconomic environment.48
Enhanced understanding of the connections between
environmental and financial risk is likely to be one of the most
salient consequences of regulatory moves to stimulate greater
environmental awareness within the financial services sector. But
in order to encourage deeper reflection within market institutions,
it is important that environmental and ethical concerns be
translated and presented in a style relevant to prevailing financial
institutional analysis. Requirements for improved corporate
disclosure of environmental risk are emerging as a key means for
facilitating
this awareness. 49 Reporting,
auditing,
and
environmental management system methodologies can render the
behavior of corporations more transparent and open to reflection,
learning, and modification of operations.5" Repetto and Austin
suggest
[u]nless environmental issues are dealt with inside the
corporation in ways similar to those used to manage other
business risks and opportunities, environmental control in such
industries will remain an internal regulatory function
superimposed on the company's core business concerns rather
than part of the process of maximizing shareholder value. 5'
In addition to discursive and informational mechanisms,
economic instruments are likely to become an important feature of

46 See id.
47 See id. at 166-72.
48 See id. at 160-64.
49 See CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS: U.S.

AND EUROPEAN LAW (Michael S. Baram & Daniel G. Partan eds., 1990).
50 See Teubner, supra note 43, at 166.
51 ROBERT

REPETTO

&

DUNCAN

AUSTIN,

IMPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 1

PURE

(2000).

PROFIT:

THE

FINANCIAL
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future environmental governance systems.12 The problem to be
addressed, according to the European Commission's most recent
environmental action program, is that "[c]ompanies that fail to
meet legislative environmental requirements are penalised. Yet,
those that go beyond are usually not rewarded neither by
government nor, often, in the marketplace." 3 Indeed, the effective
enrollment of financial organizations in such systems is likely to
depend substantially upon the concomitant existence of economic
instruments for conveying the appropriate pricing signals to
corporate managers.54
Today, in most countries, the market rather than the state is the
dominant forum for the distribution of development resources.
Although it is politically and economically unfeasible for
governments to become directly involved in wholesale decisions
of the market regarding allocation of investment resources, the
market must nevertheless be reoriented by the state along
sustainable lines. Substantial literature in economic theory
suggests that serious market failures occur when the market fails
to incorporate resource depletion and pollution impacts in its
decisions.55 In particular, sustainable development will not be
achievable unless markets place greater emphasis on long-term
investments and appropriately value the environmental costs and
benefits of corporate decisions. Such changes could lead to firms
which facilitate sustainable development being viewed as more
valuable by markets. This perception of increased value could
give these firms preferential access to finance, insurance, and
investment resources from relevant financial institutions.
Economic incentive mechanisms have so far dominated
52 Regarding the importance and uptake of economic instrument approaches, see

generally

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND MARKET MECHANISMS: KEY CHALLENGES FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (Klaus Bosselmann & Benjamin J. Richardson eds.
1999); JENNIFER RIETBERGEN-MCCRAKEN & HUSSEIN ABAZA, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A WORLDWIDE COMPENDIUM OF CASE STUDIES

(2000).

53 On the Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community,
COM(01) 31 final at 17.
54 See id.
55 See, e.g., MICHAEL COMMON, ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS: AN
INTRODUCTION (1988); ROBERTY COSTANZA, ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS (1997); GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY AND
SUSTAINABILITY (1998).
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debates regarding the reinvigoration of environmental governance
through market institutions. The broadening of the mix of policy
instruments to reorient markets along sustainable lines has focused
particularly on taxes and tradeable permits.56 Economic
instruments can make the costs and benefits of environmental
activities more transparent, thereby facilitating resource
conservation and technological innovation. 7 But, such instruments
only indirectly affect the germination of environmental problems
sourced in financial markets. 8 Obviously, by financially
penalizing or rewarding companies for their environmental
behavior, pollution charges and other instruments can help convey
appropriate signals to financial markets engaged in valuing,
insuring, and investing in enterprises. The problem, however, is
thaft the message conveyed by economic instruments can become
obfuscated and lost in the wider noise of the marketplace where
institutions are responding to many different, and often louder,
signals.59 Economic managers are reacting, inter alia, to consumer
preferences, employee demands, and corporate competition
threats.6" What is crucially missing in existing regulatory strategies
is the actual targeting of financial organizations. These regulatory
strategies can be important for broadcasting the effects of
environmental concerns through other sectors of the economy.
A stronger program of environmental policy diffusion must
also address the role of market organizations, such as banks and
institutional investors, which fundamentally allow and facilitate
development activity.61 Although a burgeoning literature addresses
changes in the environmental attitudes of business and financial
56 See generally J.B. OPSCHOOR & HANS B.
ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

14-16

(1989);

Vos,

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR

J.B.

OPSHOOR,

MANAGING

THE

ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS (1994).

57 For arguments about the advantages of economic instruments, see Gyula Bdndi,
Financial Instruments in Environmental Protection, in EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 240 (Gerd Winter ed., 1996).
58 See id. at 204.

59 See C. Samuel Craig & Susan P. Douglas, Responding to the Challenges of
Global Markets: Change, Complexity, Competition and Conscience, 31 COLUM. J.
WORLD Bus., Winter 1996, at 6.
60 See id.
61 See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 34, at 106-23; Grabosky, supra note

4, at 426-37.
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markets and postulates theories as to the most appropriate
characteristics of enterprise environmental management, a paucity
of studies explore in detail how financial organizations could
function as instruments of control for corporate environmental
management.62 At a policy level, Europe's Fifth Action
Programmeon the Environment (1993-2000) 61was one of the first
policy initiatives to recognize the importance of the financial
sector when it asserted "financial institutions which assume the
risk of companies and plants can exercise considerable influence in some cases control - over investment and management
decisions which could be brought to play for the benefit of the
environment. ' Entitled Towards Sustainability, the Programme
projected the concept of "shared responsibility" to symbolize a
multi-party approach to environmental management, entailing "the
use of an extended, and integrated range of instruments., 65 Despite
this belief, little research into the environmental role of financial
organizations has been undertaken.
It would appear that the financial services sector has generic
relevance to the achievement of sustainable development in a
variety of guises: as investors, supplying the resources for
environmental initiatives; as valuers, pricing risks and estimating
returns for companies; and as stakeholders, such as shareholders
and lenders, exercising influence over corporate management.66 To
illustrate, financial organizations may demand environmental
appraisals of borrowers' projects to price the environmental risks
of development. Financial organizations and markets have always
been, and in many ways increasingly will be, subject to detailed
regulation and close monitoring to ensure transparency,
accountability, and to prevent unfair dealings in pursuit of certain
public policy objectives. 67 The challenge is to graft onto the
62

Id.

63 Towards Sustainability: A European Community Programme of Policy and
Action in Relation to the Environment and Sustainable Development, 1993 O.J. (C 138).
64 Id. at 27.
65

Id. at 24-25.

Delphi Int'l Ltd. & Ecologic GMBH, The Role of Financial Institutions in
Achieving SustainableDevelopment 1, 1 (1997), http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/
finserv/fitotal.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
67 See generally George J. Benston, Consumer Protection as Justification for
66
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financial services regulatory systems an additional stratum of
environmental controls to steer agents toward sustainable
development. Rather than government attempting to regulate the
minutiae of company environmental practices, government bodies
could confine themselves to regulating at the wholesale level,
setting the broad regulatory parameters and standards for the
financial services sector.68 This approach would give industry and
financial institutions the responsibility to shape and supervise
environmental behavior at the "retail" level with state involvement
reserved for the most serious cases or environmental management
tasks such as biodiversity conservation, which may be less
amenable to private control.69
C. Overcoming Obstacles to SharedEnvironmental
Responsibility
A major challenge to redesigning systems of environmental
governance is coping with the risk that sharing responsibility with
the private sector may generate new regulatory complexity and
overload. The problem of regulatory overload and system crises in
interventionist, command modes of regulation has been
highlighted by numerous scholars including reflexive law
theorists, who have advocated more subtle, flexible methods of
pursuing public policy whereby regulatees learn and adjust their
behavior in response to new information and incentives.7"
Strategies to enroll private institutions in the regulatory process
can be extremely complex, involving many agents and interests so
that the efficacy of possible institutional combinations will depend
heavily on the specific circumstances. 7 Criteria of administrative
Regulating Financial-ServicesFinns andProducts, 17 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 277 (2000);
Chris Ford & John Kay, Why Regulate FinancialServices?, in THE FUTURE FOR THE
GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET: LEGAL AND REGULATORY ASPECTS 145 (Fidelis Oditah
ed., 1996).
68 See E. Donald Elliot, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING
ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 170, 176 (Marian
R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
69 Id.
For an introduction to the primary sources of reflexive law theory, see Gunther
Teubner, Social Order from Legislative Noise? Autopoietic Closure as a Problem for
Legal Regulation, in STATE, LAW, ECONOMY AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS: REGULATION
AND AUTONOMY IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1992).
71 See MICHAEL JACOBS, THE GREEN ECONOMY. ENVIRONMENT, SUSTAINABLE
70
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feasibility and economic efficiency have featured prominently in
studies evaluating the ingredients of successful public policy
design. 2 It is important to accept that there is no "ideal type" of
shared environmental governance, as the process by which the
state enlists and coordinates the private sector will invariably
involve a combination of regulatory processes.
The question of political feasibility is also central to proposals
regarding the enrollment of the financial sector as an agent of
sustainability. There are notable international differences in
political-legal systems that make some regulatory options more
feasible in certain nations than in others.73 The regulatory
experiences of industries and authorities across capitalist countries
are not interchangeable, and some reforms may not be so readily
acceptable in all jurisdictions.74 Political obstacles arise because of
the opposition from interests that do not perceive any financial or
other advantage to them from taking better account of ecological
issues and constraints in their decisions.75 Market mechanisms so
far have tended to be deployed primarily to achieve environmental
goals at a lower cost or improved environmental standards at the
same cost and in so doing reduce the regulatory burden on
business.7 6 They are less commonly deployed in ways that justify
their promotion and change unsustainable patterns of production
and consumption. " Thus, light-handed mechanisms and "end-ofpipe" charges have often been all that are entertained.78
Yet, in some cases there will be strong incentives to embrace
reform, such as when financial organizations are concerned about
DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE
72

See id. at 154-56.

73

See

152-53 (1991).

DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

(1986).

74 On the political downside of economic tools, see Corinne Larrue, The Political

(Un)feasibility of Environmental Economic Instruments, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
SEARCH OF NEW INSTRUMENTS 37, 49-51 (Bruno Dente ed., 1995).
75 See id.
76 See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in
Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 314 (1998).
77 See Energy Taxes and Emission Permits Get Mixed Responsefrom Business, 284
ENDS REPORT 28 (1998) (discussing the problems with the current mechanisms in place
in the energy industry and the vigorous opposition to even a modest carbon charge).
78 See id.
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the threat of costly environmental liabilities from projects they
fund or insure.79 Through more accurate corporate valuation, firms
with positive environmental performances may also have
advantages in capital markets. 80 Furthermore, reforms to diffuse
environmental law could reduce the burden of front-line regulatory
controls. Companies with a neutral or positive environmental
record seeking development consents from the state would hold an
advantage having already passed the environmental appraisal
systems of the markets. In contrast, firms associated with
environmental damage could find their proposals stalled without
the support of financial institutions, compelling firms to adopt
more environmentally benign practices. These front-line
regulatory controls would relieve government environmental
regulators of the difficult cases and approvals for the remainder
could be more readily processed to the benefit of business. By
integrating environmental auditing and reporting into the existing
corporate supervisory systems, companies could also efficiently
facilitate post-project environmental monitoring. Thus, sharing
environmental governance may be reconcilable with arguments for
policy choices that favor lessening the regulatory burden on
business and government. The political prospects for reform are
also likely to be enhanced as evolving European and global legal
standards on the environment create pressure on governments and
industry to improve the integration of sustainable development
policy in their decision-making systems.
Whilst the private sector contains potentially powerful
instruments to control corporate behavior and sometimes can
achieve regulatory functions more effectively than government
actors, this is not to imply that the state should entirely, or even
mostly abdicate its existing regulatory responsibilities. Rather, the
task is to design regulatory opportunities that allow the state to
draw on the capacities of other parties to create a chain of primary
79 See M. H. Ogilvie, Enter at Your Own Risk. Environmental Lender Liability in
Canada, 1996 J. Bus. L. 94, 110-12 (examining financial institutions' liabilities);
Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 942, 976-77 (1988).
80 There are numerous studies which show such a correlation: Paul Lanoie et al.,
Can Capital Markets Create Incentives for Pollution Control?, 26 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
31, 34-36 (1998); Denis Cormier et al., The Impact of Corporate Pollution on Market
Valuation: Some Empirical Evidence, 8 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 135 (1993).
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and secondary regulatory controls. The overall objective of shared
environmental governance should be to manipulate both the
market and non-market incentives of companies. This is achieved
with a pyramid of strategies beginning often with flexible,
reflexive modes of governance and moving to more rigorous
modes of regulatory intervention and compulsion where there has
been first-order mechanism failure or where critical issues are at
stake. Because reliance on discursive and incentive methods of
harnessing the private sector may be undermined by firms and
industries where there is a conflict of interest and overriding profit
objectives, there is a need for the state to retain a regulatory
backdrop and invoke sanction mechanisms where companies
threaten vital environmental goals.
The aims of private bodies are generally much narrower than
those of government actors and may often clash with the
objectives of other rightful interests. Self-regulation, voluntary
agreements, and codes of conduct associated with market-based
programs can be manipulated and interpreted by powerful business
organizations in ways to satisfy their own ends and ensure the
economic status quo is not seriously threatened.8 ' New reflexive
environmental law procedures such as auditing and reporting may
simply be discharged in a perfunctory, non-committal manner
without leading to any real environmental improvements.82
Sharing responsibility with private stakeholders may be
theoretically appealing, but in reality, the dominance of already
powerful economic interests may simply be legitimated and
perpetuated.83 Even if well-meaning intentions are present,
environmental objectives may still be thwarted where relevant
market institutions lack sufficient expertise and resources.
A fundamental constraint on markets is that financial
institutions with a "cost-benefit mind-set"84 assume all
81 See Alan Neale, Organising Environmental Self-Regulation: Liberal
Governmentality and the Pursuit of Ecological Modernisation in Europe, 6 ENVTL. POL.
1, 11-18 (1997); Ian Maitland, The Limits of Business Self-Regulation, 27 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 132, 132 (1985).
82 See Maitland, supra note 81, at 132.
83 See P. Sunley, Space for Stakeholding? Stakeholder Capitalism and Economic
Geography,31 ENVTL. PLANNING A 2189, 2202 (1999).
84 R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE NEW LOGIC OF
BUSINESS: HOW FIRMS CAN BE PROFITABLE AND LEAVE OUR CHILDREN A LIVING PLANET
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environmental values can be reduced to underlying economic
ones.85 Markets are very poor at determining ecological thresholds
and generating long-term objectives with respect to environmental
systems.86 Also, markets cannot easily incorporate environmental
qualities such as aesthetic values and biological diversity.87 These
"soft" qualities pose problems for markets because they are not
used in production systems in the same way as tangible properties
such as minerals or water. There are significant methodological
difficulties to deploying surrogate market techniques to price
environmental risks in the context of insurance or loans.88 Thus, in
some instances, the only way to protect unique ecosystems
threatened by polluting developments is through direct
prohibitions or lesser controls rather than allowing market
participants indirectly to control impacts through the price
mechanism. Financial organizations should always be a means to
effect environmental choices and judgments made in a political
context.
The setting of broad environmental limits and other metapolicy goals must, therefore, derive from ecological, social, and
economic considerations set within equitable and participatory
decision-making systems.8 9 Economic analysis can help determine
the cost of achieving such ecological standards but not their
substantive merits, which is the province of democratically-based
institutions. Research by Sagoff and Sunstein point to possible
differences between people's preferences as consumers in the
marketplace and those held as citizens in a political context. 90
Whilst the "participation" of industry, financial institutions, and
5 (2000).
85 Id.
86 See Herman E. Daly, Allocation, Distribution, and Scale: Towards an
Economics that is Efficient, Just,and Sustainable, 6 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 185 (1992).
87 See generally VALUING NATURE? ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(John Foster ed., 1997); U. Hampicke, The Limits to Economic Valuation of Biodiversity,
26(1-3) INT'L J. SOC. ECON. 158 (1999).
88 Michael Prior, Economic Valuation and Environmental Values, 7 ENVTL.
VALUES 423, 423 (1998).

89 See Brian Dollery & Joe Wallis, A Cautionary Note on Environmental
Economics, 32 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 299 (1997).

90 Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory andEnvironmentalLaw, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393
(1981); CASS R. SUNSTEN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 15-20 (1997).
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other economic actors is crucial to a sense of shared ownership of
environmental policy, financial markets cannot substitute for the
traditional participatory and information processes embedded in
government regulation.9 Markets offer a different kind of
"participation," because investors, shareholders, and consumers
tend to exclude many interests, especially the interests of the poor.
The private character of market-based regulation regimes means
there could be a deficit of accountability that detracts from the
suitability of this process for environmental management. Because
markets are vulnerable to being distorted by power and unequal
access to information and income opportunities, the state has an
important responsibility to create institutional spaces for citizen
participation and to provide measures to address the distributive
effects of market institutions.92 Corporate and institutional
investment disclosure requirements on environmental liabilities
and performance can, for instance, facilitate transparency and the
accountability of financial institutional activities. Citizen
participation in, and information about, the activities of state
financial regulators themselves is also a necessary ingredient.
Overall, mobilizing financial organizations as co-regulators for
environmental policy does not involve privatizing environmental
law but rather extending environmental law into previously
untapped market sectors to provide an 'additional layer of
regulatory controls alongside the more familiar administrative
ones. By drawing upon the expertise and financial resources of
investors and insurers to improve project design and fund
pollution cleanups, for instance, the inclusion of environmental
standards in the financial services sector can enhance the overall
effectiveness of environmental protection. Achievement of this
goal rather than deference to the sanctity of public regulation is the
important issue.

91 See generally, John Tabemer et al., The Development of Public Participationin
Environmental Protection and PlanningLaw in Australia, 13 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 260
(1996).
92 Id.
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D. FinancialOrganizationswithin Environmental
Governance
1. Relevance of the environment to financialmarkets
Although environmental issues have traditionally been at the
margins of decision making in the financial services sector, in
recent years, financial organizations have become interested in
aspects of environmental protection in terms of the use of their
own internal resources and, more saliently, control of their client's
environmental activity. But, current analyzes, nevertheless,
indicate that interest in the environment is "still not mainstream"
in the financial community.93 Extensive literature remains
skeptical of the possibilities of embedding the environment in
market processes. The problem partly appears to be one of
ignorance. Schmidheiny has commented that "capital markets will
play an important role in the search for sustainable development,
but little is known about the constraints, the possibilities, and the
interrelationships between capital markets, the environment, and
the needs of future generations."94
The concept of financial organizations as instruments for
promoting sustainability must be seen as a relative and pragmatic
one because financial organizations are not in the business of
putting themselves out of business for environmental and
philanthropic concerns. In a variety of jurisdictions, the financial
services community evolved in a political culture marked by a
preference for informal and private regulation largely veiled from
mass political processes.95 Increasingly, however, financial service
institutions have been subject to more detailed public controls to
address problems of information asymmetries and market abuse.
These controls initially came through prudential regulation geared
towards ensuring capital market stability, but more recently, they

93 See, e.g., European Commission, Workshop on Sustainable DevelopmentChallengefor the FinancialSector (Bruxelles: European Commission, 30 Oct. 1998) 14,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/finserv/home.htm.
94 STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE. A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE
ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 54,

68 (1992).

95 See JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 214-50 (1997) (discussing British

financial services regulation).
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have come from consumer protection requirements.96 In addition
to the central bank and securities commission, specialist financial
authorities commonly exist to license and supervise banks,
insurers, and investment companies, who share a common concern
for controlling financial risks. Concerns of capital adequacy,
policyholder protection, and information disclosure and
transparency are pre-eminent regulatory concerns.
Traditionally, financial markets have been skeptical about
environmental issues and seldom expressed a need for
environmental information beyond that pertaining to the financial
risks associated with project developments that could directly
affect the loan security or insurability of a site.9" Intense market
competition creates pressures on financial institutions to reduce
costs and become more efficient, squeezing out consideration of
expensive environmental supervisory systems except in cases of
obvious credit or insurance risk. A study sponsored by the
European Environment Agency suggested the invisibility or low
profile of environmental issues in the financial sector has been
attributable primarily to natural resources prices that do not reflect
anticipated shortages. The fact that the environment is not seen as
a separate "moral issue" but merely one of numerous issues
occurring in the business world results in uncertainty concerning
how environmental effects should be financially measured.9"
Financial organizations focus on providing businesses with access
to capital on competitive terms. Concomitantly, corporate assets
are commonly viewed by institutional investment houses as
"passive pools of income-generating securities,"9 9 rather than as
96 See MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 31922 (1970) (examining the development of financial services regulation in the United
States); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 44-51
(1970).
97 Walter D. James III, Financial Institutions and Hazardous Waste Litigation.
Limiting the Exposure to Superfund Liability, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 329 (1988)
(examining liability for contaminated land clean up).
98 Asa Skillius & Ulrika Wennberg, Continuity, Credibility and Comparability:
Key Challenges for Corporate Environmental Performance Measurement and
Communication para. 2.2, http://www.1u.se/IIEE/publications/communications/1999
_3.PDF (Feb. 1998) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).

99 Edward Tasch & Stephen Viederman, New Concepts of Fiduciary
Responsibility, in STEERING BUSINESS TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 125, 130 (Fritjof Capra
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resources for sustainability. The result is that to the extent
environmental issues are considered, they may merely be an "add
on" to normal business practices, rather than an integral factor in
the culture of financial decision-making. 00
Given the traditional, economically narrow orientation of
financial organizations, is it unrealistic to suggest that they could
become agents for promoting sustainable development? Certainly,
key international policy documents, such as the United Nations's
Agenda 21"° ' and regionally, the European Union's (EU) recent
environmental action programs, speak of future environmental
regulation based on "shared responsibilities," in which the private
sector collaborates and supports governmental authorities. Its
strategic location in capitalist markets means that policy-makers
cannot ignore the financial services sector. Through appropriate
government regulation, incentives, and information, the financial
services sector could be reoriented to play a key role in the
transformation to a more ecologically sustainable economy. The
challenge is to identify ways in which the environment can be
made more financially relevant to economic managers and
correspondingly to design an appropriate legislative policy.0 2 The
process of regulatory and policy reforms must address the rules
and incentives governing investors and other financial entities as
well as the functions of those government authorities which
supervise the financial sector.
The financial services sector encompasses a large and diverse
array of institutions for which the relevance of environmental
issues can be very different. In general, the sector falls into three
broad clusters: banking (lenders), institutional investors (equity)
and insurance (risk management), although overlap exists between
these categories. For lenders, the traditional concern is to
minimize risk and avoid liability, thus ensuring that loan
repayments are not compromised by environmental problems.0 3
& Gunter Pauli eds., 1995).
100 Monika Griefahn, The Role of Government, in STEERING BUSINESS TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 95, 97 (Fritjof Capra & Gunter Pauli eds., 1995).
101 AGENDA 21: EARTH'S ACTION PLAN para. 30.2 (Nicholas Robinson ed., 1992).
102 See Stephen F. Frowen, The Functions of Money and Financial Credit: Their
Objectives, Structure and Inbuilt Deficiencies, in FINANCIAL DECISION-MAKING AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 (Stephen F. Frowen & Francis P. McHugh eds., 1995).
103 See Gary Gorton & James J. Kahn, The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, 13(2)
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The efficient credit approval systems of banks are equipped to
weigh risks and assign a price to those risks, although smaller
banks may lack sufficient in-house environmental expertise to
integrate ecological issues into credit risk procedures.1"4 For equity
providers, a similar downside risk exists, but scope for upside gain
as the investment benefits from eco-efficiency and other
environmental performance improvements in companies that aid
profitability also exists.15 The insurance industry uses many of the
same risk assessment methods relative to underwriting as debt or
equity providers, but insurers are unique in being concerned with
payment to assume other parties' risks, not avoid them. 0 6
The relationship between borrowers and lenders is one of the
critical points where the interests of the environment can be
factored into economic decision-making.0 7 As lenders, banks can
be a powerful force for promoting a long-term perspective in
market behavior. Lenders often face a long-term payback period,
and their concern for repayment creates, in theory, an interest in
the sustainability of the borrower's activities. This interest can be
articulated where institutional processes are available that allow
banks to share their expertise with, and give guidance to, their
borrowers. In the United States, the threat of contaminated site
liabilities under the so-called Superfund legislation helped catapult
environmental concerns to the forefront of analysis of credit
arrangements by financial institutions.0 8 Environmental liability
has emerged as a concern for banks in various other jurisdictions
REV. FIN. STUD. 331 (2000) (discussing the theoretical aspects of bank lending and risk

management).
104 SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 94, at 10-11.
105 Id.
106 See PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK THROUGH INSURANCE 23 (1997).
107 See generally David Sarokin & Jay Schulkin, Environmental Concerns and the

Business of Banking, 73 J. COM. BANK LENDING, Feb. 1991, at 6; JOHN JARVIS &
MICHAEL FORDHAM, LENDER LIABILITY: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND DEBT (1993).

108 Known in full as the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 1996).
Among the massive literature, see Margaret Murphy, The Impact of 'Superfund' and
Other Environmental Statutes on Commercial Lending and Investment Activities, 41

BUS. L. 1133 (1986); Richard K. Harper & Stephen C. Adams, CERCLA and Deep
Pockets: Market Response to the Superfund Program, 14 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y, Jan.
1996, at 108-10.
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in the wake of widening liability, rules." 9 There are advantages for
lenders who insist that project borrowers adopt appropriate
environmental controls at the outset because projects that
commence without adequate environmental design, which could
have been undertaken more cost efficiently at the initial project
design stage, can compromise the borrower's ability to repay a
loan.
Environmental issues can also alter the economic assumptions
that underlie an investor's decision to commit capital to an
enterprise. Capital investment systems are where primary
decisions regarding future development arise and thus pressures on
the environment begin. Capital markets are now overwhelmingly
dominated by large institutional investors, rather than by
individual "amateur" shareholders. The growth of these
investment funds has pooled mammoth resources capable of
exerting significant leverage over corporate environmental
activities.110 There are many reasons why the environment might
be of interest to institutional investors. Pension funds and life
insurance companies in particular have long-term financial
liabilities, providing a structural incentive to favor long-term,
sustainable investment. Further, fund managers have fiduciary
responsibilities in trust law and statute to take an active interest in
corporate governance. Poor environmental performance that
threatens a firm's profitability forms a basis for intervention in
corporate management or "taking the exit" option and switching
investments. Considerable evidence indicates a growing niche
market for green investment products. Moreover, empirical
evidence exists of a correlation between share price movements
and corporate environmental performance."'
Environmental harm is also of interest to insurance companies,
and insurers are becoming much more sensitive to the
environmental performance of their policy-holders.112 The surge of
109 See Lending and the Environment: What are the Risks to Lenders?, CAN.

BANKERS ASS'N (Jan. 2000); Jonathan H. Marks, The EnvironmentalLiability of Lenders
in England: Is the Tide Coming in?, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 1-2 (2001).
110 See Hans J. Blommestein, Impact of Institutional Investors on Financial
Markets, in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE
NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE 29 (1998).
111 See Lanoie et al., supra note 80, at 35-39.
112 GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 34, at 118.
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claims associated with contaminated site cleanups and suspected
climate-change induced disturbances has driven some insurers to
scrutinize their clients according to standards often well beyond
government regulatory requirements. 1 3 Insurance can promote
both the deterrence and compensation functions of environmental
policy. Insurance has the ability to price various types of
environmental risk and to generate funds to pay for environmental
damage. In terms of deterrence, the risk of being excluded from
insurance coverage or having to pay higher premiums can provide
financial incentives for improved corporate environmental
performance. 14 There are a variety of other positive contributions
that the insurance industry can offer environmental management,
including assessing and publicizing various kinds of
environmental risk; advising public authorities and enterprises on
appropriate damage prevention and development planning
restrictions; and collaborating with public authorities to improve
construction standards to minimize damage from disasters.15
2. Financialmarket liberalizationand globalization
trends
It should be noted that in many countries the financial services
sector is increasingly less organized into discrete institutional
segments. 16 Deregulation of the financial services sector has led to
the merging of financial organizational roles. These institutional
reconfigurations will invariably have an influence on the sector's
contribution to environmental governance. A particular trend in
some countries has been the emergence of "financial
conglomerates" of banks and insurance companies offering an
extensive range of lending, investment, and other financial
services."' In the United States, for instance, the Financial
113 Id.
114 SCHMIDHEINY,

supra note 94, at 64-65.

115 Ivo Knoepfel et al., The Kyoto Protocoland Beyond: Potential Implicationsfor
the Insurance Industry para 3.1 (1999), available at http://unepfi.net/iii/KYOTO-HPTFINALI.html (discussing the proactive role of the insurance industry in responding to
climate change).
116 See Gunter Dufey, The Changing Role of FinancialIntermediation in Europe,
INT'L J. Bus., Spring 1998, at 49-52.
117 See Blommestein, supra note 110, at 33 (explaining that this process is known as
"bancassurance").
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Modernization Act of 199918 has liberalized the ability of banks,
insurers, and similar institutions to affiliate and engage in financial
businesses. The Act provides for the creation of a new institution a "financial holding company" able to offer a myriad of financial
services within a single entity." 9 Similar financial liberalization
moves have occurred in other Western countries. 2 ' The increasing
trend toward merging activities within a single financial
organization may facilitate the streamlining of environmental
auditing and risk management exercises. Thus, rather than banks
and insurers initiating environmental appraisals of developments
separately, a single auditing process could be undertaken where
lending and underwriting functions are discharged within one
financial conglomerate.'
Yet, the greater convergence of
financial services within a single organization may increase their
exposure to systemic market risk such as the ability of a firm to
diversify.'22 Regulators, therefore, may need to carefully control
the expansion of banks into insurance underwriting.'23
Another important recent trend in the financial services sector
is its transnational character. In the last two decades, technological
advances and the deregulation of capital markets in Western
economies have greatly accelerated the geographic mobility of
capital in its search for the most profitable investments.' 24 The
globalization of banking, insurance, and investment services has
diminished the power of governments to regulate institutions. 125
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No 106102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
119 See Charles M. Horn, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley FinancialModernizationAct: A
New Course in US FinancialServices, 2 INT'L J. INS. L. 109, 113 (2000).
120 See, e.g., Eric L. Gouvin, The Political Economy of Canada's "Widely Held"
Rule for Large Banks, 32 L. POL'Y& INT'L BuS. 391 (2001).
121 See Russ Banham, Pollution Protection Gets Easier, TREASURY RISK MGMT.,
Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 61 (discussing the relationship between environmental auditing
undertaken by lenders and insurers).
122 Frederic S. Mishkin, FinancialConsolidation:Dangers and Opportunities, 23 J.
BANKING & FIN. 675, 680-81 (1999).
123 See Linda Allen & Julapa Jagtiani, The Risk Effects of Combining Banking,
Securities, and Insurance Activities, 52 J. ECON. BUS. 485 (2000); Mishkin, supra note
122, at 681.
124 See ANDREW WALTER, WORLD POWER AND WORLD MONEY 202-04 (1993)
(discussing causes of the financial transnationalization process).
125 JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 7-8
118
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Domestic regulatory moves and local political developments
perceived as threatening to economic interests can prompt the
migration of funds across borders to "safe havens" or regimes
appearing to offer a more benign regulatory milieu. National
regulators may also face capacity and information deficits when
attempting to supervise enterprises engaged in complex transborder commercial activities. International agreements and
institutions, therefore, are needed to prevent environmentally
enlightened financial service providers from suffering competitive
disadvantages in their transnational business. Without global
standards, one bank's requirements for inclusion of environmental
conditions in loan processing may be circumvented by the
borrower simply 26taking its business to an environmentally
indifferent lender. 1
Whilst there is an emerging field of global regulation of
existing international regulatory
financial organizations,
mechanisms in this sector are largely at an embryonic stage of
development. At present, only the E.U. has a substantial
institutional structure for the supervision of the financial sector
superimposed on national regimes.'27 Globally, existing
institutions that are seeking to provide a semblance of supervision
and standard-setting for transnational financial activity include the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 12 1 the Basle Committee
on Banking Supervision, 129 and the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 3 ° But overall, the global
(2000).
126 See G. Lane & C. Normand, How can the Financial Sector Realize its Full
Potential to Support Sustainable Development?, UNEP INDUSTRY & ENV'T 7, 7
(Jan/March 1999).
127 By way of introduction, see European Commission, Institutional Arrangements
for the Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Sector (Jan. 2000), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/en/finances/banks/arrange.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
128 Established by the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements, 20 Jan.
1930.
129 See Joseph J. Norton, Trends in InternationalBank Supervision and the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 415 (1994).
130 See, e.g., International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Sept. 1998). For analysis, see
Bernard Asher, The Development of a Global Securities Market, in THE FUTURE OF THE
GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET (Fidelis Oditah ed., 1996).
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institutional architecture for financial regulation is informal,
decentralized, and fragmented.13
" One important emerging catalyst
to boost the profile of financial institutional issues in national and
international policy-making is the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), which has launched a Financial Institutions
Initiative. The Initiative began in 1992 with the release of the
"Statement by Banks on Environment and Sustainable
Development," which provides a lever for banks to be more
positively engaged in environmental policy. 3 2 The Initiative now
has over 170 members, representing financial organizations from
over forty-five countries.
Nationally, similar industry standard-setting initiatives are
emerging which will have global relevance given the international
markets in which the financial institutions are participating.133
Such initiatives will become more important given the
intensification of trade liberalization moves to eliminate national
frontiers for financial markets.' 4 The General Agreement on
Trade Services (GATS)' 35 already extends to financial regulation
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT),136 trade
principles of Most Favoured Nation, and national treatment.'37
Moreover, financial services are included in the specific service
areas of the GATS Annexes for negotiation into particular sectoral

131 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS,

supra note 125, at 96.

UNEP, Advisory Committee on Banking and the Environment, Statement by
Banks on Environment and SustainableDevelopment (1992).
133 See, e.g., Verien fir Umweltmanagement in Banken, Sparkassen und
Versicherungen (Association for Environmental Management in Banks, Savings Banks
and Insurance Companies) Presentation of the VfU, the First Industry Specific
Association for Environmental Management in Banks, Savings Banks, and Insurance
Companies, http://www.vfu.de/english_indez.html (last visit Oct. 31, 2002).
134 See Wolfgang Artopoeus, Globalization of Financial Markets, 25 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 410, 411 (1997).
135 General Agreement on Trade and Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreements,
Annex IB, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 46, arts. II
(1994).
136 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat., T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
137 See also Yi Wang, Most-Favoured Nation Treatment under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services: And its Application in FinancialServices, 30 J. WORLD
TRADE 91, 93-95 (1996).
132
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trade agreements.' 38 A Financial Services Agreement, concluded
in December 1997 through the latter process, aims to eliminate
discriminatory and market access-impairing measures so that
insurers, banks, and other financial entities of a nation have access
to the financial service markets of countries.' 39 Clearly, the shift
from government to governance will become more intertwined
with internationalized patterns of policy-making involving
0
international organizations and other supranational actors.14
Serious development of environmental regulatory frameworks
at an international level for financial institutions is a long way off.
Reform is unlikely to be advanced until national models are
available that can indicate the advantages and disadvantages of
different regulatory approaches.' 4 ' In the field of environmental
law, many policy innovations, such as the precautionary principle
and economic instruments, derive from national precedents rather
than international regulation. The dispersion of governmental
responsibilities spawned by globalization has not necessarily
diminished the role of the nation-state, which is still widely seen
as the pivotal actor. 142 Nation-states remain generically much more
powerful than multinational 43corporations because of their control
of territory and populations. 1
III. Institutional Investors
A. Environmental Issues in CapitalMarkets
Capital markets substantially shape the investment processes
of modem economies. 144 Because the investment patterns of
138 See id. at 108.
139 AADITYA MATTOO, FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
LIBERALIZATION COMMITMENTS OF THE DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMICS 10-11

(The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2184, 1999).
140 James N. Rosenau, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics, in
GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 3 (M.
Rol6n et al. eds., 1992).
141 See Linda Weiss, Globalization and the Myth of the Powerless State, 225 NEW
LEFT REV. 3, 24 (1997).
142 See id. at 20-27; PAUL HIRST &
QUESTION 88-94 (2d ed. 1999).
143 See Weiss, supra note 141.

GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN

144 See Juan Rada & Alex Trisoglio, CapitalMarkets andSustainable Development,
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capital markets shape future development and, thus, consequential
environmental pressures, it is vital to reform capital market
processes to promote environmentally sustainable, long-term
investment. These reforms may be a highly efficient and effective
means for deterring unsustainable development, 145 which could
result in enterprises, whose activities meet requirements of
sustainability, being valued more highly by markets. 46 There is
uncertainty, however, regarding the viability of harnessing
investment systems to promote sustainable development, and some
research suggests that environmentally responsible investment
may yield a lower financial return or that institutional investors
may lack sufficient incentives and means to influence corporate
environmental behavior. 47 Conversely, there are indications that
markets are increasingly interested in information regarding
businesses' environmental activities as evidenced by the
movement for ethical investment. 48 More empirical research is
needed to identify how institutional investors may effectively
influence corporate environmental activities and thereby
contribute to environmental regulation. 14
Institutional investors increasingly dominate capital markets. 5 °
In recent decades, there has been a flood of institutional savings as
people make private provisions for old age in the face of declining
state welfare entitlements. '' As financial intermediaries, investors
COLUM. J. WORLD

Bus., Winter 1992, at 42, 44.

145 See id. at 49.
146

See id.

See Ricardo Sandoval, How Green are the Green Funds? Fiscal and
Philosophical Ups and Downs of Environmental Investing, 17(Spring) AMICUS J. 29
(1995). See, e.g., Michel Patry & Michel Poitevin, Why InstitutionalInvestors Are Not
Better Shareholders, CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA 341, 364-65 (1995)
(noting the difficulties for institutional investors when attempting to influence corporate
governance).
148 See C. Gooderham, Investing with a Conscience, 569 TAX J. 17 (2000)
(discussing rising popularity of ethical investments).
149 Lanoie et al., supra note 80, at 40.
147

150 See Rada & Trisoglio, supra note 144; Carolyn K. Brancato, The Pivotal Role of
Institutions in Capital Markets, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: CHALLENGES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 13 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991)
(demonstrating that institutional investors have increasing significance in capital
markets).
151 See Bloomestein, supra note 110, at 116.
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assist with risk reduction by pooling and diversifying assets and
lowering the transaction costs of contracting and information
processing. 52 Institutional investors are not a coherent group, and
there exist a vast array of investment entities, including public and
private pension funds, mutual funds, life insurance companies,
university foundations, and funds managed by banks.' 53 A
technical distinction can be made between institutional investment
per se, involving, for example, the investment actions of pension
funds using their beneficiaries' monies and retail investment,
where individuals directly contribute to a mutual fund or unit trust
that specializes in investing in certain market segments. 5 4 In both
cases a specific investment institution is making and managing
investments. Within the OECD area, insurance companies are the
largest investors followed by pension funds.' 55 The scale of
institutionalization of investment activity has differed considerably
across countries, with investments more institutionalized in the
United States and the United Kingdom than in the bank-based
financial systems of Japan or Germany where there is a weaker
equity culture.'56 Although they invest for different purposes and
with different obligations, most institutional investors can be
characterized as managers of assets on behalf of someone else to
whom they owe a duty as fiduciaries.'57 The financial assets held
by institutional investors mainly comprise shares, bonds, and
loans, although investments in company shares have grown
rapidly.'58
152 On the role and value of institutional investors as financial intermediaries, see
Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of InstitutionalInvestor Voice,
39 UCLA L. REV. 813, 834-37 (1992).
153 See id. at 815.
154 See Hans Bloomestein, Basic Characteristicsand Information on Institutional
Investors in OECD Countries, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE NEW FINANCIAL
LANDSCAPE 69, 69 (1998).
155 See ORG. FOR ECON.
STATISTICAL Y.B. 1998 15.
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156 See Bettina Nrk, Institutional Investors and their Implicationsfor Financial
Markets in Germany, in , INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE NEW FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE,
193-94 (1998); Takeo Sumino, Japanese FinancialInstitutions and Their Challenge
Towards the 21st Century, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE NEW FINANCIAL

LANDSCAPE 156 (1998).
157 See Tasch & Viederman, supra note 99, at 126-27.
158 See Brancato, supra note 150, at 7, 27-29.
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Since sustainable development emphasizes maintenance of
natural and human capital for future generations, the role of capital
markets is plausibly of central underlying relevance to
sustainability strategies.159 Financial markets typically provide
capital to achieve a positive return or at least not a negative return.
Although there is obviously a difference between financial capital
and the broader notion of capital in sustainable development,
financial capital is relevant, since it enables major investments to
occur, such as technological and product innovations, which
invariably have environmental effects of some kind. 6 ° Capital
markets are prone to distorting levels of economic activity
depending on what has appealed to or deterred investors.
Speculative bubbles in some sectors consume scarce investment
resources. Whilst in other markets, potential borrowers for
productive investments are deprived of funding at rates that reflect
apparent risks.161 The institutional and policy frameworks of
capital investment systems are, thus, crucial to the building of
sustainable productive capacities.
The existence of adequate information for investors is one of
several important preconditions for the efficient operation of
capital markets as a mechanism for resource allocation. 62
Information regarding corporate environmental performance is
emerging as a salient factor in investment calculations.163
According to a Swedish government study, the main types of
environmental-connected information of potential interest to
financial institutions are: costs associated with company
compliance with relevant environmental legislation; managerial
and organizational environmental competence; potential liabilities
159 See Richard W. England, Natural Capitaland the Theory of Economic Growth,
34 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 425, 430 (2000) (discussing the analytical relationship between
capital accumulation, economic growth, and the natural world).
160 See id.
161 See Arjun Chatrath et al., Speculative Activity and Stock Market Volatility, 50 J.
EcON. & Bus. 323, 324-25 (1998); P. Davidson, Volatile Financial Markets and the
Speculator, 3(2) ECON. ISSUES 1 (1998).
162 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 413-15 (1970). The efficiency of capital markets can
also be undermined by the existence of thin markets and high transaction costs. Id. at
395.
163 See Lanoie, et al., supra note 80, at 32.
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from pollution emissions; and resource consumption.'64 When new
information about a company's increased future production costs
or reduced revenues arise from environmental regulation changes,
investors may revise their expectations. 65 A shift in market values
may create strong incentives for investment in environmental care
since losses of market value, the "reputational penalty," may be
larger than concomitant regulatory sanctions.'66 Changes in share
values may, thus, reflect estimates of changes in the net present
value of expected profits. Evidence of good environmental
performance may indicate to capital markets a superior ability to
generate costs savings and improve revenues, whilst evidence of
pollution violations and prosecution may result in markets downgrading a profits forecast.'67 Existing research suggests that
environmental liabilities, such as corporate spending on
contaminated land cleanups, are regarded as more salient to
market valuations than "beyond compliance" efforts, such as
voluntary investments in energy efficiency.' 68 Company
environmental policies and procedures also tend to be less useful
to financial analysts than environmental information 69translated in
terms of its impact on firm earnings and profitability. 1
Moreover, research suggests that investor reaction to
environmental information about firms depends significantly on
the extent to which the information is unanticipated news
predicted to affect a firm's profitability. 7 ° Several studies reveal
negative market returns to firms in affected industries following
announcements related to proposed tightening of environmental
regulations.' 7 ' For example, in a study of market reaction to
164 Government of Sweden, FORBATTRAD MILJOINFORMATION, Statens Offentliga
Uredningar Milj6departementet (Regerinskansliet, Stockholm, 1997), as cited in Skillius
and Wennberg, supra note 98, at 13.
165 See Lanoie et al., supra note 80 at 39.

166 Id., at 38-39.
167 Id., at 39.

168 Linda Descano & Bradford S. Gentry, Communicating Environmental
Performance to the CapitalMarkets, 5(3) CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 14, 16 (1998).
169 See Business in the Environment and Extel Financial, THE INDEX OF CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTAL ENGAGEMENT - A SURVEY OF THE FTSE 100 COMPANIES (1994) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
170 See Lanoie et al., supra note 80 at 32.
171 See Myles S. Wallace et al., Environmental Regulation: A Financial Markets
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disclosures under the United States's Toxic Release Inventory
(TRI) program, Khanna and others noted, "the largest declines in
stock prices, were not targeted toward the largest emitters, but
toward firms that were not 'known' to be polluters on the basis of
prior environmental information available to investors."'' 7 2 Among
the major studies regarding individual firm information, Muoghalu
and others found a statistically significant loss of share value
following the initiation of lawsuits related to the United States's
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.17' Although in
their study of environmental enforcement actions in Canada,
Lanoie and Laplante detected no market losses when lawsuits
were initiated, they did observe immediate abnormal losses
between 1.65 and 2% when the firm was found culpable and
fined.'74 Conversely, Klassen and McLaughlin found a correlation
between announcement of environmental awards, signifying
public recognition of environmental excellence,
and improved
17
market valuations on average of 0.82%. 1
In contrast to the foregoing analyses, several studies have
investigated the market impact of comparative information, which
directly compares firms with poor performance to those with
positive conduct.'76 Shane and Spicer found that firms identified in
public reports as major polluters lost greater market value than
those with a cleaner ranking. 7 7 In a study of financial market
reactions to firms ranked for their emissions under the TRI
requirements, Hamilton found that the larger the number of
Test, 28 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 69, 83-84 (1988); Walter G. Blacconiere & W. Dana
Northcut, Environmental Information and Market Reactions to Environmental
Legislation, 12 J. ACCT.AUDITING & FIN. 149, 176-77 (1997).

172 Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for
EnvironmentalProtection,36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 244 (1998).
173 Michael 1. Muoghalu et al., Hazardous Waste Lawsuits, Stockholder Returns,
andDeterrence, 56 S. ECON. J. 357, 365 (1990).
174 Paul Lanoie & Benoit Laplante, The Market Response to Environmental
Incidents in Canada: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 60 S. ECON. J. 652, 666
(1994).
175 Robert D. Klassen & Curtis P. McLaughlin, The Impact of Environmental
Management on Firm Performance,42 MGMT. SCI. 1199, 1207-08 (1996).
176 See, e.g., Philip B. Shane & Barry H. Spicer, Market Response to Environmental
Information ProducedOutside the Firm, 58 ACCT.REV. 521, 521-35 (1983).
177 Id.at 534.
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chemicals a firm reported to produce or handle, the larger loss the
firm suffered in its market value over a given period.'78 Similarly,
Khanna and others detected significant negative stock market
returns for firms following repeated announcements of TRI
information, especially for firms whose environmental
performance declined over time relative to other firms.'79
Interestingly, Koner and Cohen discovered that firms with the
largest decline in share value following announcement of TRI
information subsequently reduced their pollution emissions further
than other firms in the same industry sector. 8 °
Overall, current research suggests a correlation between sound
environmental practices and improved market value. Investors
infer that because of poor environmental performance a culpable
firm will incur various costs that will diminish its profitability. 8 '
The increased price of capital, thus, provides a mechanism for
articulating the social and environmental costs of corporate riskgenerating behavior. Nevertheless, despite more investor
awareness of the salience of environmental performance to market
valuation, no model has yet been formulated that systematically
charts the relationship between corporate environmental practices
and market value. The role of institutional investors will be crucial
to the future response of capital markets to environmental
performance.
B. InstitutionalInvestor Characteristics
Institutional investors have diverse legal structures, financial
objectives, and investment strategies. The main classes of
investors are pension funds, life insurance companies, and
investment companies. These investors pursue an array of
investment models ranging from funds that are actively managed
to those that rely on passive investment strategies based on index
techniques.' 82 Important factors influencing investment strategies
178 James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media andStock Market Reactions to the
Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98, 111 (1995).
179 Khanna et al., supra note 172.
180 Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109,
123 (1995).
181 Seeid. at 112-13.

182 See Stephen B. Timbers, Active Management, 10 J. FIN. PLAN. 53, 53-54 (1997)
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are the financial objectives of the institutional investor, the
regulatory and tax regime, and risk preferences.'83 A common
characteristic of institutional investors is that they are financial
intermediaries, pooling the funds of market participants and using
those funds to purchase a portfolio of securities, real property, and
other financial assets. 4 Institutional investors differ from banks
that merely take short-term deposits from customers, although
deregulation in the financial services sector has resulted in banks
increasingly participating in investment and other financial
activities.' 85
Regarding the characteristics of individual investor classes, life
insurance companies concentrate on longer-term debt instruments,
such as bonds and mortgage loans.'86 Since non-life insurance
companies tend to have mainly short-term liabilities that are
harder to forecast, their need is for liquidity (to raise capital
quickly), and accordingly, equities feature strongly in their
investment portfolios.' 87 Pension regimes can be differentiated
primarily between public-managed pension schemes and
occupational pension schemes.' Because pension funds benefit
from regular inflows of funds and have long-term liabilities, they
tend to concentrate their portfolios on long-term assets yielding
stable returns. Pooled investment vehicles, which often take the
legal form of a company, are financial intermediaries that sell
shares to the public and invest the proceeds in a diversified
portfolio of securities and assets.' 89 Examples of investment
companies include unit trusts, investment trusts, hedge funds, and
venture capital funds. 9° Their investment strategies are wide-

(analyzing alternative approaches).
183 Blommestein, supra note 110, at 47.
184 See id. at 38-39.
185 Id. at 33. Of course, in the bank-based corporate governance systems in
continental Europe and Japan, banks are often significant shareholders in their own right.
See id. at 61-63.
186 See id. at 71.
187 See id. at 73.
188 See E. PHILIP DAVIS,

PENSION FUNDS: RETIREMENT-INCOME

SECURITY AND

CAPITAL MARKETS-AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 57 (1995).
189 See BARNARD SELIGMAN, CHOOSING AN INVESTMENT COMPANY 21 (1987).

190 See Bloomestein, supra note 154, at 69.
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ranging with some concentrating on equities, whilst others opt for
bonds, real estate, or speculation in currency and commodity
markets. 9 '
The influence of fund managers is an important characteristic
of the investment community, and strategies to mobilize investors
as pathways of environmental influence must contend with the
pre-eminent role of fund managers. Many investment institutions
delegate responsibilities to separate and specialist fund
managers. 9 2 Fund management can be carried out internally or
externally by a bank or an independent money management firm,
for example. Fund managers often simultaneously manage money
on behalf of a wide variety of investment entities. Delegating
investment strategies to fund managers raises principal-agent
problems, although internal fund managers appear to pose fewer
such problems than external ones.' 93 A survey of British pension
funds' implementation of the new Socially Responsible
Investment (SRI) policy disclosure requirements under pensions
legislation'94 found that 27% of funds delegated authority over SRI
to their fund manager, and 48% of funds requested that their fund
managers take account of SRI, if such concerns were seen as
financially relevant.' 95 Obviously, because there is considerable
potential for subversion of SRI objectives through lax delegation
arrangements, it is important that investment principals set clear
objectives for their fund managers. These investment principals
must be consistent with the institution's investment principles and
objectives and establish appropriate monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms.
The expansion of the institutional investment community and
their increasing influence on the structure and operation of capital
191 See Portfolio Strategies, 8(24) EMERGING MARKETS WEEK 4-6 (2000).
192

Paul

L.

Davies,

Institutional Investors in

the

United Kingdom, in

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 69, 72 (D.D. Prentice & P.R.J.

Holland eds., 1993).
193 Blommestein, supra note 110, at 45.
194 Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture,
Bankruptcy etc.), Amendment Regulations, 1999, No. 1849(2)(4)(b) (Eng.).
195 Eugenie Mathieu, Response of U.K. Pension Funds to the SRI Disclosure
Regulation, U.K. SOC. INVESTMENT F., Oct. 2000 at 2 at http://www.U.K.sif.org/library/
welcome/frameset.shtml (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
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markets and economic activity poses new policy challenges to
regulators. Almost every institutional investor is governed by
some form of public regulation and supervision. 196 Public
intervention into capital markets has typically been a response to
market failures regarding information asymmetry, externalities,
and monopolistic practices.197 Among the extensive menu of
regulations are requirements for disclosure of reliable information
to investors, fair valuation of investor purchasers, management
fees, and specification of investor objectives and policies.' 98
Traditionally, regulatory supervision of institutional investments
concentrated on solvency issues and prudential controls to ensure
that institutions would be able to fulfill their respective obligations
to policy-holders, plan participants, and other beneficiaries. 99 The
environmental dimensions of investment have hardly been a
feature of investment regulation.
Risk management is an important element in public regulation
of institutional investors' activities, offering a potentially useful
framework for facilitating the inclusion of corporate
environmental performance issues in portfolio selection. In some
jurisdictions, especially Europe, public regulatory entities apply
quantitative regulations of investment portfolios, such as
restrictions on particular classes of investments including foreign
securities, real estate, and loans. These investment ceilings serve
to limit default and liquidity risks. 00 In some countries, regulatory
requirements for maturity and duration matching also exist to
ensure longer-term liabilities, such as life insurance, can be met.20 '
But, because investment limits may be perceived as stifling
196 ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY

15 (1994).

197 Id. (explaining economic theories of regulation).
198 See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT

REGULATION 15-54 (1999).
199 See

ORG.

FOR

ECON.

COOPERATION

AND

DEV.,

INSURANCE

SOLVENCY

SUPERVISION (1995); R.M. PECCHIOLI, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV.,
PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION IN BANKING (1987).

200 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), INSURANCE SOLVENCY
SUPERVISION: OECD COUNTRY PROFILES (2002); OECD, REGULATING PRIVATE PENSION
TRENDS AND CHALLENGES (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/
EN/home/0,,EN-home-14-nodirectorate-no-no--14,00.html (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
201 OECD, supra note 155, at 25.
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financial innovation and constraining investment efficiency, other
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom and United States,
articulate risk management through an alternative "prudent
person" standard.2 °2 Although the interpretation of this standard
differs in each jurisdiction, it generally requires trustees and fund
managers to follow high fiduciary standards in investing funds but
without government prescription of specific investment
practices.2"3 No limits to portfolio distributions exist here save for
a limit on self-investment. The prudent investment standard
manifests itself in two particular ways: the diversification of
investments and the pursuit of indexed modes of investment.
Because of this tendency to cause uniform investment practices
and herding responses, the prudent person standard has attracted
24
criticism.
The diversity and complexity of investment institutions and
their regulation, thus, can be seen as possibly overwhelming to
environmental policy-makers interested in forging ways to reorient
capital markets towards sustainable development. The systems of
prudential regulation have been geared to addressing market risks
and consumer protection issues, leaving little policy space for
entertaining environmental issues. Nevertheless, as the following
sections show, the investment community is a dynamic sector in
which opportunities for environmental-oriented investment
strategies will be pursued when financial rewards are perceived to
be obtainable.
C. InstitutionalInvestors and EnvironmentalPolicy
1. Growth of environmental-orientedinvestment
Environmentally responsible investment portfolios have
emerged in considerable numbers in recent years.20 5 Such
investments may be undertaken as part of the policies of an
See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT
(1986).
203 See, e.g., Pensions Act, 1995, c. 26(2) (Eng.); see also Paul G. Haskell, The
Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L.
Rev. 87 (1990) (discussing the prudent person rule for investments).
204 Davis, supra note 188, at 96-98.
202

MAN RULE

205 Mark Mansley, Financingthe Environmental Sector, 22 UNEP INDUS. & ENV'T
28 (1999).
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institutional investor, such as a pension, fund, or undertaken
through the retail investment markets, where individuals invest in
mutual funds, unit trusts, and other specialist investment vehicles.
In either case, ethical investment considers the social and
environmental impact of firms alongside financial performance. °6
For ethical investors, good environmental achievements may be
construed as an indication of business health, whilst poor
environmental performance may result in adverse company
publicity or even pollution liabilities. 2 7 Acting, in effect, as
environmental monitors, ethical investment institutions could
assist government authorities seeking more effective mechanisms
to penetrate and supervise markets. In contrast to market
liberalism, ethical environmental investment offers the promise of
uniting economics with politics as peremptory values derived from
outside market transactions arise to shape market activity.
Responsible investment is commonly articulated through
ethical screening, also known as "portfolio screening," which
entails the inclusion or exclusion of stocks in investment portfolios
on environmental grounds.20 8 Company subscription to voluntary
environmental codes and standards can serve as useful
benchmarks in the screening process. An effective screening
approach entails follow-up monitoring to ensure that preferred
enterprises are meeting environmental performance expectations.
A second method of responsible investment is shareholder
activism, in Which investor shareholders seek to improve a
company's environmental behavior by means of dialogue,
pressure, or support for responsible management.2 9 Shareholder
activism may involve internal pressure, where the shareholder
invests in a particular firm engaging in objectionable activities

206

See generally ANNE

SIMPSON, THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE

POLITICS ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES, Special Report
No.2108 (1991); SEVERYN T. BRUYN, THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT (1987); PETER
ENVIRONMENT,

KINDER ET AL.,
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RESPONSIBLE (1993).
207 SCHMIDHEINY,

supra note 93, at 10-11.

208 Brett A. Stone, Social Responsibility and InstitutionalInvestment: An Empirical
Analysis of the EnvironmentalScreen, 9 J. INVESTING, Fall 2002, at 81-82.
209 See, e.g., David Vogel, Trends in Shareholder Activism: 1970-1982, 25 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 68 (1983); Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh P. Rao, Of What Value are
ShareholderProposalsSponsored by PublicPension Funds?, 73 J. Bus. 177 (2000).
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with the aim to convince management to change its policy. 21°
Shareholder resolutions concerning social policy, governance and
board composition, and voting at annual general meetings are
methods by which investors seek to direct a company towards
more ethically laudable goals.21'
Current figures suggest that whilst there has been no great shift
in investment strategies, there is a blossoming retail investment
market in environmental and social investment funds and growing
commitments to ethical investment among institutional investors.
In Western Europe, there were estimated to be some 250 specialist
ethical investment funds (excluding religious-based funds)
operating in June 2001, up from a mere fifty such funds a decade
earlier. 1 2 Among the better-regarded institutions are the Okobanbk
and UmweltBank in Germany,1 3 the Ethical Investment Cooperative 214 in the United Kingdom, and Canada's Ethical Growth
Fund.2 15 Insurance companies also control a number of
environmental funds, such as Norway's Storebrand Scudder
Environmental Value Fund established in 1996.216 Reflecting its
large equity markets, the United Kingdom accounted for the
largest share with sixty-two funds.21 7 Perhaps, a more relevant
indication of the growth and volume of the ethical investment
210 ELIZABETH JUDD, INVESTING WITH A SOCIAL CONSCIENCE

10 (1990).

9 (1984).
Sustainable Investment Research International Group, Green, Social and Ethical
Funds in Europe 2001, 2002, at 7, at http://www.cseurope.org/uploadstore/
cms/docs/fundsreport2001.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International
Law and Commercial Regulation). Examples of ethical funds include: Friends Provident
Stewardship Unit Trust (U.K.), Banco Samarit Fond (Sweden), and ASN
Aandelensfonds (Holland). Some ethical funds have a particular environmental focus,
such as Jupiter Ecology (U.K.) and KD Fonds Okoinvest (Germany).
213 See Umwelt Bank, at http://www.umweltbank.de (last visited Dec. 2, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
214 See Ethical Investment Co-operative, at http://www.ethicalmoney.org (last
visited Nov. 3, 2002).
215 See Ethical Funds, at http://www.ethicalfunds.com/Do_theright thing (last
visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
216 See
Storebrand,
at
http://www.storebrand.no/storebrand/nyaapen/
omp.nsflhome.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
217 Id.
211 AMY DoMN1 & PETER D. KINDER, ETHICAL INVESTING

212
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sector is its relative market share. In the United Kingdom ethical
investment in September 2001 comprised a mere 3.5% share of the
investment market, compared to 13% in the United States.21 8 In
Canada, environmentally and socially responsible investment
assets were estimated in June 2000 at some C$49.9 billion,
representing 3.2% of the retail mutual fund market and the
institutional investment market.219
In addition to niche investment entities, mainstream
investment houses are seeking to offer environmental and social
responsibility investment lines. For example, VicSuper, one of the
largest public superannuation funds in Australia, in December
2001 opened an environmental investment option that allows
members to channel their account balance into environmentally
sound companies.220 Overall, the value of the world's ethical
investment portfolio was estimated in September 2001 at US$1.42
trillion (excluding the church sector), the United States
overwhelmingly dominated, holding 92% of the portfolio. 22' The
emergence of several indices to track ethical investments point to
the growing legitimacy of this sector. Leading ethical investment
indices include the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index
(DJSGI) 222 and the United Kingdom's Financial Times Stock
Exchange's (FTSE) "ethical index. 223
Incorporating environmental performance into the investment
calculus can be complicated. Obstacles include uncertainty
concerning the environmental integrity of a product or company
performance and the problem of comparing corporate
218 Cerulli Associates, The Cerulli Edge-Global Edition (Sept. 2001), available at

http://www.cerulli.com/.
219 Social Investment Organization, Canadian Social Investment Review 2000, 2000
at 4, at http://www.socialinvestment.ca (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
220 See Jenny Hunter, VicSuper Leads Australian Superannuation Funds in
Sustainability Investing, AUSTRALASIAN UNEP FIN. INITIATIVES (UNEP Fin. Initiatives,

Austl.), Jan. 2002, at 1 (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
221 Cerulli Associates, supra note 218.
222 See Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index, at http://www.sustainabilityindex.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
223 Stephen Foley, FTSE's "Ethical Index" to Include Oil Giants, THE INDEP., April
12, 2001, at 19.
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environmental performance. 224 Difficulties may occur in defining
the appropriate boundaries of corporate performance - some firms
may appear to achieve superior environmental performance by
sub-contracting or out-sourcing their dirtier operations, thus
raising the question of whether and how the environmental impact
of a company's subsidiaries and suppliers can be included in
analysis. 225 These uncertainties feed the risk of firms "free riding"
on the environmental achievements of others in shared market
sectors. Numerous systems have been formulated for the rating or
ranking of corporate environmental performance, 226 but problems
exist in comparing rival evaluation systems given the existence of
dissimilar assessment methodologies.22 ' To improve the
transparency of rating and ranking systems and increase the
availability of high quality environmental performance data, some
commentators advocate mandatory environmental disclosure
schemes linked to financial reporting.228
Similar complexities permeate the definition of environmental
or ethical investment. The problem with environmental
investments is how to determine eligibility criteria and the
transparency of such offerings. "Ethical investment" tends to be a
self-awarded title; the institutions set their own criteria for what is
ethical. 229 For some, ethical investment products offer a
commodified and privatized ethics that eschew any serious
reflection on the normative issues at stake. Just as the veracity of
notions of business ethics have been questioned and critiqued, so
too the ethical investment movement is vulnerable to being
dismissed as a fagade, in which ethics are connected to profits to
humanize and legitimate capitalism. 23 ° Passively contributing to
224 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Report of the UNEP FinancialInstitutions Initiative
1998 Survey (1999).
225 See generally Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing corporate strategies to mass tort suits).
226 See, e.g., Sustainable Asset Management, Switzerland; Storebrand-Scudder
Environmental Value Fund, Norway; Index of Corporate Environmental Engagement,
Business in the Environment, U.K.
227 Skillius & Wennberg, supra note 98, at 136.
228

Id. at 157-58.

229 See Are Ethical Investors Being Green?, LABOURRES., July 1991, at 13, 14.
230 Paul F.

Ramshaw, Ethical Investment: Retail Ethics and Participatory

Democracy, 29 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 105, 134-35 (1998).
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ethical investment funds arguably cannot be a substitute for proper
ethical deliberation occurring within mainstream political
processes. As Filsner and Cooper caution: "[flor the investor the
environment is not an issue in itself.... Environmental awareness

is simply a framework within which such issues as energy
efficiency, waste management, and product design and packaging
can be examined." '' If so, then reflexive considerations of
environmental impacts within financial markets need to take their
cues from the broader political system regarding the definition of
appropriate environmental uses and standards. Initiatives to
publish independent benchmarks or criteria for ethical investment
practices can assist in providing a useful reference point for
investor activity.232 Ethical investment associations and research
services can also contribute meaningfully to the formulation of
criteria and methodologies for environmental funds because they
are not directly tied to the profit considerations that can impede
the development of ethical positions in mainstream market
institutions.233
2. Institutional investors in corporategovernance
Besides improving access to financial resources for green
companies, ballooning investment funds have also ostensibly
enhanced investors' leverage over corporate management.234
Through their institutional dominance of the equity market, this
barrier to shareholder control has now been somewhat diluted, and
powerful investors are better positioned to be corporate watchdogs
and facilitate improvements in corporate governance. 235 But,
231

Gilly Filsner & Malcolm Cooper, The Environment: A Question of Profit-The

Ordinary Investor and Environmental Issues in Accounting, in GREEN REPORTING:

ACCOUNTANCY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE NINETIES 119, 124 (Dave Owen ed., 1992).
232 See, e.g., The Australian Ethical Charter, at http://www.austethical.com.au/
charter.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
233 See, e.g., INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
NEEDS FOR CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION (1992).
234

See generally
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235 See Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 117, 131 (1988); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 523-24 (1990).
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whilst Geltman argues, "concerned investors have been at the
forefront of forcing management to examine corporate
environmental practices,, 236 others remain skeptical of this side
role of institutional investor practice 237 or at least believe investors
need to be much more proactive in order to be effective. 23 ' For
professional institutional investors, modem investment strategies
are said to have become "the science of constructing the optimal
portfolio" with the focus on "short-term performance and liquidity
rather than the fundamental value of companies. 23 9 But, according
to Monks and Minow, institutional investors "have two
indisputable motives for paying close attention to [corporate]
ownership: avoiding liability for breach of fiduciary duty and
enhancing portfolio values by promoting management
accountability. '24 ° Because of these basic characteristics, some
scholars believe investors may be able to influence corporate
environmental behavior directly through pressure on corporate
management or indirectly through share trading tactics. 241 Thus,
removal of specific regulatory constraints on institutional activism
may make more extensive institutional influence possible.
Fund managers have an incentive to nurture good corporate
governance because of their fiduciary duty to take an active role in
institutions by the full exercise of their principal's shareholder
entitlements, including voting of proxies.242 This fiduciary duty
obliges them to carefully monitor their holdings and protect the
value of investments. It may necessitate balancing index fund

236 Elizabeth G. Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism and the
Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465, 467 (1997) (for example through shareholder
proposals).
237 See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEoL. J. 445, 452 (1991).
238 See P. Hatchwell, Sleeping Tigers: The Impact of 'Green' Investors 38 ENV'T
INFORMATION BULLETIN 16 (1994).
239 Helen Garten, InstitutionalInvestors and the New FinancialOrder,44 RUTGERS

L. REV. 585, 607 (1992); see also BEVIS LONGSTRETH,
MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 83-84 (1986).
240 ROBERT

A.G.

MODERN INVESTMENT

MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY 18 (1991).

241 See GUNNINGHAM & GRABOSKY, supra note 34, at 113-14.
242 See generally ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 92-

129 (1982) (introducing pension fund management).
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strategies with active monitoring. 243 The nature of fiduciary duties,
however, varies among institutions, and life insurance companies
are not subject to fiduciary responsibilities analogous to those
imposed upon pension fund trustees. Arguments advancing the
regulatory role of institutional investors often focus on the
possibility of enhanced shareholder control, since individual
shareholders generally lack the resources or economic incentives
to participate in monitoring management actions.
In contrast to individual investors, institutional funds are
acquiring a role in corporate governance in several ways. A
primary way is through enhanced market control derived from
equity and debt holdings. As major shareholders, institutional
investors have a central role in takeovers. 44 Second, control via
equity can occur through increased shareholder activism,
manifested by voting decisions, resolutions, and other mechanisms
for influencing management.245 Shareholder proposals sponsored
by institutional investors are a routine tactic by which institutions
seek to achieve their goals in disciplining corporate management
or influencing aspects of company policy. 246 Control through debt
is more important for corporate supervision in continental Europe
and Japan, where banks play a key role in monitoring finances.247
Holland suggests investee companies may hold important
advantages over conventional state regulation: "active and
effective use of this interconnected system of (corporate
governance) controls may therefore reduce the need for more
formal and costly additional legislation, and for extensive
monitoring and implementation of sanctions by public policy

243 Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of Prevention: Meeting the
Fiduciary Duty to Monitor and Index Fund through Relationship Investing, 20 J. CORP.

L. 413, 414-16 (1995).
244 See Rakesh Duggal & James A. Millar, Institutional Investors, Antitakeover
Defenses and Success of Hostile Takeover Bids, 34 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 387, 389, 399
(1994).
245 See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and

Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 279
(2000).
246 William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference?, HARV. BUS. REV.,

Sept.-Oct. 1990 at 70, 74; see also Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The
Motivation andImpactof PensionFundActivism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 335 (1999).
247 Blommestein, supra note 110, at 65.
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248

makers."
The expanding influence of institutional investors in corporate
governance has been noted in various jurisdictions.249 InCanada,
institutional investors have been reported abandoning traditional
passive investment strategies, especially in relation to combating
ineffectual management. In the United States, pension funds
have exploited the shareholder proposal procedure provided under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934251 including proposals about
environmental accountability on annual meeting ballots. 2 But, in
the United Kingdom, the recent Myners report revealed "evidence
of general reluctance
to tackle corporate underperformance in
investee companies,''253 attributable to such factors as a culture
among investor institutions that "seeks to avoid conflict" 54 and a
potential conflict of interest, where fund managers hold a financial
interest in investee companies.255
IV. Potential Barriers to Ethical Investment
A. Limited shareholderliability
The prophesied role of institutional investors steering markets
toward sustainable development faces various legal and economic
restraints. Whilst probably not insurmountable barriers, they do
require government intervention to be overcome. Limited
shareholder liability is one such restraint. The cardinal principle in
Western corporate law is the axiom that the company is a separate
legal person from the members who comprise it.25 6 A corollary

248 Id.

See, e.g., Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 246.
250 See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, InstitutionalShareholders and CorporateGovernance
in Canada, 26 CAN. Bus. L. J. 145, 178-79 (1996).
251 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.73-291, ch. 404, § 14(a), 48 Stat.
881 (1934) (codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811, § 78n (2000 & Supp. V
1999)).
252 See Geltman & Stroback, supra note 235, at 483.
249

253 PAUL MYNERS, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: A REVIEW

10(2001).
254 Id. at 11.
255

Id. at 14.

256

See, e.g., Saloman v. Saloman & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22, 27.
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principle is that absent exceptional circumstances, investors in the
company are not liable beyond the amount they invest. 257 If the
value of liability or other claims against the company exceeds the
value of the firm's assets, the owners risk losing only their
investment in the company. The corporate law doctrine of limited
liability is now legislated in nearly all jurisdictions.258 Corporate
limited liability has the potential adverse effect of transferring
uncompensated business risks to creditors 219 and can undermine
the "polluter pays" principle 260 to the extent that insolvent firms
are able to abandon environmental debts. Thus, in principle,
imposing liability on institutional shareholding investors for the
environmental impacts of their portfolio companies could
discourage environmentally irresponsible investments.
In practice, however, extending shareholder liability would be
politically contentious and could create major economic
disincentives to new investment. This ceiling on liability is
justified because it is seen as serving a number of beneficial
functions. Limited liability is applauded for encouraging business
formation by sparing investors the risk of personal financial
ruin. 261 Additionally, by limiting the risks faced by shareholders to
the amount they contribute, limited liability improves the liquidity
and efficiency of security markets.262 It also reduces the
monitoring costs of shareholders; investors need no longer
individually monitor management behavior to prevent losses they
would otherwise incur. Concomitantly, the reduced monitoring
burden enables investors to achieve a more efficient, diversified
portfolio of assets to reduce their risk of business failure.2 " These
justifications for limited liability, however, have been strongly
257 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 89-90 (1985).
258 Although limited liability is commonly seen as a concession bestowed by the
state, Easterbrook and Fischel argue that firms would in any event attempt to secure it by
contract. Id. at 93.
259 Id. at 91.
260

See supra notes 79-80, 176-181 and accompanying text.

261

Id. at 94.

262

See Kevin F. Forbes, Limited Liability and the Development of the Business

Corporation,2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 163, 165 (1986); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DAVID

42 (1991).
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 257, at 96-97.

FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
263
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contested and are seen by some commentators as out-weighed by
the moral hazard that arises when corporations over-invest in risky
activities.264 Certainly, the crushing exertion of environmental
liability will, in due course, force liquidation of the enterprise,265
but not before the enterprise has inflicted severe harm from a
social efficiency standpoint.
In contrast to the received wisdom of limited shareholder
liability, Blumberg argues that the doctrine was introduced as a
"political response to economic and political pressures, rather than
as a necessary consequence of the entity concept., 266 Limited
liability for shareholders is in effect a subsidy for investment,
insulating shareholders from the environmental risks incurred by
corporations and so encouraging over-investment in hazardous
activities. 267 The concentration of stock ownership by a few
companies or individuals suggests that the reality of shareholder
and corporation separation can be a fiction. In the circumstance of
a closely held corporation or corporations wholly owned by a
parent corporation, it has been argued that limited liability should
be abandoned.268 Major institutional shareholders, relatively well
placed to obtain information and monitor the risks of companies'
activities, may also be in a position to influence the environmental
activities of corporations. 269 The victims of toxic torts and
statutory violations, by contrast, arguably are less well placed to
monitor and avoid the environmental risks of companies'
activities. Limiting the liability of investors is also associated with
shareholder passivity by "decreasing the personal responsibility on
which the integrity of democratic institutions depends. 27 °
264 Henry B. Hansmann & Reiner Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liabilityfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879, 1883 (1991); James A. Brander &
Tracey R. Lewis, Oligopoly and FinancialStructure: The Limited Liability Effect, 76

AM. ECON. REV. 956, 956-57 (1986).
265 Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 689, 715 (1985).
266 Philip 1. Blumberg, Limited Liability and CorporateGroups, II J. CORP. L. 573,

595 (1987).
267 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 264.
268 Blumberg, supra note 266, at 630; see also Paul Halpern et al., An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability in CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117, 148 (1980).
269

See Gillan & Starks, supra note 245.

270 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 240, at 10.
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Various mechanisms have been devised to neutralize the
adverse effects of limited liability short of its wholesale
abandonment.2 ' These include equitable corporate-veil piercing
rules and statutory exceptions purporting to override limited
liability rules where actions inconsistent with the separate
personality of entity and owners have been taken.272 Corporate
veil-piercing may be permissible for a closely-held corporation,
where there is greater scope for shareholder monitoring and
participation in management.273 In general, however, courts rarely
pierce the veil, which usually requires the presence of a highly
dominating shareholder that has manipulated the corporate
structure to defeat some public convenience or perpetrate a fraud
or

other

crime. 27' For

example,

in Anglo-American

law,

institutional investors and other financial institutions that behave
like "shadow directors" can become liable for corporate
decisions. 275 Examples of statutory exceptions under the United
States's Superfund legislation include imposing responsibility on
parent companies for the pollution cleanup costs generated by its
subsidiaries.276 But, attempts to statutorily hold shareholders
directly liable for their company's environmental impact have not
been entirely successful because of narrow interpretations by
courts of liability producing situations.277

271 See Steven B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited
Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 157 (1992); N.A.
Mendelsohn, A Control-BasedApproach to ShareholderLiability for Corporate Torts,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1271-72 (2002).
272 See Presser, supra note 261, at 157; Carsten Alting, Piercingthe Corporate Veil
in American and German Law-Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative
View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187, 190 (1995); Mendelsohn, supra note 271, at
1271-72.
273 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 257, at 94; see also PHILIP BLUMBERG,
THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, SUBSTANTIVE LAW 110-11 (1987).
274 JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS 43-48 (2000).

275 See N.R. Campbell, Liability as a Shadow Director, 1994 J. Bus. L. 609.
276 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2762 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675); see
Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy Schipani, CERCLA and the Erosion of TraditionalCorporate
Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 260 (1992).
277 See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L. Ed. 2d
43 (1998) (considering whether a parent corporation could be liable under Superfund for
the polluting activities of its subsidiaries).
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Scholars have debated at length alternative means of achieving
a balance between the economic virtues of limited liability and the
need to contain its cost externalities. 78 Mendelson has advocated a
''capacity to control" test whereby major investors that possess a
controlling influence could be held liable for corporate wrongs.27 9
In relation to lender liability, Superfund liability was interpreted in
the seminal United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. case as extending
to a bank lender where its involvement in the financial
management of the corporation gave it the "capacity to influence"
decisions, despite the lack of involvement in the actual operation
of the business. ° The Court of Appeals reasoned that extending
liability to lenders would create disincentives for banks to extend
financial assistance to businesses with potential waste problems.28 '
Liability for a corporation's environmental damages could also be
imposed on a shareholder when the size of its holdings gave it the
influence
the
corporation. 82
capacity
to significantly
Consequently, institutional investors in a controlling position
would be compelled to supervise company managers more closely
to minimize the company's exposure to environmental or other
liabilities. On the other hand, Mendelson argues a capacity to
control test would continue to offer the efficiencies that noncontrolling small investors enjoy under limited liability.283
Determination of what amounts to a controlling influence, of
course, would require careful consideration in cases where
shareholders hold less than a majority of the equity.284 In addition
to discouraging overly risky activities, imposing liability on
controlling investors would likely reduce demand for shares in
companies that continue to engage in risky activities.285 Yet, a
278

Mendelson, supra note 271, at 1204-05.

279

Id. at 1206.

280

United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1 th Cir. 1990).

281 See Michael B. Kupin, New Alterations of the Lender Liability Landscape:
CERCLA After the Fleet FactorsDecision, 19 REAL EST. L. J. 191, 214-17 (1991).
282 See id.
283

Mendelson, supranote 272, at 1271-79.

284 It has been suggested that holding only five to ten percent of corporate shares
may amount to possessing some significant control. See Victor Brudney, Equal
Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations,71 CAL. L.
REV. 1072, 1073-74 n.2 (1983).
285 See id.
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capacity to control test could have an over-deterrence effect
because by imposing liability entirely on the controlling
shareholder, rather than all shareholders, it could encourage the
controlling entity to deter corporate management from undertaking
somewhat risky but overall socially valuable investments.286 For
the foreseeable future, it does not appear that legislators or courts
are likely to embrace any far-reaching changes to the doctrine of
corporate limited liability.287
B. FiduciaryActivism and CorporateEnvironmental
Responsibility
The level of institutional activism is often not easy to
determine because, as one commentator sees it, "[t]here is a lot of
'behind the scenes' or 'paddling under water' involved in
influencing companies.""2 8 Institutional investors theoretically gain
direct power from the voting rights present in their ownership
stakes, and the greater the stake in the company the greater the
potential influence.289 This power may include the right to vote on
appointment of directors, approve or reject proposed mergers, sell
substantial assets, and charter amendments.29 ° Yet, because of
legal constraints on, concentrated ownership; fiduciary obligations
that require extensive diversification to minimize risk; and a
strong preference for liquidity, institutional investment agents
have tended to seek portfolios comprised of fragmented holdings
across a plethora of companies.2 91 This fragmentation can reduce
the influence of an investor or discourage activism because the
stakes may be considered too small given the size of the
institution's equity holdings.2 92 A cardinal principle of creating an

286

See id.

287

See id.

288 John Holland, Self Regulation and the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance, 1996 J. Bus. L. 127, 138.
289 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.
L. & ECON. 395 (1983).

290 Id.at 400.
See W. Lee, Modern Portfolio Theory and the Investment of Pension Funds, in
EQUITY AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIPS 284, 301-03 (P. Finn ed., 1987).
292 See id. at 303.
291
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efficient investment portfolio is diversification. 293 Theory suggests
that rational economic actors who diversify only face
undiversifiable or "systemic" risk, this being the general risk of
to5
the market as against a particular share.294 But, according 29
Garten, "the logic of diversification ...may dictate otherwise.
Holding twenty rather than 2,000 stocks may lower the cost of
monitoring all portfolio companies as well as increasing the
from active
investor's share of any gain (or loss) resulting
296
company.
each
of
affairs
the
involvement in
Besides the effects of portfolio diversification, institutional
passivity has been linked to uni-dimensional corporate
performance indicators, such as share price movements and
quarterly earnings statements, which can foster a short-term
orientation among market players. 297 Fund managers are typically
measured on annual or quarterly appreciation of funds compared
to stock indexes, serving to heighten their attention to short-term
stock price movements. 298 Further, "return-conscious" managers
may be hesitant to risk the costs of institutional activism.29 9 Like
entrenched corporate managers, who use control to advance their
own interests at the expense of shareholders, professional money
managers may fail to act properly for the interests of their
beneficiaries.3"' Mutual funds, designed for maximum liquidity
because they offer daily sale or repurchase, are considered
particularly vulnerable to short-term and passive investment
decision-making. 3"' Because of their extended liabilities, life
293 See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF

(1986).
For analysis of economic theories of systemic market risk, see E. PHILIP
DEBT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND SYSTEMIC RISK 133-34 (1992).
295 Garten, supra note 239, at 624.
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 11-15
294

DAVIS,

296 Id.

297 Rada & Trisoglio, supranote 133, at 45.
298 See Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Failing Capital
Investment System, 70 HARV. Bus. REV. 65, 67 (1992); Martin Lipton & Stephen A.
Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of
Directors 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 205-13 (1991) (discussing the effects of competition
among fund managers).
299 Garten, supra note 239, at 627.
300 Id.

at 628-29.

301 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 240, at 201-02.
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insurance companies and pension funds are instruments for longerterm saving over periods of twenty or thirty years.302 Both
institutional sectors face only small liquidity risks, emanating
principally from transfers and withdrawals in the case of pension
funds, and premature surrenders in the case of insurers.303 Further,
the enormous size of some funds significantly diminishes the
option of full disinvestments from a company, owing to the
potential adverse effect on share price.3"4 The spread of indexed
portfolios also means that funds are compelled to adhere to overall
market trends." 5
In addition to the debates regarding investor myopia,
institutional investors may face obstacles when coordinating
action against under-performing
company management.
Fragmented portfolio holdings may have the effect of reducing the
influence of institutional investment funds unless investors are
able to coordinate their influence.3"6 Proxy rules in some
jurisdictions may hamper inter-institutional communication and
coalition formation against incumbent management.30 7 For
example, until recently, the Canada Business Corporations Act of
1985 allowed corporate management to bar shareholder proposals
lodged "primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic,
political, religious, social, or similar causes '3 8 from the
management proxy circular.30 9 Overall, the regulatory trend in
industrial economies has been for securities watchdogs
progressively to liberalize rules restricting shareholder proposals
from management's proxy statement.31 °
Apart from proxy rules, institutions may lack incentives to take
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See id.
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Davies, supra note 192, at 79.
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Id.

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:An
Agenda for InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865-67 (1991).
306 Id.
305

307 See John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC., Investor Protection versus Market
Efficiency, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1991).
308 R.S., 1985, c. C-44, s. 1; 1994, s. 137(5)(b).
309

This provision was repealed in February 2001. R.S., 2001, c-14, s. 59.

See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Corporate Governance in the Nineties: Managers vs.
Institutions, 59 U. CiN. L. REV. 357, 371-72 (1990).
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action individually if intervention in corporate affairs achieves
small, deferred, and diffused benefits, whilst the upfront
transaction costs are large.3 ' Macey argues that the returns from
institutional investment activism are invariably shared with other
investors, yet these rival investment funds may not incur any of
the costs. 31 2 Some other scholars suggest the costs of institutional
activism may be over-stated.3"3 According to Garten, "institutional
activism does not have to be expensive. Reading proxy material
and voting is easy. Submitting a proposal for inclusion in the
company's proxy statement is less expensive than mounting a
proxy fight. Telephoning incumbent management may be the
cheapest action of all."3"4 Some forms of activism, such as
shareholder proposals,. also offer the possibility for economies of
scale for institutions holding shares in multiple companies.315
Further, through the emergence of institutional shareholder
organizations, such as the United States's Council of Institutional
Investors or the Association of Canadian Pension Management,
many collective action problems may dissipate. 1 6
In Anglo-American legal systems, Parkinson identifies two
means by which institutional investors have cooperated to
intervene in corporate affairs.3" 7 These are collective action
through peak associations, and informal collaboration among
institutions to apply pressure on individual company boards.318
Intervention is most common in a crisis management scenario.319
In the bank-based economy of Germany, where banks often hold
significant equity stakes in companies in addition to providing
debt financing, banks more actively supervise corporate clients'
See id. at 370.
Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional Investors and Corporate Monitoring: A
Demand-Side Perspective, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 601, 608 (1997).
313 Garten, supra note 239, at 627.
311

312

314

Id.

315 Black, supra note 235, at 581-84. Garten comments, "an institution can limit its
lobbying efforts to one test case, which, if well publicized, may persuade other
companies to accept the [shareholder] proposal." Garten, supra note 239, at 644.
316 Black, supranote 235, at 608.
317 John E. Parkinson, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY:

THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 168-69 (1993).
318

Id.
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affairs.3 2' German banks have been known to take account of
environmental concerns in their investment decision-making.32'
Japanese banks have been known to oust incumbent management
with their own nominees where firms have performed poorly.322
Also, in both jurisdictions, the corporate equity holders more often
adopt longer-term investment positions than do institutional
investors in the United States or United Kingdom.323 In the latter,
collective action by institutions has covered such matters as
executive compensation and proposals that directly affect
shareholders' influence within the company or schemes posing
major corporate change.324 Investors are less likely to intervene to
change business policy, although the possibility to do so arises
particularly when a company needs to replenish its finances
through the capital markets.325 Cohen argues that through the use
of codes of conduct and other measures, "fiduciary activism by
pension and mutual funds has begun to extend beyond prosaic
issues of corporate governance to encompass sensitive policies
'
with respect to social issues and environmental management."326
Overall, according to Davies, "the essence of the problem, if
one wants to encourage more institutional activism, is how to shift
the balance of advantage for institutions somewhat away from
sale.., and somewhat towards intervention in cases of underperforming companies. 327 Institutional investors are increasingly
rejecting the "Wall Street" rule, which stipulates that an investor
should sell a company's stock if he or she dislikes the decisions of

320 Theodor Baums, CorporateGovernance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40
AM. J. Comp. L. 503 (1992).
321 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS, 145-46 (2000)
(discussing pressures by Deutsche Bank to sell Monsanto shares because of the
company's involvement in controversial genetically modified crop developments).
322 Macey, supra note 312, at 607.
323 MICHAEL L. GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF

JAPANESE BUSINESS 29-30 (1992).
324 Davies, supra note 192, at 85.
325 See id.
326 Maurie Cohen, Evidence of a New Environmental Ethic: Assessing the Trend
Towards Investor and Consumer Activism, in THE ROLE OF BUSINESS ETHICS IN
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 111, 118 (Ian Jones & Michael Pollitt eds., 1998).

327 Davies, supra note 192, at 91.
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management. 328 Because the sell option can have the effect of
depreciating share prices and harming the selling institution,329
investors need ways to prompt managers to take actions necessary
to protect investments. The growing popularity of index-tracking
funds also tends to lock investors into the market and remove the
exit option. Nevertheless, shifting from a sell strategy to a voice
strategy may generate other structural and operational challenges
for institutional investors. Where institutions have both a business
and an investment relationship with firms, such a commercial
symbiosis may pose a barrier to effective institutional activism in
corporate governance. 33 0 This dual relationship arises for banks
where, in addition to holding equity, they wish to provide loans to
the same firm.
For several reasons, insurers probably have a greater symbiosis
" ' Insurers often have an
with the firms in which they invest.33
equity investment in the same company that they either sold
insurance to or would like to sell insurance to in the future. There
is a potential conflict of interest in these dual commercial
relationships. For instance, institutional investors, such as banks
and insurers, may be taciturn to assert influence in firms in which
they hold shares for fear that firm managers may sever the
business relationship. Thus, David and Kochhar suggest, "the
increase in investment value possible through active intervention
may be nullified through loss of business with the firm. ' 332 In
some jurisdictions, governments have legislated to circumscribe
the extent to which insurers are allowed to invest their funds in
equities.333 Other investors, such as public pension funds and
mutual funds, which do not have business relationships, may be
able to play an active role in corporate governance.33 4 But, some
328 John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as

CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288 (1991).
329 See id. at 1287-89; William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Difference?, 68
HARV. Bus. REV. 70, 71 (1990).

330 Parthiban David & Rahul Kochhar, Barriersto Effective CorporateGovernance
by InstitutionalInvestors: Implicationsfor Theory and Practice, 14 EUR. MGMT. J. 457,
460 (1996).

331 Monks & Minow, supra note 240, at 207.
332 David & Kochhar, supra note 330, at 460.
333 Id.

334 Black, supra note 235, at 595-604.
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commentators, drawing inspiration from German and Japanese
models of corporate governance, do not now view multiple
financial relationships as a problem, but rather see them as
offering superior avenues for investor influence beyond merely a
shareholder voice.335 Recent moves in other countries to allow the
creation of multi-service financial institutions may eventually
allow deeper relationship investing than has been possible in
recent decades.336
Whatever the means of influence available, it is important that
decision-makers in investment institutions have an appropriate
level of expertise effectively to take account of environmental and
other ethical issues in their portfolio companies. In OCED
countries,337 there are few legal requirements for such decisionmakers to develop the skills they need to discharge their
investment responsibilities.
Investment regulations
have
traditionally focused on protecting beneficiaries from gross
mismanagement or incompetence rather than facilitating proactive,
effective investment.338 Further, regulatory requirements have
tended to concentrate on issues of process and procedure rather
than on investment outcomes. According to a U.K. study, most
pension fund trustees "do not have extensive knowledge of
investment issues, and in particular do not have detailed
' Furthermore,
knowledge of issues relating to their own funds."339
this U.K. report found that few pension funds have an investment
committee of in-house professionals to assist trustees.340 On the
question of degree of expertise required by trustees, English case
law has stated, "it is the duty of the trustee to conduct the business
335 Garten, supra note 239, at 610.
336

Id. at 659.

337 OECD permanent member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Spain, South Korea, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. OECD Website, at
http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-countrylist-0nodirecotrate-no-no-159-0,00.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2003).
338 See JULIAN FRANKS & COLIN MAYER, RISK, REGULATION, AND INVESTOR
PROTECTION: THE CASE OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (1989).
339 Myners, supra note 253, at 40.

340 Id.
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of the trust with the same care as an ordinary man of business
would extend towards his own affairs. 34' Under the U.S.
Employment, Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, a higher
standard applies. Fiduciaries are required to discharge their duties
with the skill and care of someone familiar with the issues
concerned.342 Where pension trustees are under no legal duty to
become educated in investment matters and lack in-house
expertise, investment decision-makers risk having insufficient
capacity to evaluate critically advice from external advisers.
In the absence of appropriate specialist expertise, institutional
activism may be useful only in advancing broad-based policy
reforms regarding environmental management rather than solving
firm-specific operational issues. This suggests certain limitations
to potential models for enlisting investors as agents of
environmental policy. Fund managers are recruited for their
expertise in portfolio management, not for their ability to run
companies-let alone advise on environmental practices. The
ability of investors to access external sources of environmental
expertise coupled with improved provision of corporate
environmental information, such as through reporting
requirements, will be crucial to facilitating institutional activism in
corporate environmental policy.
C. Ethical Investment and FinancialPerformance
Apart from the rules and responsibilities governing investors'
interaction with corporate governance, financial incentives for
ethical investing ultimately shape institutional investors'
commitment to ethical investing. According to a Bank of America
representative, "to promote environmental performance benefits to
the financial community, it will be necessary not only to show
evidence of performance but also to illustrate the financial
'
benefits."343
Various studies have measured the relationship
between the social or environmental responsibility of a company

341 Barlett v. Barclays Bank (No.1) [1980] 1 All ER 139, 140, Ch. 515, at 531, per

Brightman J.
342 As defined by regulations made by the Department of Labor, 29 CFR §
2550.404a-1 (2002).
343 Evan C. Henry, The Value of Environmental Performance to Financial
Stakeholders, 22 UNEP INDUSTRY. & ENv'T 11, 11 (1999).
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and its economic achievements.344 Proponents of ethical investing
dispute the notion that incorporation of ethical principles into
investment decisions compromises financial returns. Bromberg
claims that because of the "exceptional returns and widespread
popularity" of some ethical investment funds, "profit-seeking
investors... have unwittingly become the strongest proponents of
ethical investment strategies. 345 Yet, if environmentally
responsible funds offer their investors good market rates of return,
then why create them? If it is profitable to be environmentally
responsible, then all that would need to be done is to enliven
corporate managers to be smarter profit maximizers.
Debates over the differences in the risk/return ratio between
traditional and ethical investments have been the most contentious
issue in assessing green financing. According to modern portfolio
theory, fund managers who engage in traditional investing are
solely concerned with protection of funds through the attainment
of the highest possible return on an investment, representing some
acceptable degree of risk.346 Being preoccupied with risk and
return, the traditional fund manager will seek to diversify
investments in order to lower risk and increase yield.347 Rational
investment demands that a given investment provide a higher rate
of return to compensate for increased risk such as when risk and
return are positively correlated. Against this theory, ethical
investment is said by some to involve a less attractive risk/return
ratio than traditional investing if capital markets are efficient.348
Langbein and Posner argue that ethical investment entails higher
risks because portfolios designed in accordance with ethical
principles are less diversified, and thus contain more risk than
344 See, e.g., Jean McGuire et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm
FinancialPerformance, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 854 (1988) 31(4); Ronald M. Roman et al.,
The Relationship Between Social and FinancialPerformance: Repainting a Portrait,38
Bus. & Soc'Y 109 (1999).
345 Matthew Bromberg, Social Investing: The Good Guys Finish First 67 Bus. &
SoC'y REV. 32, 32 (1988).
346 WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, 20 (1970).
347 See also WILLIAM F. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, 2024 (1970); RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FINANCE, 136-39 (3d ed. 1988).
348 John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of Trusts,
79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 94 (1980).
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portfolios based on profit maximization."' Ethical investment
portfolios are less diversified because the use of negative screens
excludes investment in certain stocks. Langbein and Posner also
suggest that the additional administrative burden of stock selection
and monitoring raises the transaction costs of ethical investment
strategies.35 °
Underpinning modern portfolio theory is the assumption that
capital markets operate efficiently.351 Several characteristics of
capital markets are relevant to the efficiency issue, including
highly imperfect information that can be costly to collect; the
existence of principal-agent relationships that create agency costs;
and important externalities of investment decisions.352 Research
suggests that because inefficient speculative booms disturb capital
markets, it may be possible for ethical investment strategies to
maximize income.353 Shiller argues that in practice many
investment decisions are based on emotion or impression rather
than derived from objective information.354 Hylton asserts that
investors typically "chase trends," thereby creating "speculative
booms or 'bubbles' that move prices away from fundamentals. 355
Inefficient markets undermine the separation theorem, an
important corollary of portfolio management theory. The theorem
holds that investors will maximize their incomes by separating
investment and spending decisions, in other words, the criteria
governing firm investment decisions as against the investor's
personal consumption tastes.356 By maximizing income, in theory,
investors will then have more to spend in a charitable way than
349 Id. at 77-89.

350 Id. at 94.
351
352

Id. at 77-79.
Id. at 93.

353 For a discussion of the inefficiency of capital markets, see Fischer Black, Noise,
41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further
Evidence on Investor Overreaction and Stock Market Sensationality, 42 J. FIN. 557
(1987).
354 Robert Shiller, Speculative Prices andPopular Models, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. Spring
1990, at 56-63.
355 Maria O'Brien Hylton, Socially Responsible Investing. Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1,25 (1992).
356 See Yoram Kroll & Haim Levy, Further Tests of the Separation Theorem and
the CapitalAssetPricingModel, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 664 (1992).
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would be possible if they engaged in sub-optimal efficiency
strategies by mixing investment and spending decisions. But,
under inefficient capital markets, theory suggests participating
ethical investors possibly can maximize their investment income,
whilst engaging in consumption in direct contravention of the
separation theorem.357
Data regarding the actual performance of ethical investment is
ambiguous partly because of the threshold problems of
formulating appropriate benchmarks and timeframes. According to
Hylton's analysis, "the [ethical investment] funds do not appear to
'beat' the traditional market consistently ... but the fact that some
funds outperformed the market may be further evidence in support
'
of the inefficiency hypothesis."358
During the 1990s, ethical
investment, especially in relation to the environment, gained
greater legitimacy in sharemarkets. As noted earlier, in September
1999, the Dow Jones Indexes launched the Dow Jones
Sustainability Group Index (DJSGI),35 9 which reportedly
outperformed the Dow Jones Global Index between 1993 and
2000 by growing some 180% compared to growth of only 125%
for the Global Index.36°
The question of relative financial performance between ethical
and traditional investment is also germane to claims that policies
that favor ethical investment may be illegal when practiced by
general institutional investors, such as occupational pension
funds.3 6' Certainly in some jurisdictions, general institutional
investors, like those not privately established specifically as an
ethical investment vehicle, may be reluctant to favor ethical
investment because of legal rules both in equity and statute which
357 Hylton, supra note 355, at 27.
358 Id. at 31.

359 See
Dow
Jones
Sustainability
Group
Index,
available
at
http://indexes.dowjones.com/jsp/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 27, 2002).
360 See European Commission, Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework
for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 9 (July 2001), available at http://www.eiro.
eurofound.ie/2001/07/feature/EU0107228F.html.
361 John H.

Langbein,

Social Investing of Pension Funds and

University

Endowments: Unprincipled, Futile, and Illegal, in DISINVESTMENT: IS IT LEGAL? IS IT

MORAL? IS IT PRODUCTIVE? 16 (John H. Langbein et al. eds., 1985); see also James J.
Angel & Pietra Rivoli, Does Ethical Investing Impose a Cost Upon the Firm? A
Theoretical Perspective, 6 J. INVESTING, winter 1997, at 57.
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govern fiduciary behavior in private welfare and pension funds.
Trustee investors, having the legal fiduciary responsibility to
exercise prudence and due diligence, may find the least risky
course is to mimic the investment strategies of their peers. As
noted above, because environmentally responsible investments
may eliminate many potential investment choices, they have been
criticized for being more risky without providing for
correspondingly higher expected returns.362 Hutchinson and Cole
have argued that an ethically sensitive, as opposed to dictated,
investment policy can be compatible with financial objectives and
trust law considerations, when ethical considerations are invoked
to select from economically comparable investment alternatives.363
At a theoretical level, trust law has been viewed by some
commentators as potentially offering the ideal legal framework for
encapsulating our environmental responsibilities to the future.
Because trust law embodies the well-established notion of
responsible action on behalf of another, Scott argues it can provide
a basis for articulating our obligations to future generations
through requirements to protect and sustainably manage
environmentally significant goods.3 64 Trust law precedents, such as
duties to safeguard trust principal and avoid speculative, risky
investments, can be construed as congruous with sustainability
precepts to preserve natural capital and act in a precautionary
manner. 365 Even the trust doctrine of enhancing portfolio
diversification, argues Scott, can be construed as consistent with
sustainable development, since by "continuing to convert natural
into human-made capital, the portfolio held in trust gradually loses
diversity and becomes vulnerable to catastrophe. 366 The challenge
for policy-makers is to design institutional arrangements that can
harness the insights of trust doctrine into practical standards for
362 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 419-20 (3d ed. 1986).

363 James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment
of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PENN L. REV. 1340, 1345-46

(1980).
364 See Anthony Scott, Trust Law, Sustainability, and Responsible Action, 31
ECOLOGICAL ECON.

139; see also EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL

EQUITY (1989).
365

Scott, supra note 364, at 145-49.

366 Id. at 149.
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the conservation of environmental resources.
Current jurisprudence falls short of embodying such an ideal
of intergenerational equity. Extensive debate both in the courts and
among scholars regarding the legality of ethical investment
exists. 3 67 To illustrate, in the United Kingdom, notions of fiduciary

responsibility in equity were interpreted in the seminal cases of
Cowan v. Scargill (1984),368 Martin v. City of Edinburgh District

Council (1988),369 and Harries v. Church Commissioners of
England (1992).370 These cases constrained pension fund trustees
from considering ethical factors in investment policy. In terms of
general trust law, the basic proposition was stated by Megarry V-C
in Cowan v. Scargill as: "when the purpose of the trust is to
provide financial benefits for the beneficiaries ... the best

interests of the beneficiaries are normally their best financial
interests.""37 In reaching this view, Megarry emphasized the
trustees' duty to consider diversification of investments and to
take such care as an ordinary prudent person would in such
circumstances.372
However, Megarry acknowledged that in rare situations the
notion of "benefit" might mean that if all the beneficiaries of the
trust were adults With strict moral views, then receiving significant
investment returns from sinful activities they disapproved of
would not be to their benefit.373 This approach was upheld in
Martin, where Lord Murray found that councillors serving as
trustees, who sought to eschew investments in apartheid South
Africa, were in breach of trust.3 74' However, he appeared to qualify
the basic fiduciary principle by noting that to ask the trustee to
"divest himself of all personal preferences, of all political beliefs,
367

See, e.g., Canada-Manitoba:Investments by Trustees: Ethical Considerations,

19 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1534-35 (1993); R. Ellison, The Golden Fleece? Ethical
Investment andFiduciaryLaw, 5 TRUST L. INT'L 157 (1991).
368
369

Cowan v. Scargill, 1 Ch. 270, 287 (1985), 2 All E.R. 750, 761 (1984).
Martin v. City of Edinburgh Dist. Council, 1998 S.L.T. 329 (O.H.).

370 Bishop of Oxford v. Church Comm'r of Eng., 1 W.L.R. 1241, 1246 (1992), 2 All
E.R. 300, 305 (1993).
371 Cowan, 1 Ch. at 287 (involving investment policy of a miner's pension fund, and
a proposal that the policy should exclude investment in energies competing with coal).
372 Id. at 289.

373 Cowan, 2 All E.R. at 761.
374 Id.at 762.
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and of all moral, religious or other conscientiously held principles"
' Thus, trustees would
was neither "reasonable" nor "practicable."375
be expected to recognize their own preferences and attempt to act
fairly and impartially.376 In Harries v. Church Commissioners of
England, which involved a dispute over the investment policy of
church funds, Nicholls V-C appeared more sympathetic to ethical
considerations than in earlier cases, suggesting that trustees may
accommodate views on moral objectives, such as eschewing sin
stocks, provided that this did not involve a significant risk of
financial detriment.377
In the United States, argument has focused on whether ethical
investment through pension funds is contrary to the seminal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).37 8
ERISA sets minimum standards for pension plans in private
industry, including standards of accountability as plan
fiduciaries.379 Specifically, it imposes a duty on pension fund
managers to exercise a "prudent [person] standard of care" ' and
to discharge their duties "solely in the interests of the participants
and beneficiaries." '' ERISA also requires "diversifying the
investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do
' Although ERISA is silent on ethical investment portfolios,
so."382
Langbein and Posner believe that such a portfolio would violate
ERISA's fiduciary duties because the minimal diversification
typical of ethical investment involves greater risks without the
375 Martin, 1988 S.L.T. at 334.
376 Id.

377 Bishop of Oxford v. Church Comm'r of Eng., 1 W.L.R. 1241, 1246, 2 All E.R.
300, 304-05.

378 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); Langbein & Posner, supra note 349, at 104;
L.E. Irish & A.G. Kent, The Social Investing Quandry: Many Investment Fiduciaries
Consider Non-Financial Factors in Making Pension Investments, 8 TRUST L. INT'L 10

(1994).
379 Public pension funds are regulated by state governments, and state laws
prescribe the investments such funds may pursue, often adopting the "prudent person"
fiduciary standard. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate

GovernanceReconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 800 (1993).
380 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
381 29 U.S.C. § I104(a)(l).
382 29 U.S.C. § l104(a)(l)(c).
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prospect of greater returns."' They also oppose ethical investment
because it politicizes investment decisions, although they concede
that if beneficiaries are informed of the increased risks and costs
of such a fund, the investment portfolio might comply with
statutory requirements.384 According to the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts, "what little case law there is [on ethical investment] is not
illuminating," and "fiduciary issues involved in the pension fund
385
context vary considerably with the nature of the pension plan.
Thus, in relation to a defined contribution plan, it has been argued
that "where the workers put in a set amount and get back whatever
the returns add up to, there is a stronger argument for allowing
beneficiaries to make social investing decisions. 386 However, in
relation to a defined benefit plan, where the company promises to
pay a certain benefit, "[i]t may not be possible to allow individual
plan participants to make social investing decisions because they
are not the ones who will feel the consequences. 387
Recently, the U.S. Department of Labor's regulations and
interpretations regarding the application of fiduciary duties under
ERISA were clarified. In 1998, the Office of Regulations and
Interpretations advised that the statute does not preclude
consideration of collateral ethical benefits, so long as financial
return is not compromised.388 It stated: "A decision to make an
investment or to designate an investment alternative may not be
influenced by non-economic factors unless the investment
ultimately chosen for the plan, when judged solely on the basis of
its economic value, would be equal to or superior to alternative
available investments."38 9 It continued by stating that a designated
socially responsible mutual fund would not contravene ERISA so
long as the fund operated within the bounds of ERISA's fiduciary
383 Langbein & Posner, supra note 349, at 103-04. For the alternative argument, see

Myron P. Corzan & Ronald B. Ravikoff, Social Responsibility in Investment Policy and
the Prudent Man Rule, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 518, 530-36 (1980).
384 Langbein & Posner, supra note 349, at 104-07.
385 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE)

§ 227 (1992).

386 MONKS & MINOW, supra note 240, at 223.
387 Id.

388 See, e.g., Office of Regulation and Interpretations, Advisory Opinion (May 28,
1998), available at www.dol.gove/pwba/programs/ori/advisory98/98-04a.htm

(on file

with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
389 Id.
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standards. The Office's advisory position appears somewhat
narrower than the view taken in Board of Trustees of Employee
Retirement System of the City of Baltimore v. Mayor and City
Councillors of Baltimore,39 ° where the court found that a city
ordinance requiring a municipal authority pension fund to
disinvest from companies engaged in business in South Africa did
not cause trustees to violate their prudential investment duties as
long as the cost of investing according to social responsibility
precepts was de minimis.
Thus, across various jurisdictions, investment trustees can be
seen as subject to an overriding duty to act in the best interests of
trust beneficiaries, and this is normally understood as the best
financial return on investments subject to a degree of prudence.
Because of media criticism alleging poor financial performance of
some ethical funds, the "best financial return" duty can thus
readily be understood as investment in "old economy"
The important criteria to satisfy fiduciary
companies.39
obligations are that the ethical investment policy does not lower
the expected return of the plan's assets; there is sufficient portfolio
diversification; the policy can be implemented without
burdensome administrative procedures; and there is wide member
acceptance of the policy. If "financial benefits" can be understood
as measured on a longer time frame, then environmental
investment preferences need not be seen as inconsistent with a
financial benefits test and indeed may be a superior way of
maximizing economic return to beneficiaries.
The prudential standard has the flexibility to be more broadly
interpreted to encompass social and environmental criteria.392 Of
course, where an investment fund is established explicitly as an
ethical investment vehicle, then the trust law constraints against
green investment diminish so long as the optimal financial return
is pursued within the agreed framework.393 It must also be
390 562 A.2d 720 (Md. App. 1989).
391 See, e.g., Kathryn Cooper & Robert Winnett, Is Vice more Profitable than
Virtue?, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 16, 2000, at 3.
392 Joan Bavaria, Fiduciary Obligation and the Importance of an Environmental
Accounting Standard, 6 CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 46, 49 (1999),
http://www.corporate-env-strategy.com/corpenvst/show.

available at

393 In Harries v. Church Comm 'rs of Eng., Nicholls V-C noted, "trustees would be
entitled, or even required, to take into account non-financial criteria.., where the trust
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recognized that the nature of fiduciary duties varies among
investment entities. Life insurance companies, which are the
largest investors in OECD countries,394 are not subject to fiduciary
responsibilities equivalent to those imposed upon pension fund
trustees, but they are commonly subject to minimum solvency and
asset liquidity requirements.395
Overall, if institutional investors are to be successfully
mobilized by the state as a mechanism for promoting sustainable
development, it appears governments will not be able to rely on
existing market processes and traditional private law controls.
Institutional investment is one of the key nodal points in the
market, where, through government incentives and directions,
economic and environmental decision-making can be integrated in
accordance with the requirements of sustainable development.
Specific interventions are needed to improve the market's
transparency of corporate environmental performance information.
In addition, measures are needed to reduce the structural bias
against ethical investment and investor reluctance to be involved
in corporate governance. In addition to the improved corporate
environmental disclosure and reporting obligations already
discussed, there are a number of specific practical reforms worth
pursuing.
D. EnvironmentalRegulation andInvestment Funds
1. Role offinancialservices regulation
For the bulk of investment institutions not specifically
constituted as ethical investment vehicles, in the absence of
compelling evidence of the relevance of environmental
performance to economic performance, some form of government
intervention is required to facilitate green investment. Selfregulation, rather than government direction, has been the
approach traditionally favored by the investment community for
accommodating public interest concerns.3 96 Financial reform in
deed so provides." 2 All E.R. 300, 305 (1993).
394 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 156.

395 In the E.U.context, see B. Adams, European Commission: Insurance: Solvency
Margins, 5 INT'L INS. L. REV. 178 (1997).
396

European Parliament Fact Sheets 3.4.3 on Banking, Insurance, and Securities,
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recent decades has tended to be shaped by the "financial
repression" thesis, namely that governmental economic
intervention in the form of interest rate determinations and other
financial controls provokes capital flight, fragmented capital
markets, and other inefficiencies.39 v Subsequent financial
liberalization reforms, limiting government involvement in
oversight and prudential regulation, have, however, spawned
extreme market volatility and speculative booms inimical to
environmentally and socially optimal financial performance.398
Whilst there is no apparent move worldwide to re-engineer
heavy governmental involvement in macro-economic policy and
the financial services sector, reform of investment systems to
accommodate ethical development concerns is emerging as a
political issue in a number of countries. The landmark New
Zealand Superannuation Act of 2001, for instance, proposes that
the national Superannuation Fund managers must, in formulating
their investment policies and standards, consider ethical
investment issues and must avoid harming New Zealand's
reputation as a responsible member of the world community.3 99
Investor and consumer sentiment is becoming more receptive to
such plans. According to a British survey conducted by the Ethical
Investment Research Service, seventy-three percent of respondents
believed that their pension scheme should have an ethical
policy. a°
Beyond
omnipresent
regulatory
stipulations,
governments may be able to influence the investment decisions of
available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/3_4_3en.htm (last visited Nov. 26,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
397 RONALD I. MCKINNON, MONEY AND CAPITAL IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 68

(1973); EDWARD S. SHAW, FINANCIAL- DEEPENING IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 12
(1975); Glenn Yago, Financial Repression and the Capital Crunch Recession: Political
and Regulatory Barriers to Growth Economics, in ECONOMIC POLICY, FINANCIAL
MARKETS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 81, 87-89 (Benjamin Zycher & Lewis C. Solomon
eds., 1993).
398 The Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s is a notorious example of these
problems. See D.C. Cole & Betty F. Slade, The Crisis and FinancialSector Reform, 15
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 338 (1998); see also Don Goldstein, Uncertainty, Competition and
Speculative Finance in the Eighties,29 J. ECON. ISSUES 719 (1995).
399 New Zealand Superannuation Act, 2001, § 61(d) (N.Z.).
400 Neasa MacEarlean, How to do the Decent Thing With Your Old-Age Money, THE
OBSERVER, Nov. 15, 1998, at 18.
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fund managers through discrete requirements for disclosure of
corporate environmental performance to shareholders and
financial markets. Without some form of state intervention, it may
be left to fund members and consumer pressure to encourage
investment bodies to support environmentally sound companies
and industries. Such a solution is too random and uncertain to
provide a proper basis for articulating environmental governance
through financial organizations.
Promotion of a more receptive climate for ethical investment
should begin with the diffusion of environmental standards into
the overall regulatory architecture for the financial sector. This is
consistent with the principle of integration of environment and
development.
sustainable
underlines
that
development
Government financial regulators that supervise institutional
investors and other financial entities should not be making
decisions isolated from environmental conditions that underpin the
long-term health of companies and financial markets. Government
licensing of financial institutions provides an obvious pathway to
impose standards and objectives for environmentally responsible
decision-making. Unfortunately, a paucity of precedents for
systematically embedding environmental policy into financial
services regulation exists, and the issue remains largely confined
to the periphery of government policy debate and academic
research.4"'
Recently, a number of nations have moved to overhaul their
legal frameworks for the financial services sector, thereby raising
new opportunities for the referencing of environmental concerns in
the regulatory framework for this sector. Proposals for inclusion of
environmental standards emerged during the passage of the United
Kingdom's Financial Services and Market Act of 2000, which
integrated and streamlined the country's financial services
industry under the auspices of a single regulator, the Financial
Services Authority (FSA).402 The Act equips the Authority with a
full range of statutory powers for the approval and control of
financial organizations and services, including banks, insurance
companies, and many other institutions previously governed by a
401

See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Financial Institutions for Sustainability, 8
52 (2000).
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.8, § I (Eng.).
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specific statute.4 °3 During the preparation of the legislation, the
U.K. Social Investment Forum (UKSIF) protested to the House of
Commons Environmental Audit Committee due to the absence of
any environmental appraisal of the Bill.40 4 The UKSIF proposed
modifications to the FSA's mandate, including a requirement to
facilitate best practice in environmental risk management and to
promote the provision of environmental investment and lending
products. 4 5 The government rejected these proposals, leaving the
FSA with only the vague remittance in the final Act to address
indirectly the environment, if it so chose, via its "public awareness
objective. 40 6 Absent a specific mandate, the FSA, at best, might
issue guidance notes on environmentally prudent investment
practices. 4 7 This has already been attempted by the Department
for Environment and the Corporation of London. Their London
Principles of Sustainable Finance, issued in August 2002,
recommended that financiers: "reflect the cost of environmental
and social risks in the pricing of financial and risk management
products; . . .[and] [e]xercise equity ownership to promote high
standards of corporate social responsibility by the activities being
financed."4 But, current political realities make it unlikely that a
financial regulator in Britain or elsewhere would seek to impose
general environmental obligations on financial markets despite the
general movement away from a self-regulatory culture in this
sector in recent years.
Despite such a lacuna at a meta-policy level, there are some
specific measures that financial regulators could introduce to
Id. at § 2.
Nor was reference made Treasury's consultation document, the Financial
Services andMarkets Bill: A ConsultationDocument (July 1998).
405 Press Release, U.K. Social Investment Forum, U.K. Social Investment Forum
Tells M.P.s of Need to Include Environment in Framework for Financial Services
Regulator (Apr. 19, 1999), at http://www.UK.sif.org/press/1999-04-19-a/content.shtml
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation).
406 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 4(2) (Eng.).
407 On the rules and guidance powers of the FSA, see lain MacNeil, The Futurefor
Financial Regulation: The Financial Services and Markets Bill, 62 MOD. L. REV. 725
(1999).
403
404

408 Co. OF LONDON (CoL)
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stimulate environmentally sensitive investment and to encourage
institutional participation in corporate governance. It is
inconceivable that regulation could ever actually instruct
institutional investors when to make ethical investments, since this
is essentially a commercial judgment made by institutions on a
case-by-case basis. Regulation, however, could feasibly require
institutions to state their positions in relation to their corporate
investments and to adopt measures to reduce the free-rider
impediments to collective action. For instance, governments could
liberalize the formal channels currently available for shareholders
to intervene in corporate governance processes, such as the proxy
context and the shareholder proposal under securities
regulations.4"9 Financial regulators could review share ownership
restrictions so as to ease limitations on significant holdings and
relax the portfolio diversification rules that can impede investor
activism.
Further, investment institutions could be required to register
their share votes, so as to encourage institutions to formulate and
express a view on all issues put to a vote at shareholder
meetings.4" ' However, because institutions might simply delegate
voting decisions to fund managers in the matters under
consideration, additional measures would be needed. One
possibility suggested by Gilson and Kraakman is the appointment
of minority independent directors to corporate boards nominated
by institutional investor groups rather than enterprise
management.4 1 The expert independent directors would function
as well-informed monitors of portfolio companies, providing a
meaningful check upon management and affording a valuable
source of external expertise.41 2 This suggestion may be a more
practical alternative to existing proposals to extend generally the
accountability of corporate management to other stakeholders
beyond the equity holders.413 Commentators predict that
409

See Geltman & Skroback, supra note 236 (discussing some useful reforms).

410

Davies, supra note 192, at 92.

411

Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 306, at 872-73.

412

Id. at 873

See Bruce Langtry, Stakeholders and the Moral Responsibilities of Business, 4
Bus. ETHics Q. 431 (1994), available at http://www.proquest.umi.com; Michael J.
Polonsky, Incorporating the Natural Environmental into Corporate Strategy: A
Stakeholder Approach, 12 J. Bus. STRATEGIES 151 (1995).
413
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introducing a stakeholder approach to corporate governance risks
shifting power to management because of the difficulties in
providing a means of balancing and reconciling the array of
additional interests at stake. 14
Besides mandatory voting and reorganization of non-executive
director roles, taxation incentives can be used to stimulate a
stronger future orientation in investment choices. 15 The broad
approach should be to reward capital gains and discourage
dividends that divert funds away from investment to spending. 6
Government can give the private sector an incentive to invest in
longer-term projects by lowering taxes for long-term investments,
while raising taxes on short-term trading profits. 4 1 7 To counteract
the risk that shareholders may respond by selling shares rather
than waiting for dividends, it has been suggested that variable tax
treatment could be introduced depending on the holding periods
for shares." 8 For instance, capital gains tax rules could be altered
to ensure a relative penalty for rapid turnover of shareholdings. 1 9
The Netherlands has gone the furthest in taxation reform to
stimulate ethical investment. The Dutch Green Investment
Directive was issued by the government in 1995 to provide tax
deductions for interest payments and dividend yields from
approved environmental investment funds. 420 To qualify, the fund
must invest at least seventy percent of its assets in environmentally
friendly projects determined to be acceptable by the Dutch
environmental agency.421 Projects currently government certified
include renewable energy, organic agriculture, and environmental
technology. 422 The attractive interest rates mean investors see
414 ENTERPRISE AND COMMUNITY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4-

5 (Simon Deakin & Alan Hughes eds., 1997).
415 Rada & Trisoglio, supra note 133, at 48.
416 Id.
417 Id.

418 Id.
419 See id.
420 See Green Investments Granted Tax-Free Status in Holland, 51 ECONEwS (June

1996), http://www.earthfuture.com/econews/backissues/96-06.htm.
421 Id.

422 See David Rosenberg, Investing in a SustainableFuture, INT'L GREEN PLANNER

(Res. Renewal Inst., S.F., Cal.), Fall/Winter 1996/1997, at http://www.rri.org/
newsletters/newsfa1196/newsfaIl96.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
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gains in funding progressive new projects that were formerly
perceived as risky with limited return. 423 Recent studies suggest
the Dutch scheme has been very successful in generating increased
investment in environmental projects through the delivery of
sizeable tax advantages to green savers and investors.424 The Dutch
innovation points to possible solutions in the broader problems of
determining ethical investment criteria and enhancing investors'
access to environmental expertise. In addition to providing
guidance and advice on environmental investment strategies, an
investment certification body could assist in positing eligibility
criteria for investment tax advantages, generating considerable
economies of scale which would reduce both investors' and
corporations' costs.
2. Ethical investment policy disclosure obligations
So far the most promising reforms adopted to promote
environmentally responsible investment are regulations adopted in
several E.U. states and Australia that require certain investors to
disclose their stance on environmentally and socially responsible
investment. 425 The U.K. government was the first to take this
approach. Despite some misgivings from the National Association
of Pensions Funds, in July 1999, the U.K. government issued a
regulation under the Pensions Act of 1995, directing private
pension fund trustees to disclose their policies on socially
responsible investment and on the exercise of shareholder rights,
including voting rights. 426 The earlier government Green Paper
stated: "trustees should be free to consider moral and social issues
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
423 David Rosenberg, Investing in a Sustainable Future, 11 GREEN PLANNER (1996),
availableat http://www.rri.org/newsletter/newsfal196/newsfalI96.html.
424 See Bert Scholtens, Greenlining: Economic and Environmental Effects of
Government Facilitated Lending to Sustainable Economic Activities in the Netherlands
(Mar. 2001) (unpublished SOM-theme E, Financial Markets and Institutions,
dissertations, University of Groningen), http://som.rug.nl (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
425 PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
The Role of Australia's Financial Sector in
Sustainability, ii, Environment Australia (2001), available at http://www.ea.gov.au/
industry/sustainable/finance/role-fin-sector.html.
426 Pensions Act § 35(3)(f) (1995), amended by Occupational Pension Schemes
Amendment Regulations 1999 § 2(4), available at http://www.hmso.gov.U.K./
si/si 1999/19991849.htm

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 28

in relation to their investments, provided trustees adhere to the
obligations placed on them by trust law and always put the
beneficiaries' interests first., 427 The changes to the Pensions Act
were spearheaded by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on
Socially Responsible Investment formed in January 1998 to
promote debate and legislative change for ethical investment. 428
The regulation does not,42 however,
require trustees to adopt an
9
ethical investment policy.
The important empirical question that must be investigated is
whether the U.K. pensions law reform has actually contributed to
an increase in ethical investment. It is too early to answer
authoritatively this question because the amendment has only been
in effect since July 2000. The U.K. Social Investment Forum
reported in October 2000 that fifty-nine percent of British pension
funds and local municipal funds had incorporated ethical
investment principles into their investment process, such as at the
level of policy (e.g., in the statement of investment principles),
engagement, by shareholder agreement tactics (e.g., exercise of
voting rights), and by more active monitoring (e.g., trustees giving
directions to their fund manager). 43 ° Another survey commissioned
by JustPensions revealed that many pension fund trustees were not
properly monitoring their fund managers, to whom they had
delegated responsibility for implementing their ethical investment
policies. 43 ' A later survey in 2001 conducted by Friends of the
Earth revealed that ninety percent of the 100 largest occupational
pension funds mentioned ethics in their statements of investment
principles but also found that the quality of many statements was
U.K. Department of Social Security, Strengthening the Pensions Framework: A
Consultation Paper (1999), para. 30.1, available at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/
publications/dss/1999/penfra/penfra.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
428 See The All-Party ParliamentaryGroup on Socially Responsible Investment, UK
Social Investment Forum, at http://www.uksif.org/activitities/govparl/content.shtml (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
429 U.K. Social Investment Forum, supra note 405.
427

430 Survey of Statement of Investment Principles, U.K. Social Investment Forum
(Oct. 2000), http://www.pensionsurveys.com/2133.htm.
431 David Coles and Duncan Green, Do UK. Pension Funds Invest Responsibly? A
Survey of CurrentPractice on Socially Responsible Investing (JustPensions, U.K.), July
2002, at 1, available at http://wwwjustpensions.org/ukpf2002-justpens.pdf (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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poor. Only a minority could demonstrate they were monitoring
and reporting to trustees on ethical issues.43 2 There is an important
difference between having a policy and being able to show that it
is being implemented.
The United Kingdom's ethical investment reforms have
provided the model for a suite of pension reforms in other
European countries in the last two years.433 Legislation requiring
fund managers to disclose or take account of environmental,
social, or ethical considerations in their investment policies has
arisen in France, Germany, Sweden, and Belgium.434 Several
other governments are considering analogous reforms.
Interestingly, these reforms have not been directly inspired by
European Union legislation. The European Community's proposed
directive on the activities of institutions for occupational
retirement provision did not include any environmental disclosure
provisions, although an amendment of the Commission's proposal
was later advanced in the European Parliament.435 This
amendment sought to provide an obligation to consider "ethical
and socially responsible investment principles" in Article 12(1)
disclosures of investment policy requirements.436 Elsewhere, in
July 2001, the European Commission published a Green Paper on
Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social
Responsibility as a basis for further debate on the subject.43 7
In France, the February 2001 law on employee savings funds
created a framework for long-term employee savings with the
possibility of incorporating ERI concepts. Disclosure is optional
432 See Beatrix Payne, Large U.K. Plans Get Failing on Social Responsibility
Concerns, 29 PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS 14 (2001); see also Jill Solomon et al.,
Socially Responsible Investment in the U.K.: Drivers and Current Issues, 27 J. GEN.
MGMT. 1 (2002).
433 See Cowe, infra note 456, at 22.

434 Id.

435 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Activities of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision, COM(00)507 final.
436 Draft Report on the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
on the Activities of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision - Committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs, EUR. PARL. Doc. (PE 295.986/DEF) 52 (May 8, 2001),
availableat http://www.europarl.eu.int.
437 Green Paper Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/
available
Europa
(2001),
Responsibility,
employment_social/soc-dial/csr/greenpaper.htm.
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for fund managers of Employees Savings Funds, and an agreement
between employers and trade unions is necessary to create these
funds.438 The legislation provides:
[l]f appropriate, the law details social, environmental or ethical
concerns that the fund manager has to respect when buying or
selling securities or while exercising rights that are related to
securities ownership. The annual reports of the funds shall
address the application of these factors, under conditions defined
by the Commission des Opdrations de Bourse.4 39
Further, France's June 2001 law creating the Pension Reserve
Fund (150 billion euros by 2020) goes a step further. The
Directorate must report annually to the Board of Trustees how it
has taken into account social, environmental, and ethical
considerations in the management of the funds. 440 The relevant
legislative provision provides that the executive board
"implements the investment policy directions and supervises their
correct application. It regularly reports to the supervisory board
and in this manner it describes the way the general investment
policy directions of the funds have
taken social, environmental and
44
ethical concerns into account., '

Ethical investment also features in Germany's new pension
legislation promulgated in May 2001.442 New occupational pension

Projet de loi sur l'dpargne salariale, 7 February 2001, No.2001-152, article 21.
439 This quotation, in the original French:
438

Le rZglement pr6cise, le cas dchdant, les considerations sociales,
environnementales ou 6thiques que doit respecter ]a socidt6 de gestion dans
l'achat ou lavente des titres, ainsi que dans l'exercise des droits qui leur sont
attachds. Le rapport annuel du fonds rend compte de leur application, dans des
conditions d~finies par laCommission des operations de bourse.
ld.
440

Id.

441

The quotation, in the original French:

11met en oeuvre les orientations de lapolitique de placement. I1contr6le le
respect de celles-ci. 11en rend compte rdgulirement au conseil de surveillance
et retrace notamment, Acet effet, lamani~re dont les orientations gdndrales de la
politique de placement du fonds ont pris en compte des considerations sociales,
environnementales et dthiques.
Projet de loi portant diverses dispositions d'ordre social, 6ducatif et culturel. 28 June
2001, Chapitre Vbis, article L.135-8.
442 See Pension Reform Unveiled, 322 EUR. INDUS. REL. REV. 22 (Nov. 2000).
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schemes have to fulfill a number of criteria, including the
disclosure of ethical investment policies, in order to qualify for tax
deductions.4 43 The reforms state that "the pension fund shall
provide written information regarding whether and how ethical,
social, and environmental considerations are taken into account
regarding the use of the contributions received.""4 The legislative
phraseology is very similar for personal pension plans.445 The
disclosure regulations, in effect since August 2001, have not been
widely welcomed by the pension funds because of the perceived
onerous reporting obligations. Some funds have attempted to
circumvent the requirements by simply stating that they do not use
ethical investment criteria.446
Since January 2001, Swedish state-run pension funds have
been required to incorporate ethical investment criteria in their
investment strategies and report to the government annually with
respect to how they are fulfilling this policy.447 The obligations
apply to the five largest state-controlled pension funds in
Sweden.448 The government's stated policy is that "investment
activities shall take environmental and ethical considerations into
account without lowering the overall objective of a high return."44' 9
There is also the possibility of governments investing their
own revenue in green industries. For example, the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance in January 2001 established an Environmental
Fund financed from state petroleum revenues to invest in

443 See id.
444 "Der Pensionsfonds muss die Versorgungsberechtigten schriftlich dartiber
informieren, o.b und wie er ethische, soziale und okologische Belange bei der
Verwendung der eingezahlten Beitrage berticksichtigt": Betriebliche Altersvorsorge:
article 10, § 115, #4, Anderung des Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes.
445 Private Altersvorsorge: article 7, §1, #9, Gesetz Uber die Zertifizierung von
Altersvorsorgevertrhgen.
446 Misinterpretationof SRI Disclosure Regulations for Private Pensions Schemes
Block the German SRI Market, European Sustainable and Responsible Investment Forum
(2001), http://www.eurosif.info.info./news.shtml.
447 See Sara Calian, Pension Reform Widens Swedes' Choice, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27,
2001, at C23.
448 Id.
449 A Presentation of Sweden's New National Pension Funds, Fourth Swedish
National Pension Fund 4 (2001), available at http://www.ap4.se/417.asp.
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environmentally sound equity instruments.45° Elsewhere, in
January 2001, the Belgian Council of Ministers also advanced a
regulation similar to the United Kingdom's pension fund
disclosure law, requiring occupational pension funds to reveal
how, and whether, they weigh the ethical, environmental, and
social performance of their investment portfolios.45 '
Apart from the problem of establishing mechanisms to monitor
whether investors actually implement professed ethical investment
policies, there is also the dilemma, unresolved by the recent
European pensions reforms, of defining ethical investment criteria.
As noted earlier, "ethical investment" tends to be a self-awarded
title, and no single authoritative definition of it or similar terms
exists in any country's laws or policies apart from the Dutch
ethical investment taxation incentive regime.452 The introduction
of the German reforms has been hampered because of confusion
among regulators and consumers as to what qualifies as ethical
investment.453 Moreover, the problem of defining the appropriate
boundaries for assessing corporate environmental performance,
taking into account the role of subsidiaries and franchise networks,
454
is also unresolved by recent E.U. ethical investment reforms.
Current evidence suggests that in several countries, notably
France and Sweden, the ethical investment market has matured in
the wake of these pensions reforms.455 Yet, the European
Sustainable and Responsible Investment Forum, which has been
monitoring the reforms, argues that there is a danger the disclosure
rules will become a public relations exercise as there are
insufficient concomitant obligations on funds to actually explain
450 NORWAY

MINISTRY
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FINANCE,
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ENVIRONMENTAL

FUND,

http://www.odin.dep.no/fn/engelsk (last visited Dec. 8, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).

451 Projet de loi relative aux pensions compldmentaires, Article 42, Chapitre 8:
Transparence.
452 See, e.g., SEVERYN T. BRUYN, THE FIELD OF SOCIAL INVESTMENT (1987).
453 Pirkko Juntunen, Morley Launches First SRI Product in Germany, FIN. NEWS,
July 18, 2002, availableat http://www.efinancialnews.com.
454 Polonsky, supra note 413, at 151.
455 Ross Kendall, World SRI Estimated at US$1.42 Trillion, ETHICAL INVESTOR
(Ass'n for Sustainable & Responsible Inv. in Asia, Austl.), Sept. 14, 2001, at
http://www.asria.org/pro/news&events/ethicallnvestorCerulliReport.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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how their ethical investment policies are implemented and taken
into account.456 There is also the issue of whether ethical
investment regulations should extend beyond pension funds to
other classes of investment, such as those managed by insurance
companies.457 A U.K. survey conducted in 2000 found that none of
the insurers questioned had any ethical investment policy or
practice.458 Significantly, Australia has recently adopted new
regulations on ethical investment that go beyond the European
examples in terms of market coverage and depth of disclosure.459
As with Europe, assets of ethical investment funds in Australia
have surged in recent years by some 500% between 1996 and
2001-many fold higher than assets of managed funds as a
whole.4 6'

Although

a

PriceWaterhouseCoopers

study

commissioned by Environment Australia (the main federal
government environmental agency) suggested a low level of
environmental awareness among mainstream Australian financial
organizations, 461 government authorities are taking the issue
seriously. Environment Australia recently established within its
Sustainable Industries Branch a unit for "Sustainable Development
and the Financial Services Sector" with the stated aim to "facilitate
the integration of sustainability issues into the services, products,
462
and operations of the financial services sector.,
Environment Australia contributed to the drafting of the
Financial Services Reform Act of 2001 (FSRA), which introduced
new ethical investment disclosure requirements for financial
456 Roger Cowe, Where Britain Led, Europe is Now Catching Up, PARLIAMENTARY

BRIEF, June 2002, at 22, available at http://www.thepolitician.org/Downloads/
offline/0602_main.pdf
457 Press Release, Friends of the Earth, Insurance Firms Named and Shamed (Jan.
2000), http://www.foe.co.U.K..
458 Id.
459 DENI GREENE CONSULTING SERVICES,
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SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT IN

SURVEY

2

(2001),

available

at

http://www.eia.org.au/pdf/eia-benchmarking-survey.pdf.
460 id.
461 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Role of Australia's Financial Sector in
Sustainability, ii, Environment Australia (2001), http://www.ea.gov.au/industry/
sustainable/finance/role-fin-sector.html.
462 See Sustainable Development and the Financial Services Sector, Environment
Australia, http://www.ea.gov.au/industry/sustainable/finance/index.html.
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organizations.463 The FSRA came into effect on March 11, 2002;
although there is a two-year transitional compliance period for
industry participants, it will apply immediately to any new class of
product offered.4 64 The legislation is more ambitious than the
European reforms in that it applies to a more extensive range of
investment products including superannuation products, such as
pensions, managed investment products, and investment life
insurance products. The FSRA obliges financial product issuers to
include in their Product Disclosure Statements (PDS) information
about the extent to which labor standards and environmental,
social, or ethical considerations are taken into account in the
selection, retention, or realization of the investment.4 65 The
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is
empowered to issue "guidelines that must be complied with
where" a PDS asserts that environmental, social, or ethical
considerations are considered in the "selection, retention, or
[realization] of the investment. 466 During the parliamentary
debates, Senator Murray commented:
If a promoter claims that the company's investment choices are
made, taking into account environmental, ethical and other nonfinancial considerations, where is the investor to go to confirm
that claim? It will be up to ASIC to have a look at the ethical
investments that are presently on offer and to evaluate the sorts
of criteria for disclosure that their prospectuses make-in other
words, to provide a guidance note or guidelines.467
Regulations promulgated under the FSRA detail the financial
product disclosure requirements, including the obligation to
disclose "the extent to which" social and environmental
considerations are taken into account. The FRSA also includes an
obligation to disclose if these matters are not taken into account at
all or if they are, what matters the product issuer considers to be
labor standards or environmental, social, or ethical considerations.
463 Financial Services Reform Act, 2001, § 1013D(1)(I) (Austl.), available at
http://search.aph.gov.au/search/Parllnfo.asp.
464 Id.
465 Id.
466

Id. at § 1013DA.
39 PARL. DEB. SENATE, (Austl.) (1st Sess. 10
26458, http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/dailys/

467 SENATE OFFICIAL HANSARD,

Period) (Aug.
ds23080 1.pdf.

23,

2001)
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Finally, the FSRA requires an explanation of the extent to which
such considerations are actually taken into account in investment
decisions.468 In this respect the Australian reforms promise greater
accountability and market coverage than the European examples.
Many of the foregoing reforms ultimately depend on
improvements to systems of corporate accounting and reporting to
ensure that environmental impacts can be effectively translated
into financial analyses and used in investment calculations. Better
alignment between corporate goals and societal welfare requires a
system in which more and different information is available to
guide valuation and investment decisions. Accounting rules need
to be modified to better reflect corporate environmental
performance, and public disclosure needs to be extended to ease
the cost of assessing real corporate value. Improved access to
information and greater transparency of decision-making are
central features of the new reflexive modes of regulation that are
accompanying or displacing some traditional command styles of
environmental control.469 Economic instruments to convey the
costs and benefits of corporate environmental performance are
also needed to enable investors to better gauge the sustainability
and profitability of companies. These other necessary reforms to
support investors' role in environmental governance are canvassed
in the next part.
V. Additional Legal and Policy Measures for Promoting
Environmentally Responsible Investment
A. Economic Instruments
1. Instrument options and implementation
Economic instruments have figured prominently in
environmental law reform debates.47 ° Apart from their flexibility
and cost efficiency advantages, economic instruments promise a
more effective way of diffusing environmental policy. Their
ability to communicate information regarding the environmental
468

Corporations Regulations, 2001, cl. 7.9.14C (AustI.).

469 See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1229 (1995).
470 See generally THEODORE PANAYOTOU, INSTRUMENTS OF CHANGE: MOTIVATING
AND FINANCING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

(1998).
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costs and benefits of economic activity can feed into the decisionmaking systems of financial markets. If governments are not
prepared to penalize polluters by making them pay for their
environmental impacts, investors and other financial institutions
can hardly be expected to respond in kind. Economic instruments
have been defined broadly as "instruments that affect costs and
benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents, with the
effect of influencing behavior in a way that is favorable to the
environment."47 ' The major types of economic intruments are
taxation instruments and tradeable emission allowances.4" Since
the early 1970s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has been an active proponent of economic
instruments.473 At a regional level, the E.U. has also emerged as an
enthusiastic proponent; its Fifth EnvironmentalAction Programme
called for a "broadening of the range of instruments" as one of its
key priorities.474 In 1997, the European Commission published a
Environmental Taxes and Charges in the
Communication 47on
5
Market.
Internal
Arguments for economic instruments are commonly presented
in terms of their advantages over command and control
regulations, which are seen as administratively complex and
costly. 476 By decentralizing resource allocation and pricing
decisions, economic instruments promise greater consumer and
producer flexibility4 77 and can promote the economically efficient
allocation of scarce resources. 478 The most prevalent argument
471 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION

& DEV., Environmental Policy: How to Apply

Economic Instruments 10 (1991 ).
472 ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Economic Instruments for
EnvironmentalProtection (1980).
473 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING
A PRACTICAL TAX SYSTEM (1992); ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., Managing the
Environment: The Role of Economic Instruments (1994).
474 European Commission, supra note 63, at 101.
475 Communication on Environmental Taxes and Charges in the Internal Market,
COM(97).
476 See Robert B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection:
Opportunities and Obstacles, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 171 (Richard L. Revesz et al., eds., 2000).
477 See OECD, supra note 471, at 14.
478 See generally Bbndi, supra note 57, at 201.
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made for economic instruments is their cost effectiveness
compared to command regulation.479 In theory, economic
instruments allow society to achieve the same environmental
outcome at, a lower cost or achieve environmental improvements
at the same cost. The methodological pluralism of economic
instruments allows industries to save costs because each business
can tailor its own means of reducing pollution. Command
regulations, by contrast, tend to specify strict limits on certain
inputs, such as use of fuels and adoption of particular control
technologies at facilities, such as waste treatment.
Until quite recently, the extensive public discussion
concerning economic instruments had not been followed by
governmental commitment to implement such instruments. Even
today, no jurisdiction provides a legislative framework for
systematic use of economic instruments in environmental
management.48 ° Governments have concentrated on implementing
"defensive measures" in which the most "blatant environmentally
detrimental economic incentives" have been removed, such as
" ' Technical problems of
subsidies for resource consumption.48
instrument design also appear to have slowed the up-take of
economic instruments. Grabosky and Braithwaite suggest
methodological uncertainties including "the logistic impossibility
of auditing honest measurement of emissions on which charges
would be based., 482 The correct setting of pollution or resource
charges can be especially complex, requiring identification of
users and their level of environmental impact. 483 Another
explanation for the slow uptake of economic instruments is their
"political unfeasibility. 484 Economic instruments magnify the
costs of environmental policy whereas costs under command
regulation are less transparent and hence less readily
479 See generally Keohane et al., supra note 76.
480 Robyn Eckersley, Markets, the State and the Environment: An Overview, in

1 (Robyn Eckersley ed., 1995).
481 p. Christoff, Market-based Instruments: The Australian Experience, in
SCHMIDHEINY, supra note 94, at 163.
MARKETS, THE STATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

482 p. GRABOSKY & J. BRAITHWAITE,

OF MANNERS GENTLE:

ENFORCEMENT

STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 37 (1986).

483 See generally Implementation Strategies for Environmental Taxes, OECD
(1996).
484 Larrue, supra note 72, at 45-49.
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objectionable. Opposition has come from the social welfare lobby
which is concerned about socially regressive "user pays"
environmental taxes 485 or pollution "hotspots" arising from
emission trading schemes. 486 The environmental movement
traditionally has been suspicious of economic instruments because
of their association with degrading market processes. 87 Industry
also has sometimes been an intransigent influence; the user pays
and polluter pays-concepts
that underpin
economic
instruments-make them unpopular with companies fearing
increased production expenses and competitive disadvantages.488
There have been, however, other developments and pressures
in recent years that have facilitated adoption of economic
instruments in environmental policy, and they are becoming
accepted as a legitimate policy tool. During the 1990s,
governments became more receptive to economic instruments
partly due to improved information and understanding generated
by government inquiries, academic studies, and pilot projects.8 9
For example, in an effort to explore promising potential
applications of economic instruments, in 1994, the Canadian
Ministers of the Environment and Finance established a Task
Force on Economic Instruments and Disincentives to Sound
Environmental Practices. 49" The Australian and Canadian
485 ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED TAXES IN

OECD

COUNTRIES.

ISSUES

AND

STRATEGIES

87-89

(2001),

available

at

http://www.oecdpublications.gfi-nb.com/cgi-bin/OECDBookShop.storefront/EN/
product/972001 101E 1.
486 See Nina Schuyler, Clean Air, Inc. CAL. LAWYER, July 1995, at 39.
487 For example, Schumacher sermonized that free markets "take[] the sacredness
out of life, because there can be nothing sacred in something that has a price." E.F.
SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 43 (1973).
488 See B.J. Richardson & K.L. Chanwai, Taxing and Trading in Corporate Energy
Activities: PioneeringU.K. Reforms to Address Climate Change, 14 INT'L CORP. & COM.
L. REV. 18, 18-27 (forthcoming, 2003).
489 Among the proliferation of studies, see, e.g., Government of Canada, Economic
Instrumentsfor Environmental Protection:Discussion Paper (1992); U.K., Government
Task Force on the Industrial Use of Energy (chaired Lord C. Marshall), Economic
Instruments and the Business Use of Energy (1998); Sweden, Ministry of the
Environment and Natural Resources, The Swedish Experience-Taxes and Charges in
EnvironmentalPolicy (1994).
490 TASK

FORCE ON

ECONOMIC

INSTRUMENTS

AND

DISINCENTIVES

TO SOUND

ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND DISINCENTIVES TO SOUND

ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES: FINAL REPORT (1994).
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governments, for instance, have been studying and piloting trading
market systems to assess the feasibility of a national emission
trading market.49 Governments have also warmed to economic
instruments as a consequence of moves to commercialize state
services and assets in the field of water and energy supply. Ongoing concerns with full cost-recovery in service and supply have
meant that policy-makers could not easily ignore the potential role
of the market for promoting the efficient allocation of resources.492
The growing profile of market methodologies and instruments
through studies, inquiries, and international experience has led to
their increasingly formal acknowledgement in national policy and
law. Typical of the new approach is the Canadian Environmental
Protection Act's general mandate to authorities to introduce
economic instruments.493 In Britain, even though the Conservative
government in 1992 boldly announced, "[i]n [the] future, there
will be a general presumption in favour of economic
instruments,"4' 94 it was not until the Blair Labour government and
the Lord Marshall report that the agenda advanced significantly.495
Today, there are three domains where market-based
approaches to environmental policy have been deployed with
some rigor. The micro-economic restructuring of the water and
energy sectors in many countries has been accompanied by an
introduction of higher consumption charges. These charges could
improve environmental quality through the prospect of better
accountability and higher user-pays water charges, which should

491 See Austl. Industry Commission, Framework for Greenhouse Emission Trading

in Australia (Dec. 1997), http://www.pc.gov.au.ic/research/information/greenobj/
greenobj.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation); R.S. Jutlah, Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy
in Canada,324 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 343-47 (1998).
492 See, e.g., Austl. Industry Commission, Water Resources and Waste Water

Disposal (1992).
493 It states: "The Minister may establish guidelines, programs and other measures
for the development and use of economic instruments and market-based approaches to
further the purposes of this Act, respecting systems relating to: (a) deposits and refunds;
and (b) tradeable units." Environmental Protection Act, S.C., ch. 33, § 322 (1999)
(Can.).
494 COMMITTEE, THIS COMMON INHERITANCE: THE SECOND YEAR REPORT,

1992,

Cm. 2086, at 35.
495 GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE ON THE INDUSTRIAL USE OF ENERGY,

supra note 489.
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deter profligacy.4 96 The second sector where economic instruments
have been featured is natural resources management, especially for
water and fisheries, where individual transferable harvesting
quotas have been introduced in response to the demonstrable
failure of technological input rules.497 In this respect, Australia and
New Zealand have considerable experience with tradeable
resource management rights. 498 Thirdly, market mechanisms have
penetrated pollution regulation through the introduction of loadbased levies, performance bonds, and tradeable emission
schemes. 499 Environmental taxes have been widely applied within
the E.U. with the Benelux and Scandinavian countries having the
most extensive practice.50 By contrast, marketable rights schemes
have been preferred in the United States, examples being the
bubble and offset emissions-rights programs for specific industrial
plants formulated administratively by the federal Environmental
Protection Agency since the mid-1970s,5 °' and the acid rain
abatement program introduced by the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act.5"2 European interest in marketable permits has
focused on their application for controlling greenhouse gas
emissions as a way of meeting anticipated obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol." 3 In April 2002, the United Kingdom introduced
a limited trading system for carbon emission allowances among
the country's largest industrial firms." 4

496 See Alex Gardner,

Water Resources Law Reform in

Western Australia:

Implementing the CoAG Water Reforms, 19 ENVTL. & PLANNING L. J. 6, 20 (2002).
497 Karen Hopfl, Go Fish! Individual Transferable Quotas and International
Possiblitiesin the South Pacific, 8 COL. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137 (1997).
498 See

ORG.

FOR

ECON.

COOPERATION

&

DEV.,

IMPLEMENTING

TRADEABLE PERMITS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES

DOMESTIC

230-31 (2002),

available at http://oecdpublications.gfi-nb.com/cgi-bin/OECDBookShop.storefront/
EN/product/972002121E1; 1. Clark & A. Duncan, Development and Implementation of
New Zealand's ITQ Management System, 5 MARINE RES. ECON. 325 (1986).
499 Id.

500 OECD, supra note 485, at 51, 56.

501 Winston R. Griffin, The E.P.A. 's Emissions Trading Policy: A Clouded Past,But
a Bright Future,20 N. KY. L. REV. 207, 218-33 (1992).

502 Clean Water Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
503 Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union,

COM(00)87 final at 7-9.
504 See Richardson & Chanwai, supra note 488.
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2. Constraintsto economic instruments
A significant regulatory gap can exist between the theoretical
virtues of taxes and trading mechanisms and the practical
difficulties encountered by governments in implementing
proposals. To function within the economic system, the
environmental consequences of development activity need to be
revealed in the language of prices and put into a form that allows
decisions to be made. Teubner argues that economic instruments
do not necessarily translate into concrete incentive measures for
corporate actors. Rather, he argues these economic instruments
may produce "only an outside noise, as extremely vague
measures," which are distorted by intra-organizational corporate
decision-making and market dynamics." 6 On the other hand, Orts
argues that "compared to command-and-control regulations,
market-based environmental regulations are more often in
harmony with the vision of reflexive law., 507 Taxes and tradeable
permits, for example, should encourage businesses to consider
more carefully the relative costs of compliance. 0 8 But, to the
extent that the legal system arbitrarily determines the economic
prices and signals to be communicated, the less "reflexive"
economic policy instruments become.
Beyond potential implementation weaknesses, economic
instruments may be criticized for failing to engage the underlying
contradictions between capitalism and ecological systems. The
core problem with reliance on economic policy instruments is the
inaccessibility of many environmental functions and values to the
market mechanism. The values of nature are complex, varied, and
inter-connected. The concept of Total Economic Value has been
advanced by ecological economists to explain that many
environmental values, although ultimately economically important
in terms of maintaining life support systems, have no direct use
value.50 9 De Groot suggests that market values articulated by taxes
505 Gunther Teubner, The Invisible Cupola: From Causal to Collective Attribution
in EcologicalLiability, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 429, 450 (1994).
506 Id.

507 Orts, supra note 469, at 1269.
508 Id. at 1271.
509 See generally Oliver Fromm, Ecological Structure and Functions of Biodiversity

as Elements ofIts Total Economic Value, 16 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 303 (2000)
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and tradeable permits, for example, have a blind spot. 1° The blind
spot is that these market values capture only a small subset of the
spectrum of nature's values with existence values and option
values, for example, remaining largely beyond the purview of
economic instruments. 5 ' The market is a mechanism that allocates
resources among traders, but the conditions necessary for markets
to flourish in relation to environmental goods are not easily
obtained. The complex properties of ecological systems make it
difficult to create well-defined marketable rights to environmental
goods. Also, sufficient information about environmental goods is
often lacking, and the transaction costs of establishing institutional
arrangements
to combat these problems may be "forbiddingly
' 512
large.
These conclusions, however, do not mean that there should be
no place for economic instruments in environmental management.
What is required is more analysis of the merits of specific
instruments in specific contexts and the overall combination of
policy instruments in regulatory regimes. Administrative
mechanisms, agreements, education, and other tools will
invariably continue to have a role in the environmental policymaking state. Apart from their direct effect on industrial polluters,
it is essential to appreciate the potential down-stream effects of
economic instruments in stimulating environmental interest among
financial service organizations.13 Environmental taxes would
directly affect company balance sheets and, thus, influence
financial markets' analysis of companies. Financial institutions
would be expected to support environmental taxes because as lowenergy users they would not be heavily affected by new charges
and would benefit from taxes that address global warming, which
is a major concern for insurers. Where environmental taxes are
based on the polluter-pays principle, a reduction of taxes for
environmental-friendly financial products, such as eco-

(stating that even though many categories of values have been created to further
biodiversity, the best available valuation system is a cost benefit analysis).
510 RUDOLF DE GROOT, FUNCTIONS OF NATURE 131-41 (1992).

511 Id.
512

Bo Gustafsson, Scope and Limits of the Market Mechanism in Environmental

Management, 24 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 259, 266 (1998).

513 Delphi International, supra note 66, at 64-65.
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investments, should help. In relation to tradeable permits,
companies that are able to generate cost savings through trade in
pollution permits could become more attractive investment
opportunities for financial organizations.
B. CorporateEnvironmentalManagement Systems
In addition to economic instruments, environmental
management systems (EMSs) developed for businesses can be an
commitment to
for facilitating
important mechanism
environmental issues among institutional investors." 4 Not only
may corporate adoption of EMSs assist investors to better gauge
the environmental credentials of companies considered for
funding, but investment institutions may also wish to adopt an
EMS as a way to improve their own in-house environmental
management. In essence, EMSs are formal structures of processes
and standards that corporations adopt in order to improve in-house
treatment of flows of materials and energy and to provide a
framework for companies to identify, evaluate, and regulate their
environmental risks. Supporting the development of EMSs is a
variety of new company-based environmental management tools,
notably environmental accounting and auditing, life-cycle
assessment, environmental reporting, and formulation of
environmental performance indicators. Companies desiring to
maintain access to markets subject to increasing government
regulation can stimulate the early introduction of EMSs.
There are a burgeoning number of off-the-peg EMSs.515 They
may be sourced in national models, such as the British Standard on
Environmental Management Systems (BS 7750) or derived from
industry-sponsored codes, such as the Business Charter for
Sustainable Development (1991).516 The non-profit sector has also
514 See generally, David Monsma, Sustainable Development and the Global
Economy: New Systems in Environmental Management, 24 VT. L. REV. 1245 (2000);
John Vorhees, Global Environmental Solutions: Management Systems and
Synchronicity, 28 STETSON L. REV. 1155 (1999).
515 See generally Jennifer Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Codes of Environmental
Management Practice: Assessing their Potential as a Tool for Change, 22 AN. REV.
ENERGY & ENv'T 487 (1997) (providing an overview of the amount and types of EMSs).
516 International Chamber of Commerce, The Business Charter for Sustainable
Development - 16 Principles(Nov. 1, 2002) at http://www.iccwbo.org/sdcharter/charter/
principles/principles.asp (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
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developed corporate environmental standards, such as the CERES
17
Principles (originally known as the Valdez Principles)
formulated in 1990 by the Coalition for Environmentally
Responsible Economies (CERES)."' Sometimes EMS initiatives
may be organized sectorally, such as the chemical industry's
renowned Responsible Care Program (1989)."' 9 Initiated by the
Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, Responsible Care
contains principles and rules contained in codes of conduct, which
aim at improving enterprises' performances on health, safety, and
environmental protection.52° The development of this and other
EMSs promises higher levels of compliance because industry feels
some sense of "ownership" for the resulting norms. Apart from
production cost advantages, market advantages may accrue from
the improved profile of companies among consumers interested in
" '
purchasing environmentally friendly products and services.52
Globally, perhaps, the leading EMSs are those of the
International Standardization Organization (ISO). Founded in
1947, the ISO is a worldwide association of national standards
authorities that seek to promote harmonization of technical
standards so as to facilitate technology exchange and trade.52 2 The
ISO has no authority to impose its standards on members, and
businesses and government authorities voluntarily adopt the
standards. These standards, however, might be "in effect" if
countries require ISO certification for access to their markets.523 In
1993, the ISO moved to create an explicit EMS standard in the
form of the ISO 14000 series, which provides the primary
517 See generally DAVID LEBEDOFF, CLEANING UP: THE STORY BEHIND THE BIGGEST
LEGAL BONANZA OF OUR TIME (1997).

518 CERES homepage, http://www.ceres.org.

519 Chemical Manufacturers Association, Responsible Care Guiding Principles
(1998).
520 Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, A Primer on Responsible Care and
SustainableDevelopment (1994).
521 Seema Arora & Shubhashis Gangopadhyay, Toward a Theoretical Model of
Voluntary Overcompliance,28 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 289, 291 (1995).

522 International Organization for Standardization, What is ISO, (Nov. 1, 2002) at
http://www.iso.ch/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/whatislSO.html.
523 P.C. Murray, The International Environmental Management Standard, ISO
14000: A Non-Tariff Barrieror a Step to Emerging GlobalEnvironmental Policy, 18 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577, 579-80 (1997).
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framework for addressing, inter alia, management system
principles and techniques, environmental auditing, and life cycle
assessment. All the ISO 14000 series are in the form of "guidance"
except ISO 14001, which establishes various criteria for
certification, including development of an environmental policy
statement; corporate plans to achieve environmental goals and to
comply with legislation; and monitoring systems.524 The aim is a
process by which businesses may reflexively learn to identify and
eliminate environmentally damaging activities.525 In effect, the
ISO standards provide "a common environmental terminology...
[a] 'lingua franca' of environmental management, ' which can
prove valuable to multinational firms operating in countries with
divergent regulatory frameworks. ISO registration has occurred
across a vast range of sectors, including financial organizations.
In the E.U., an important regulation aimed at stimulating
companies voluntarily to improve their environmental
performance is the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS)
of 1993.528 The scheme differs from the ISO 14000 series because
it aims to promote continuous environmental performance
improvements of industrial activities, and it requires public
disclosure of auditing results. 2 9 Industries participating in the
14001 scheme voluntarily agree to install a site-based EMS and
prepare performance reports to be verified by a certified
environmental auditor at least once every three years. If the
detailed standards are met,530 the industry can market an approved
524 See generally ISO 14001:
Hillary, ed. 2000).

CASE STUDIES AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE

525 TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN,

ISO 14000: A

(Ruth

GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL

MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 45-76 (1996); Robert A. Reiley, The New Paradigm: ISO

14000 andIts Places in Regulatory Reform, 22 J. CORP. L. 535, 557-69 (1997).
526 JOSEPH CASCIO ET AL., 180 14000 GUIDE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 69 (1996).
527

See generallyHillary, supra note 524.

528 Council Regulation 1836/93 Allowing for Voluntary Participation by Companies
in the Industrial Sector in a Community Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, 1993 O.J.
(L.
168)
1, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_... I g=EN&
numdoc=31993rl 836&model=guichett.
529 Hillary, supra note 524, at 285.
530 The EMAS Regulation stipulates that the environmental management system
must comply with detailed requirements stated in the Annex to the regulation: Council
Regulation 1836/93 Article 3(c), 1993 O.J. (L 168) 1, 3.
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emblem in its advertisements and other promotion schemes. A
written statement verified by an independent auditor, outlining the
company's management policy must also be made available for
"'
public scrutiny.53
Besides the unprecedented government
specification of corporate environmental management and auditing
standards, the use of private auditors in the verification process
also marks an important step toward reducing administrative
burdens by sharing regulatory tasks with the non-government
sector. Orts cites the EMAS as a good example of a reflexive
environmental law because it encourages awareness-raising and
disclosure by industry of environmental impacts.532 The incentive
for companies to participate is the prospect of enhanced green
credentials and the potential for more efficient business
operations.533
The ISO standards, EMAS, and industry-generated codes of
practice can provide a wealth of surrogate environmental standards
and information that institutional investors and other financial
organizations could avail in assessing the risks of prospective
customers and investment opportunities.534 There is already
evidence that insurance markets are acknowledging firms'
accreditation to EMSs when underwriting and determining
coverage. For instance, significant discounts on environmental
liability insurance premiums have been offered to chemical
manufacturers that subscribe to Responsible Care.535 Stenzel
reports that banks may offer finance on preferential terms for
clients with a certified EMS.536 Davies suggests, "by looking for
ISO 14001 registration in loan applications, banks can determine
531 Council Regulation 1836/93, supra note 528, art. 5.
532

Id.

533 See Patricia Romano, Sustainable Development: A Strategy That Reflects the
Effects of Globalization on the InternationalPower Structure, 23 HOUSTON J. INT'L L.
91, 115-16 (2000).
534 How to Open Pollution Coverage Market-Make Policy Contingent on Obeying
Environmental Code, INS. ADVOC., Apr. 5, 1997, at 10.
535 David Hunter, Responsible Care Earns Discount on ELL Premiums, 159 CHEM.
WK. 11, 11 (1997); Ellen Rafferty, Participants in Responsible Care Offered an
Insurance Discount, 105 CHEM. ENG'G 48, 48 (1998).
536 Paulette L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management
Standards Provide a Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. Bus. L. J.
237, 272 (2000).
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several facts relevant to the health of their loan portfolios."53' 7 But,
because ISO and other EMSs tend to look at existing rather than
future environmental performance, they need to be supplemented
with regular verification by certifiers if they are to be of maximum
value to investors, lenders, and insurers concerned about future
environmental risks.
The participation of financial organizations themselves in
relevant EMSs is also crucial. Extending or copying off-the-shelf
EMSs to encompass financial services and products could
facilitate the development of environmental competencies in
financial organizations. Already a number of banks are achieving
their own ISO 14001 certification. For example, Swiss Bank UBS
was the first bank to have its lending business certified on a global
basis. 38 Although EMAS was originally intended only to apply to
industrial businesses, an amendment in 2001 broadened the
scheme to encompass financial services.539 The principal problem
with the original 1993 EMAS Regulation was its narrow focus on
industrial sites rather than environmental policies and management
practices at a company-wide level. The need to open the EMAS
Regulation to the financial sector was not acknowledged for
several years.5 40 The original EMAS model allowed governments
to extend the EMAS provisions to "sectors outside industry,"
including "the distributive trades and public service", but solely
"on an experimental basis. 54' Austria for example enacted a
regulation in 1996 allowing its banking and insurance industry to
participate in EMAS,5 42 and Germany did the same in February

537 Chris Davies, What ISO 14001 Means for the Banking Industry, 106 CAN.
BANKER 8, 8 (1999).
538 Bettina Furrer & Heinrich Hugenschmidt, FinancialServices and ISO 14001, 28
GREENER MGMT. INT'L 32, 32 (1999).
539 See Council Regulation 761/2001 Allowing Voluntary Participation by
Organisations in a Community Eco-management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), O.J. (L
114).
540 See, e.g., European Commission, Workshop on Sustainable DevelopmentChallenge for the Financial Sector 12 (Oct. 30, 1998), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/finserv/home.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
541 Council Regulation 1836/93, supra note 526, art. 14.
542 ASS'N FOR ENVTL. MGMT. IN BANKS, SAVNGS BANKS, & INS.

11, 71 (1998).
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But the site-based focus of the 1993 EMAS Regulation
meant it could not readily address the environmental effects of the
external business relations of banks and investors - that is to their
borrowers and investment companies.544 Under Annex VI of the
reissued EMAS Regulation of 2001, it is stated that participating
organizations shall consider all environmental aspects of their
activities, including "indirect environmental aspects" arising from
"capital investments, granting loans and insurance services.' 545
The new EMAS Regulation provides that it can be applied to an
entire organization's operations, thus, overcoming the site-based
focus of the original scheme.5 46 This is significant because
analyzing a financial organization's direct impact on the
environment, such as energy consumption and waste emission, is
quite different from considering the impact on its customers,
which will be much more extensive.
Whilst the propagation of corporate EMSs provide a
framework for reflexive management and environmental selforganization, there are several constraining factors.54 7 From a
regulatory perspective, EMSs may be unsatisfactory to the extent
that they favor private over public interests, and where accepted
by authorities as justifying regulatory relief, they may reduce legal
protection to community interests and diminish local participation
in environmental decision-making.141 In addition, free-riding thirdparties cannot be forced to comply at all given the voluntary
nature of the process, unless governments legislate minimum
environmental standards and allow early contracting parties to

543 E.C.-Eco-Extension

Decree,

1998;

ASSOCIATION
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MANAGEMENT IN BANKS, SAVINGS BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, TIME TO ACT:
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

4 (1998).

544 See Council Regulation 1836/93, supra note 526, art. 14.
545 Council Regulation 761/2001, supra note 539, annex VI, cl.
6.3(b).
546 Id. at art. 3(2).
547 JENNIFER NASH & JoHN EHRENFELD, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL

3-4 (1999).
See, e.g., E. Basse, The ContractModel-The Merits of a Voluntary Approach, 2
ENVTL. LIABILITY 74 (1994); A. Rest, The Integration of Environmental Covenants and
Contracts into the Public Law System, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS AND COVENANTS:
NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR A REALISTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY? 225 (J.M. van Dunne ed.,
1993).
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secure certain advantages. 49 Furthermore, the very goals selected
by a company as the basis of its EMS may be modest, so that
desired standards can be achieved without substantial cost. 5
Some EMSs such as ISO 14001 do not mandate public disclosure
but merely give guidance on communicating environmental
practice. 51 These characteristics suggest not all EMSs in their
current form can be readily integrated with public environmental
governance systems where the availability of regulatory relief
would depend on providing mechanisms for external scrutiny and
proof of compliance. 52 Greater involvement of environmental
organizations in the design of EMS standards may assist in making
them more publicly acceptable. 53
C. Environmental Reporting
1. Factoringthe environment into corporatefinancial
reporting
Apart from economic instruments and corporate EMSs, a third
arguably necessary reform to facilitate investment institutions'
engagement with environmental issues is obligations on
businesses to periodically report on their environmental
performance. It is an axiom that capital markets need reliable
information to accurately price securities and allocate capital
efficiently. 54 The investment literature emphasizes the importance
of investors, banks, and other financial service providers having
timely, meaningful, and relevant information to support
investment decisions.55 Effective investor involvement in
549 See NASH & EHRENFELD, supra note 547 (discussing the nature of environmental
management systems that are being implemented by industries).
550 See Stenzel, supra note 536, at 284 (discussing problems with the ISO 14001's
environmental goals).
551 NASH & EHRENFELD, supra note 547, at 11.

Riva Krut & Harris Gleckman, ISO 14001: A
(1998).
553 See Stenzel, supra note 536, at 279.
552

MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR

SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 98

B. BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY
327 (1997).
See, e.g., GLORIANNE STROMBERG, REGULATORY STRATEGIES

554 See JONATHAN

OF CORPORATE

FINANCE
555

FOR THE MID-

(1995);
Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information, 40 J.
90S-RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR REGULATING INVESTMENT FUNDS

IN CANADA
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corporate governance is also linked to extensive access to
corporate information.556 Improvements in the level and
dissemination of corporate environmental information is central to
the advancement of reflexive styles of law that seek to change
from within organizational cultures and practices. Disclosure of
environmental information can help inform investors about a
firm's environmental activities and impacts, which is especially
important where such factors may affect enterprise earnings and
profitability.557 Requiring firms to disclose environmental costs
under securities laws and other company-directed legislation can
facilitate investors' and other stakeholders' scrutiny of the firms'
environmental behavior. In theory, if accurate information is made
public, market forces can respond by factoring environmental
costs and performance into company valuations.
Corporate communication of environmental behavior may
occur in various ways, including disclosure through financial
reporting systems mandated by statute and stock exchange listings,
and disclosure requirements to environmental regulators.558 The
main corporate communication devices, however, are company
annual and interim reports, which are produced to meet statutory
reporting requirements and to provide the shareholders with a
statement of how the organization has -been managed on their
behalf. 59 Traditional corporate reporting statements have not
adequately captured the financial consequences of companies'
environmental management. Corporate accounting has been
associated
with
myopic,
profit-centered
performance
measurement, and promotion of a stock market focus on bottomline profit and standards such as earnings-per-share.560 Reliable
FIN. 1031 (1985) (discussing investors' imperfect knowledge of the true profitability of

an enterprise).
556 See John Holland, Financial Reporting, Private Disclosure and the Corporate
Governance Role of FinancialInstitutions, 3 J. MGMT & Gov. 161 (1999).
557 See LANCE E. DAVIS ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC

GROWTH 19-20 (1971) (discussing the importance of corporate reporting in controlling
risk).
558 See Louis Lowenstein, FinancialTransparency and CorporateGovernance: You
Manage What you Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996) (discussing approaches to

corporate financial reporting in the United States).
559 See id.
560 See GREEN REPORTING: ACCOUNTANCY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN
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measures of an enterprise's overall environmental performance
have yet to be formulated or standardized, although the accounting
profession increasingly acknowledges the need to reform its
appraisal methodologies in this regard.56 '
Corporate environmental reporting so far has occurred mostly
on a voluntary basis.562 Consequently, the scope and quality of
corporate disclosure is uneven, although there is a trend toward
production of stand-alone environmental reports and the degree of
environmental reporting by firms is generally increasing in most
jurisdictions. The quality and comprehensiveness of voluntary
reports has often been subjective, reflecting management's
perception of interests and needs.563 The glossy pictures and
rhetorical flourishes of many reports testify to advertising and
public relations motivations rather than information, transparency
and accountability.564 Reports tend to be descriptive,
characteristically self-laudatory, and frequently confined to rather
uninformative declarations of good intent.5 65 In terms of reporting
levels, a survey by KPMG in 1999 suggested that internationally
about twenty-four percent of major companies release
environmental reports.566 Reporting has tended to be most
common in sectors such as mining, energy and water utilities, and
industrial and consumer goods companies. The UNEP
Sustainability Benchmark Surveys have also found improvements
in a wide range of industry sectors across different countries.
ACCOUNTING, supra note 231.
561 See, e.g., Australia's Institute of Chartered Accountants, Corporate Reporting The Green Leap (1996); Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, Statement of
Principles of Environmental Costs and Liabilities(1995).
562 See NASH & EHRENFELD, supra note 547.

563 See C. Deegan & M. Rankin, Do Australian Companies Report Environmental
News Objectively?, 9 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 50 (1996).
564 See generally James Guthrie & Lee D. Parker, Corporate Social Disclosure
Practice: A Comparative International Analysis, 3 ADVANCES IN PUB. INT. ACCT. 159
(1990).
565 See C. Deegan & M. Rankin, supra note 563, at 52, 62.
See KPMG, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTING (Inst. For
Envtl. Mgmt., Neth.),
1999, at 14, available at http://www.wimm.nl/
publicaties/kpmgl999.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
567 See John Elkington et al., The Third International Survey on Company
566

Environmental Reporting: The 1997 Benchmark Survey, 21 GREENER MGMT. INT'L 99
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Company size has been identified as an important variant, with
large companies much more likely to engage in environmental
reporting than small and medium-sized enterprises. 68
Perhaps, because much voluntary corporate environmental
reporting tends to be of an unreliable and suspect nature, it has yet
to make a fundamental impact on market perceptions of
companies. Reported information is largely useless to investors
unless it is concrete data that can be translated into financial terms.
Financial institutions are more concerned with attempting to
forecast the financial effects of companies' future environmentalrelated performance than in reviewing their current or past
performance. 69 Information regarding asset impairment, liabilities,
and prospective environmental expenditures are likely to be of
much greater interest to financial institutions than mere policy
statements and aspirations. 7
Reporting by financial institutions' on their own
environmental impacts is also crucially important for effective
environmental governance. According to a 1997 report to the
European Commission, "there is little practical interaction
between environmental reporting systems and the financial
services sector."5 7' A paucity of environmental reporting in the
financial services sector has been noted in some surveys. 7' A
1999 review of 350 major companies in the United Kingdom
conducted by the Pensions and Investment Research Council
found that only seven of the fifty financial sector organizations 57in3
the sample produced a separate environmental report.
Institutional investors, like other business entities, are subject to a
(1998) (discussing the results of the 1997 survey).
568 See Carol A. Adams et al., Corporate Social Reporting Practices in Western
Europe: Legitimating CorporateBehaviour?, 30 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
569 Giovanni Azzone et al., A Stakeholders' View of Environmental Reporting, 30
LONG RANGE PLAN. 699, 703 (1997).

570 See id.
571 Delphi International Ltd., supranote 66, at 43.
572 See Riva Krut & Ashley Moretz, The State of Global EnvironmentalReporting:
Lessonsfrom the Global 100, 7 CORP. ENVTL. STRATEGY 85, 88 (2000).
573 Pensions and Investment Research Council, EnvironmentalReporting 1999: The
PIRC Survey of the FTSE 350 (1999), as cited in Geoff Lane, How Can the Financial
Sector Realize its Full Potential to Support Sustainable Development?, UNEP IND. &
ENVTL., Jan.-Mar., 1999, at 7, 8-9.
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range of financial reporting requirements, and the inclusion of
environmental statements could help raise the status of
environmental policy in fund managers' calculations. The German
banking and insurance sectors have demonstrated perhaps the
strongest commitment to environmental reporting, but have
acknowledged the difficulties in extending environmental
accounting from a financial organization's internal environmental
effects (e.g., use of energy and waste) to accounting for the
indirect environmental effects of its financial decisions (e.g., loans
and insurance). 74
Not all commentators agree that extending environmental
reporting among market institutions is worthwhile.575 The
analytical and technical methodologies of accounting have
provoked some reservations. 76 For Cooper, conventional
accounting displays dichotomies that are overly simplistic and
inadequate to reflect the complexity of environmental issues.5 77
Mouck578 and Power579 see financial reporting as serving to
depoliticize public interest concerns for corporate accountability.
Gray, resonating the juridification thesis of Teubner, fears that
there are grave dangers in embracing a "calculative" approach to
sustainability given that calculation methodologies might
problematically amplify instrumental and scientific solutions.58 °
Similarly, Power sees regulated accounting systems as extending
574 ASSOCIATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN BANKS,

SAVINGS BANKS

AND INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note

543, at 10.
575 See Christine Cooper, The Non and Nom of Accounting for (M)other Nature, 5
ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 16, 36 (1991); Rob Gray, Accounting and
Environmentalism: An Exploration of the Challenge of Gently Accounting for
Accountability, Transparencyand Sustainability, 17 ACCT. ORG. & Soc'Y 399, 415-16
(1992); Keith T. Maunders & Roger L. Burritt, Accounting and Ecological Crisis, 4
ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 9 (1991); Tom Mouck, Financial Reporting,
Democracy andEnvironmentalism: A Critique of the Commodification ofInformation, 6
CRIT. PERSP. ACCT. 535 (1995);

Michael Power, After Calculation? Reflections on

Critique of Economic Reason by Andre Gorz, 17 ACCT. ORG. & SOC'Y 477 (1992);
Michael Power, Auditing and Environmental Expertise: Between Protest and
Professionalism,4 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 30 (1991).
576

See Maunders & Burritt, supra note 575.

577 See Cooper, supra note 575.
578
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supra note 575, at 415-16.
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the colonization of society by technocrats at the expense of
creating spaces for the debating of fundamental values."'
However, by cautioning against regulation of environmental
accounting, these critiques tend to reinforce the status quo based
on voluntarism and market forces with respect to accounting
innovations. Whilst, obviously, environmentalism involves much
larger political and philosophical questions about corporations and
the market than financial reporting systems can ever convey, this
should not deny the contribution reporting and other information
tools can make to sustainable economies. Lehman, for example,
views corporate environmental accounting as much more than
information provision-to him it is a "moral discourse" that can
serve to "evaluate and explain data" and thereby promote a more
transparent and accountable system of corporate governance." 2
The challenge is to ensure that the reinvigoration of reporting
systems is framed by proper public debate and government
regulation rather than become a process monopolized and
neutralized by industry and accountancy bodies interested in
maintaining the status quo. The recent Enron scandal has
highlighted the grave risks corporate reporting systems face from
vested interests, and the consequential huge damage that
malfunctioning corporate governance can inflict on employees'
pension savings. 83
The whole process of environmental reporting is redundant if
it has no real effect on organizational behavior. The ultimate test
for the value of environmental reporting information is its effect
on decision-making. This, of course, can be difficult to measure.
.Perfunctory corporate environmental reporting is not the goal, but
rather reporting should serve as a basis for the formulation and
implementation of business environmental policy by management,
and as an information base for consultation with investors and
other corporate constituencies interested in its environmental
performance. Green accounting and reporting efforts also do not
simply have to be seen as instrumental regulatory compliance, but
581 See Power, 17 ACCT. ORG. & SOC'Y, supra note 575.
582 Glen Lehman, A Legitimate Concernfor EnvironmentalAccounting, 6 CRITICAL
PERSP. INACCT. 393, 408 (1995).
583 See Mitchell Pacelle, Enron Report Provides Details of Deals that Masked Debt,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A6.
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can be an element in a reflexive arena of review, negotiation, and
change. The actual process of collecting and assimilating
information can be just as important in shaping organizational
change as the very existence of the final report.
2. Regulating corporate environmental reporting
The proliferation of environmental reporting approaches has
encouraged governments to create standardized reporting formats
to enable comparison between firms. This has involved provision
of guidance on voluntary environmental reporting standards and,
less commonly, imposition of government specifications.584 In
recent years, for instance, environmental authorities in Australia,
Japan, and Finland have issued environmental disclosure and
reporting guidelines for businesses.585 The business sector remains
generally skeptical and even hostile to regulatory intervention on
environmental reporting, especially in mainstream company law
statutes, and has preferred retention of a voluntary approach. 86
Yet, pressure from financial regulators and environmental groups
has brought more formal regulatory solutions. Thus, in 2001, the
European Commission issued a recommendation on regulating
corporate environmental reporting.587
Traditionally, there has been scope indirectly to incorporate
environmental issues within the general company law disclosure
obligations to shareholders of material financial matters or capital
expenditure. However, environmental disclosure through financial
reporting has tended to stress pollution damage liabilities and
capital expenditure, with scant attention to provisioning for
potential liabilities, capitalizing on environmental assets,

584 See

U.N.

DEP'T OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, IMPROVING GOVERNMENTS'

ROLE IN THE PROMOTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING, REPORT OF THE
EXPERT WORKING GROUP MEETING, U.N. SALES No. E.00.II.A2 (2000) (analyzing

governments' role in environmental managerial accounting).
585 See,
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ENVIRONMENT
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A

(2001), http://www.ea.gov.au/
industry/sustainable/per/smehandbook.html.
586 T. Cannon, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: A TEXTBOOK ON BUSINESS ETHICS,
HANDBOOK FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES

GOVERNANCE, ENVIRONMENT: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 27 (1994).

587 Commission Recommendation (2001/453/EC) of May 30, 2001 on the
recognition, measurement, and disclosure of environmental issues in the annual accounts
and annual reports of companies, 2001 O.J. (L 156/33).
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accounting for intangible assets, and estimated pricing of
externalities. 8 Explicit reference to environmental matters in
regulation is rare. Among European nations, mandatory
environmental reporting has been instituted in various forms in the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.589 In the United
Kingdom, the Company Law Review Steering Group recently
proposed a new framework of statutory accounts and reports that
would cover environmental issues as part of the objective to widen
the scope of reporting to cover "the qualitative, or 'soft,' or
intangible, and forward looking information.""59 In Canada, the
Securities Commissions oblige public corporations to report the
current and anticipated financial or operational effects of
environmental protection requirements in an Annual Information
Form. 9' This complements other Canadian environmental
reporting systems such as the country's National Pollutant Release
Inventory, established in 1992, which requires businesses to report
on releases and transfers of many substances. 92
Sometimes the reporting requirements are contained within
environmental legislation rather than company law. Denmark's
environmental reporting rules, enacted in 1996 under the
Environmental Protection Act, 593 direct certain companies to
publish environmental reports (known as "green accounts") for
each production site.594 Legislation mandating environmental
reporting for specific categories of companies was also introduced
in 1998 in the Netherlands by an amendment to the Environmental
588

Delphi International Ltd., supra note 66, at 42.

589

KPMG, supra note 566, at 8.

590

U.K.,

COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
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181

(2000).
591

KPMG, supra note 566, at 8.

See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L. J. 257, 348
(2001) (finding that although its list of reported pollutants is shorter, Canada's NPRI
covers more industries and activities than the United States TRI).
593 Denmark Ministry of Environment and Energy, Statutory Order on Green
Accounts No. 975, Dec. 13, 1995, http://www.ecn.cz/rtk/DK-Green-Account2.htm.
594 Environmental Protection Act, § 35, discussed in Tareq Emtairah, Corporate
Environmental Reporting: Review of Policy Action in Europe, IIEE REPORT, Feb., 2002,
at 20, 22; see also P. Rikhardsson, Developments in Danish Environmental Reporting,
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Management Act of 1993." 9' There is, however, a risk that by
separating environmental information from so-called financial
information in reporting systems that the financial implications of
corporate environmental performance will be obfuscated.5 96
Although corporate financial reports are designed primarily to
report to regulators and investors on financial activities, they are
also one of the major sources of information used by a wide range
of users including environmental pressure groups.597 The
imperatives of diffusing environmental policy through economic
institutions arguably requires that environmental reporting
mechanisms be embedded in mainstream corporate governance so
that the links between environmental and market performance can
be readily analyzed.
But, the main problem for many governments has not been one
choosing
between environmental law or company legislation for
of
nesting environmental reporting requirements but the absence of
any regulatory stipulations for environmental reporting. The
industry preference for voluntary environmental reporting is partly
because of the additional costs of reporting requirements,
especially for small businesses, and the risk that disclosure could
expose a firm and its officers to prosecution where there is
evidence of non-compliance with regulations.598 There is also the
corporate fear that reporting on environmental performance will
place themselves under greater media and market scrutiny.599
These concerns, however, may be somewhat unjustified as
research suggests that enterprises with more extensive
environmental disclosures in their financial reports, prior to a
catastrophe with industry-wide implications, tend to face less
adverse market reactions than enterprises without such
disclosures.6"' It appears that investors construe more extensive

595 Emtairah, supra note 594, at 28-30.
596 Id.
597 Clare Roberts, Environmental Disclosures in Corporate Annual Reports in
Western Europe, in OWEN, supra note 231, at 139.
598 ECOMANAGEMENT:

THE ELMWOOD GUIDE TO ECOLOGICAL AUDITING AND

SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS 23 (Ernest Callenbach et al., 1993).
599 Id.
600 Walter Blacconiere & Dennis Patten, Environmental Disclosures, Regulatory

Costs and Changes in Firm Value, 18 J. ACCT. & ECON. 357, 372-73 (1994).
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disclosures as a positive signal of a firm's ability to manage its
exposure to changing regulatory burdens.6"'
Arguably the most comprehensive environmental disclosure
regime contained within financial services regulation is the United
States's Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting
requirements. The Securities Act of 1933602 and the Securities
Exchange

Act

of 193463

provide

a

structure

for market

SEC.60 4

supervision under the auspices of the
Under regulations
that arose in the early 1970s, the SEC's disclosure rules have
become both "more particular and more insistent about the need
for disclosure of environmental liabilities and obligations" by
registered companies.6 5 The principal vehicle for disclosure is the
annual 10-K filing statement, although environmental information
must also be communicated through the quarterly 10-Q form and
the 8-K form.606 The environmental disclosure requirements

operate at several levels. First, there are affirmative disclosure
duties under Regulation S-K, adopted by the SEC in 1982:607
environmental issues are contained in Item 101 (Description of
Business), 6 8 Item 103 (Legal Proceedings), 69 and Item 303
(Management's Discussion and Analysis of Finance and Results of
Operations).6"0 Central to the SEC's environmental disclosure
requirements is the concept of "materiality.'
Most critically,
section 101 obliges registrants to disclose "the material effects that
601

Id. at 375.
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605 Perry W. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under Securities
Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-BasedIncentives for Pollution Control, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1995); see also Elizabeth Geltman, Disclosure of
ContingentEnvironmental Liabilitiesby Public Companies Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 144 (1992).

606 The form 10-K is an annual report pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq.
607 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (1994).
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609 § 229.103.
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compliance" with government environmental regulations "may
have upon the capital expenditures, earnings, and competitive
position of the registrant and its subsidiaries."6 1
Whilst the SEC reporting rules facilitate access to
environmental cost estimates, criticisms have been made that the
estimates themselves may be unreliable as registrants may
experience difficulties in quantifying their potential environmental
liabilities, and there can be ambiguity defining the ambit of
'
"compliance costs."613
In evaluating reports, the Commission's
policy has been to rely on the accounting principles promulgated
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).614 The
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards issued by the Board
gives businesses significant discretion in determining liability
estimates, thereby potentially allowing firms to understate
environmental liabilities.6" 5 The SEC has on occasion intervened,
such as with the publication of an Interpretative Release in 1989,
giving guidance on disclosure of uncertainties and contingent,
future, material expenditures.616 In essence, the SEC states that
companies must disclose a known potentially material problem
unless it can determine that the event is unlikely to occur or, if it
does occur, the effects are unlikely to be material.617 An
independent study of 234 companies in twelve industries revealed
that, although there has been a significant increase in
environmental reporting since 1989, the overall quality of
environmental disclosures was low with high levels of quality
612

§ 229.101(c)(xiii).

613 Luis Martins et al., Assessing CorporateEnvironmental Performance, in CAPRA
& PAULI, supra note 99, at 65, 73.
614 See generally, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD HOMEPAGE at

http://www.fasb.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2002). Since 1973, the FASB has been the
designated organization in the private sector for establishing standards of financial
accounting and reporting in the United States. FASB FACTS at http://www.fasb.org/facts
(last visited Nov. 2, 2002).
615 FASB, ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 5 (1976); FASB, REASONABLE ESTIMATION OF THE
AMOUNT OF A LOSS: STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS

INTERPRETATION No.14 (1976).
616 MD&A Interpretative Release, 54 Fed. Reg. 22427, 22429 (May 24, 1989)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211,231,241,271).
617 See Maureen Crough, SEC Reporting Requirements: Environmental Issues,
ENVTL. CLAIMS J., Winter 1994/1995, at 41, 44.
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disclosure only in certain sectors. 618 The Enron scandal will
undoubtedly serve to further increase pressure on regulators to be
more vigilant in scrutinizing the quality of reported information.6 9
Registrants who violate the securities law also face onerous civil
or criminal statutory penalties, and security-holders can bring a
cause of action for loss arising out of material misstatements or
omissions.620

VI. Conclusion
Sharing environmental governance with institutional investors
encourages investors to favor environmentally sound companies
and to use their financial leverage to make corporate management
and policy more mindful of environmental resource use and
pollution concerns. Enlisting institutional investors as a
mechanism for sustainable development in capital markets raises
various complex issues of corporate governance, problems of
environmental valuation and reporting, and economic questions
concerning the behaviour of capital market systems. This Article
has emphasized the growing importance of ethical investment
strategies among institutional investors and the financial relevance
of environmental issues to corporate values. Whilst a number of
structural and legal barriers to institutional activism have been
identified, there also exist some possible regulatory and policy
solutions, ranging from reforms of corporate governance and
financial services regulation to complementary reforms involving
the use of economic instruments and corporate environmental
management systems.
One reform area of considerable potential highlighted by this
Article is corporate accounting and reporting. The pioneering
work of the United States's Securities and Exchange Commission
in corporate environmental reporting marks a shift in this aspect of
company law from the private law domain into the public law
realm. Through improved environmental accounting and auditing,
corporate environmental performance can be better verified and
information effectively communicated to capital markets, which in
618 G.O. Gamble & K. Hsu, Environmental Auditing-United States, 9 ACCT.
HORIZONS 34 (1995).

619 Bush Sign "EnronBill" into Law, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT 5 (2002).
620. Crough, supra note 617, at 49.
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turn can create financial incentives for performance
improvements. If environmental audits and reports are to be
meaningful, it is essential that they reflect an enterprise's full
range of operations, including relationships with subsidiaries and
franchise networks that may otherwise be exploited by the parent
company to disguise its overall environmental impacts. Extension
of auditing and reporting requirements to financial institutions is
also vital, as this will encourage greater reflection and possibly
decision-making adjustments in light of the revealed
environmental impacts. The revisions to the E.U.'s EMAS
Regulation to incorporate the financial services sector is a
landmark reform that will be important in coming years to monitor
how investors and other financial entities respond.
Procedural reforms that stimulate greater reflection and
understanding of the relevance of environmental conditions among
investors are crucial to providing a means of integrating economic
and environmental policy in the spirit of sustainable development.
Recent reforms in Europe and Australia on disclosure of ethical
investment policies are beginning to provide a regulatory
framework for such activities. In turn, institutional investors can
become a mechanism for diffusing environmental awareness in
general market activity. Future detailed empirical research will be
necessary to assess how investment institutions respond to ethical
investment policy disclosure obligations, specifically whether such
obligations lead to more ethical investment. Similarly, as
governments increasingly adopt economic instruments as a means
of environmental policy, empirical research is needed on how such
reforms influence the investment community. It would also be
useful to investigate the possible differences in the environmental
responsiveness of each investment sector, such as pension funds
and life insurance companies.
This Article has given examples of initiatives in various
countries to extend environmental policy into the institutional
investment community and financial markets generally. However,
extensive and systematic practice in this area is obviously not yet
occurring and may be some years away. The development of more
shared environmental governance with financial organizations will
depend on several conditions. Well-developed financial markets
and the presence of rigorous financial regulatory structures that
address problems of information disclosure and risk management
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are essential because they provide a framework onto which
environmental concerns, such as pollution liabilities and
environmental costs, can be effectively grafted. Second, the
presence of specialist financial institutions that cater to niche
markets, such as ethical investment funds, can provide a platform
of experience and knowledge to feed more mainstream changes in
this sector. The most advanced reforms have tended to occur in
countries with a history of such specialist institutions, such as the
United Kingdom's Social Investment Forum. Third, the
performance of traditional environmental law systems is
important. Countries with a long history of environmental
regulation with well-developed systems, such as the United
Kingdom and Australia, are more likely to be aware of the pitfalls
and limitations of current approaches and the concomitant need to
explore new styles of environmental governance in order to
promote sustainability. Fourthly, the prospects of reform will also
be shaped by the growing transnational character of the financial
services sector. The globalization of banking and investment
services is reducing the power of states individually to regulate
financial institutions. If regional or global regimes can be
developed that place environmental obligations on all investors
and other financial service providers, then the conditions for
domestic reforms in this direction will improve.
In conclusion, it is important to realize that institutional
investors and other financial institutions will only be a part of the
environmental regulation process. Even with the reforms outlined
in this Article, institutional investors clearly lack the
environmental expertise to become intimately involved in shaping
corporate environmental performance. Further, merely aggregating
the preferences of investors through the market is not an
appropriate means for determining society's overall environmental
goals. The effective utilization of investors and capital markets in
ultimately on the
depends
environmental governance
establishment of proper strategies for sustainable development and
a regulatory framework for translating such strategies into
economic decision-making systems. Such standards and goals will
likely be communicated, in part, through existing government
financial regulators, whereby environmental considerations are
integrated into the web of prudential regulation.

